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Abstract
Since the late 90's side-channel attacks have been a threat for cryptographic
implementations. They use observations of physical features of a device while it
computes cryptographic algorithms. These leakages can give information about
the key. A common countermeasure against such attacks is masking. The main
idea of masking is to randomize the internal state. In consequence an adversary
must combine of several leakages to mount the attack. Masking schemes have
an impact on the efficiency of the implementations. In this thesis, we explore
different solutions to improve the efficiency of masking implementations. Firstly,
we explore solutions for masking implementations for the AES. We investigate
the use of amortization technique to reduce the cost of polynomial masking. We
also propose a new way to combine Boolean secure multiplications to reduce the
cost of masking. Next, we focus on the assumptions used for proofs of masking.
We show that the use of low entropy masking schemes can ...
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Abstract
Since the late 90’s side-channel attacks have been a threat for crypto-
graphic implementations. They use observations of physical features of a
device while it computes cryptographic algorithms. These leakages can
give information about the key. A common countermeasure against such
attacks is masking. The main idea of masking is to randomize the inter-
nal state. In consequence an adversary must combine of several leakages
to mount the attack. Masking schemes have an impact on the efficiency
of the implementations. In this thesis, we explore different solutions to
improve the efficiency of masking implementations. Firstly, we explore
solutions for masking implementations for the AES. We investigate the
use of amortization technique to reduce the cost of polynomial masking.
We also propose a new way to combine Boolean secure multiplications
to reduce the cost of masking. Next, we focus on the assumptions used
for proofs of masking. We show that the use of low entropy masking
schemes can be risky. We also show how to convert proofs in the prob-
ing model into proofs in the transition based model. Then, we propose
several easier-to-build strategies for masking block ciphers. We present
three block ciphers. Finally, we focus on leakage resilience and com-
pare the security that can be obtained by using either leakage-resilient
construction, masking or their combination.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Scope and motivation
The secret communication between legitimate participants has always
been an issue. Cryptography aims to study how such communications
can be performed. Since the past century, the use of cryptography has
been developing. Starting from the state of being an art practiced by
diplomats and military commanders it has now become a tool used daily
by common people. During this period of time the related fields have
moved from languages and mathematics to computer science, microelec-
tronics, telecommunications and mathematics.
Nowadays, more and more information is exchanged with the devel-
opment of the internet and mobile telecommunications. Hence, a lot of
information must be stored in different devices such as computers, smart
phones, but also smart cards, smart car keys or passports. This stored
information can reveal personal information. It must thus be secured.
Block ciphers represent an important component of the various so-
lutions offered by cryptography. They can be used for encryption (us-
ing a secret key shared by the legitimate participants) or for building
other cryptographic mechanisms such as hash functions, for more de-
tails see [108]. Block ciphers can be deployed on low-cost devices, which
may imply strong implementation constraints. In those cases, design-
ing ciphers with small memory, energy and cost are required. This
opens a new direction of research for lightweight cryptography (e.g.
NOEKEON [49], PRESENT [26], PRINCE [27], LED [88]). Block ci-
phers are usually assumed to be secure in the black box model. In this
model the adversary has only access to the inputs and outputs of the
algorithms.
Since cryptography is executed by devices, we should not only pay
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attention to the security of the algorithm in the black box model. We
should also take care of the physical security of the algorithm implemen-
tation. The idea behind side-channel attacks is to measure the physical
features of a device while it computes a cryptographic algorithm and
use this additional information to perform an attack. In the late 90’s
Kocher et al. showed how to exploit power consumption of a device
to obtain side-channel information [114]. Since then, several attacks
have appeared in the literature. These attacks can use different dis-
tinguishers, e.g. correlation coefficient [30], mutual information [76], or
Gaussian templates [38]. They can also use different physical features,
e.g. electromagnetic radiation [158], sound [7], or temperature [93].
Numerous countermeasures have been presented to limit the damage
caused by side-channel attacks. Some techniques aim at increasing the
noise, e.g. random delay interruption [43] or shuﬄing [188]. Other tech-
niques aim at randomizing the internal state. In this case, the leakages of
basic computations are independent of the secret. Masking schemes [94]
belong to this family of countermeasures.
Intuitively, masking splits the internal state into several shares. It
is expected to “force” the adversary to combine several leakage sam-
ples corresponding to these shares in order to recover secret information
from her measurement traces. It implies an increase of the attack data
complexity that is exponential in the number of shares (with the mea-
surement noise variance as a basis). It was first hinted in the specialized
case of single-bit DPA attacks [37], then experimented in more general
contexts [182], and recently showed formally [60, 61, 154].
This thesis mainly deals with protection of software implementation
of block ciphers with masking. Like for every protection, there is a
trade-off between performance and security. The performance criteria
are the computational speed and the quantity of randomness required.
The security proofs require a minimum noise level, a source of uniform
randomness and that each leakage dependent on one share at most.
1.2 Outline and main contributions
Masking of the AES
In Part I, we evaluate the efficiency of different techniques to mask the
AES.
In Chapter 3, we evaluate the efficiency of state of the art higher-
order masking schemes for the AES on an Atmel microcontroller. We
show that specialized masking schemes are more efficient than general
solutions. More precisely, we obtain better results for Boolean mask-
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ing [73, 105, 169], which provides “only” security in the probing model
(where the adversary can observe a number of operations in the im-
plementation) , than for polynomial masking [156], which in addition
provides security in the presence of glitches (that are physical effects
breaking the independence requirement of masking). We explore the
possibility of using some amortization technique from multi-party com-
putation (MPC) [70] to reduce the cost. We obtain a quasi-linear com-
plexity of the polynomial masking in function of the security order.
In Chapter 4, we focus on the combination of secure multiplications
from [169] and [45] in order to obtain a better representation of the S-
boxes. We show an addition chain for the AES S-box that allows us to be
more efficient than previous techniques. The representations obtained
are specific to the cost observed for the two secure multiplications and
our device. Nevertheless, our counting method can be used to reduce
the costs on other platforms, with different operations available .
Proof assumption errors
In Part II, we analyze the security of certain masking schemes when the
hypotheses of the proofs are not fulfilled.
In Chapter 5, we focus on the security of low entropy masking sche-
mes [20, 35, 120, 138]. The security proofs assume that the leakage
functions are linear. We evaluate the security of such constructions
when this hypothesis is not fulfilled. In this case, we show that the
security of the low entropy masking schemes is not guaranteed anymore.
In Chapter 6, we focus on the memory transition leakages [42]. In
that case, the leakage function can be dependent on 2 shares. We show
that proofs carried out in a so-called value-based probing model (in
which the proofs for masking are generally performed) can be translated
into a transition-based probing model, at the cost of a division by 2 of
the security order.
Block cipher design
In Part III, we consider building block ciphers that are designed with
the constraint of being easily masked. We explore two directions for this
purpose.
• The first direction aims at finding new S-boxes with efficient rep-
resentation for masking.
• The second direction aims at limiting the number of S-boxes exe-
cuted.
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In Chapter 7, we focus on ciphers for masking in general (polynomial
and Boolean). For the S-box, we consider S-boxes with multiplications
on small fields. In order to minimize the number of S-boxes per round,
we consider partial substitution layer. We describe a new block cipher,
Zorro, that combines these two ideas in order to further reduce the
total complexity corresponding to non-linear operations in the cipher.
Zorro leads to performance gains for small security orders compared to
the AES. It has been shown meanwhile that partial substitution layers
are hard to design and lead to risky designs. See the cryptanalysis of
full Zorro in [192, 117], the discussion in [11], and the more recent
attempts in [5, 58]. While these further works lead to many interesting
open problems, they also motivated us to investigate a second, more
conservative, approach.
In Chapter 8, we focus on ciphers for Boolean masking. In this
view, we studied bitsliced ciphers. Indeed, Boolean masking of an AND
gate is efficient [94]. Hence, building a cipher with an efficient bitslice
representation is an advantage for Boolean masked implementation. We
try to gain benefit from the constructions that use smaller S-boxes to
build larger S-boxes, as in MISTY [130]. For the small (4-bit) S-box
we look at the exhaustive search for bitslice decomposition presented
in [186]. For the linear diffusion part, we try to take advantage of table
representation. We describe two new block ciphers Robin and Fantomas
that lead to performance gains for Boolean masking compared to the
AES and Zorro.
Leakage resilience
In Part IV, we finally consider the security bounded by the computa-
tional power and not by the number of traces.
In Chapter 9, we compare the security of masking schemes and re-
keying (a.k.a. leakage resilience). For this purpose, we divided our study
in two parts according to the kind of primitives we want to evaluate.
For stateful constructions, the re-keying techniques allow us to obtain
computational bounded security, while masking reduces the quantity of
information leaked by an execution. Re-keying alone is more efficient
than a combination of re-keying and masking (that can be necessary
when high security levels are required).
For stateless constructions, the adversary is limited on the number of
plaintexts she can observe. However, she can observe the computation
of the same plaintext several times. The noise can thus be averaged and,
as a consequence, computational bounded security cannot be achieved.
We show that the tweaked PRF from [133] can reach computational
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bounded security under the assumption that the leakages of different
subkeys are leaked at the same time (which implies a parallel hard-
ware implementation). In chapter 10, we study the transposition of the
tweaked PRF to software implementation by mixing it with shuﬄing.
Here, the additional assumption on the leakage functions is that they
should be similar for all resources. Concretely, we manage to obtain a
security with a small bound on the computational power in the context
of an implementation on an 8-bit device.

Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Block ciphers
2.1.1 General description
A block cipher is a pair of functions. The first element of the pair
is called the encryption function, denoted by Enc and the second is
called the decryption function, denoted by Dec. Each pair of functions
is parametrized by a key k of fixed length κ. Enc and Dec operate
on messages of fixed length η, called blocks. The two functions1 Enc :
Fκ2×Fη2 → Fη2 and Dec : Fκ2×Fη2 → Fη2 verify ∀k ∈ Fκ2 ,Dec(k, Enc(k, .)) =
Idη(.), where Idη : Fη2 → Fη2;x 7→ x is the identical function. Block
ciphers belong to symmetric key cryptography since the key used for
the encryption and decryption process is the same, and must be kept
secret to preserve security. These processes are represented in Figure 2.1.
Plaintext Enc Ciphertext
Key
Dec Plaintext
Figure 2.1: Illustration of a block cipher encryption/decryption.
Concretely, a block cipher family therefore corresponds to a family
of 2κ permutations over Fη2 (denoted BC), and their inverses. Their
functions aim to emulate the behavior of a random permutation. More
1We note the alphabet as F2, since most block ciphers consider this alphabet, but
it can be larger.
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formally, a secure block cipher is a Pseudo-Random Permutation (PRP),
in the sense that it cannot be distinguished from a random permutation
by any polynomial time adversary, with a probability non negligibly
higher than 12 (for more details, see for example [102]). Proving that a
block cipher family is a set of PRP could be difficult.
A relaxed security notion of ciphers is given by Shannon: “In a
strongly ideal cipher, all statistics of the cryptogram are independent of
the particular key used” [177]. This leads to the two main rules of block
cipher designers: diffusion and confusion [108].
• The goal of confusion is to make the relation between the plaintext
and the ciphertext as complex as possible.
• The goal of diffusion is to make a bit of the ciphertext dependent
of as many bits of the plaintext and the key as possible.
To construct an efficient algorithm, these two properties are gener-
ally combined to instantiate the cipher building blocks. This part is
then iterated. Such constructions are named iterated block cipher. A
representation of such a construction is given in Figure 2.2. An atomic
block of operations (R) is named a round. Each round Ri takes as input
the state and the round key ki and outputs the updated state. Round
keys are derived from the master key k according to a key scheduling
algorithm.
p
k Key scheduling
R0 R1 . . . Rr−1 c
k0 k1 kr−1
Figure 2.2: Illustration of an iterated encryption block cipher.
The two main families of iterated block ciphers are Feistel Networks
and Substitution Permutation Networks (SPN) family. Both construc-
tions are described in the next two subsections.
2.1.2 Feistel networks
Feistel networks, named after Horst Feistel, separate input bits into two
equal parts left l and right r. A round is represented in Figure 2.3. The
left part goes through a function Fi that depends on the round key ki,
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and the output is then XORed with the right part, i.e.
Ri : F
η
2
2 × F
η
2
2 × Fκ2 → F
η
2
2 × F
η
2
2
(li, ri, ki) 7→ (li+1, ri+1) = (ri ⊕ Fi(ki, li), li).
li
Fi
ki
⊕
ri
ri+1li+1
Figure 2.3: Illustration of a Feistel round.
Feistel networks has the advantage of using any function Fi, the
bijection comes from the crossing of the two parts. The input of the
round function li becomes ri+1, hence the inverse of the round can be
computed. In particular, it turns a pseudo-random function into a PRP
with four rounds [119]. Their implementations of encryption and de-
cryption are generally among the smallest.
Generalized Feistel networks use more than two branches, i.e. the
input is separated in more than two parts, or with no equal sizes.
For example, Feistel networks are used for ciphers as the Data En-
cryption Standard (DES) [184] and PICARO [149].
2.1.3 Substitution permutation networks
Substitution Permutation Networks (SPN) are the second family of block
ciphers. The structure of SPN is simple, hence the cipher description
is simple. They are composed of three phases of SPN schematized in
Figure 2.4.
• Key addition: it consists in XORing the round key and the state.
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• Substitution: it is the non-linear part of the cipher. Generally it
consists in applying a table2 to each word (a fixed number of bits)
of the state. The aim of this phase is to add confusion to the
cipher.
• Permutation: it is (usually) a linear layer that propagates some
bits of the state to all the other bits. While the word “permuta-
tion” seems to imply that this phase performs a bit permutation
(i.e. a wire-crossing), we keep the designation for more complex
relations between the bits. This phase aims to diffuse the bits of
the plaintext and the key among the ciphertext.
statei
ADD round Key
Substitution layer
Permutation layer
statei+1
Permutation layer
ADD round Key
...
...
KS
Figure 2.4: Illustration of an SPN round.
Unlike Feistel networks, the decryption of an SPN is generally dif-
ferent than the encryption process. Hence, it generally requires us to
compute the inverse of each function. The implementation of the de-
cryption requires similar space as the encryption.
Ciphers classified in this family are for example NOEKEON [49], the
AES [1] and PRESENT [26].
2Using a look-up table allows calculating functions with high algebraic degree in
a few cycles.
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2.1.4 Advanced Encryption Standard
The AES is the current standard private key block cipher. It was selected
from a competition to replace the DES. For that reason, it is often
considered as a case study for side-channel protection. It belongs to
the SPN family. In its standardized form, it operates on blocks of 128
bits and can have a key of sizes: 128, 192 or 256 bits. The number of
rounds depends on the key size, 10 for 128-bit keys, 12 for 192-bit keys
and 14 for 256-bit keys. The state of the cipher is organized in a 4 × 4
matrix of elements of F28 . A round is composed of four transformations
represented in Figure 2.5.
• SubBytes is the substitution part of the cipher. It consists in the
inversion in the Galois field F82, plus a linear transformation.
• ShiftRows is the first permutation operation. It rotates the second
row by 1 to the left, the third by 2 and the fourth by 1 to the right.
• MixColumns is the second permutation operation. It is a matrix
multiplication of the state with a (Maximum Distance Separable)
MDS matrix.
• AddRoundKey is the key addition operation. It adds a round key
that is produced from the master key according to a key scheduling
to the state.
State
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
SubBytes ShiftRows MixColumns AddRoundKey
Round Key
Figure 2.5: Illustration of an AES round.
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2.1.5 Cryptanalytic properties for S-boxes
The S-box is an important component of a cipher as it generally brings
the confusion property. This subsection briefly summarizes the main
cryptographic properties that an S-box must fullfil. In particular, we re-
call some tools used for evaluating the resistance of S-boxes against lin-
ear, differential and algebraic attacks. Such tools are based on Boolean
functions theory. For this purpose, we consider an S-box as a vector
of Boolean functions S = (f0, . . . , fn−1), fi : F2n → F2. For x ∈ Fn2
and u ∈ Fn2 , the notation xu stands for the product
∏n−1
i=0 x
ui
i , with
the convention 00 = 1. We will denote by #A the cardinality of a
set A and by 〈a, b〉 the dot product between two elements a, b ∈ Fn2 :
〈a, b〉 = ∑n−1i=0 aibi.
Non-linearity.
Linear cryptanalysis is one of the most investigated attacks against
block ciphers [128]. To prevent it, the target algorithm must present
a high non-linearity (usually coming from the S-box characteristics).
The Walsh transform can be used to evaluate the correlation of a linear
approximation (a, b) 6= (0, 0).
Definition 2.1.1. Walsh transform of a vectorial Boolean function S:
WS(a, b) :=
∑
x∈F2n
(−1)〈a,x〉+〈b,S(x)〉.
Definition 2.1.2. Walsh spectrum of a vectorial Boolean function S:
ΩS = {WS(a, b)|a, b ∈ F2n , (a, b) 6= (0, 0)}.
The smaller is max(ΩS), the stronger is the S-box regarding linear
cryptanalysis. In particular, a value max(ΩS) for the Walsh spectrum
of S implies that its best linear approximation has probability Prlin =
max(ΩS)
2n .
Differential profile.
The second well-known family of statistical attacks is differential crypt-
analysis [22]. As for linear cryptanalysis, we consider all non-zero dif-
ferentials and their probabilities (up to a factor 2−n).
Definition 2.1.3. Differential spectrum of a vectorial Boolean function
S:
∆S = {#{X|S(X + a) = S(X) + b}|a, b ∈ F2n , (a, b) 6= (0, 0)}.
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The smaller is max(∆S), the stronger is the S-box regarding dif-
ferential cryptanalysis. In particular, a value max(∆S) for the differ-
ential spectrum of S implies that its best differential has probability
Prdiff =
max(∆S)
2n .
If max(∆S) = d, the S-box is said to be differentially d-uniform.
Algebraic degree.
Although the tools for analyzing algebraic attacks are not as advanced
as for linear and differential attacks, the algebraic degree is generally
considered as a good indicator of security. Moreover, having a non-
maximal algebraic degree allows distinguishing a function from a random
one. For any Boolean function, the algebraic degree can be defined as
follows using its Algebraic Normal Form (ANF).
Definition 2.1.4. Algebraic normal form of a boolean function f . A
Boolean function f can be uniquely represented using its ANF:
f(x) =
∑
u∈Fn2
aux
u.
Definition 2.1.5. Algebraic degree of a boolean function f . The alge-
braic degree of f is defined as:
deg(f) = max
u∈Fn2
{Hw(u), au 6= 0} ,
where Hw denotes the Hamming weight function.
Definition 2.1.6. Algebraic degree of a vectorial Boolean function S.
The algebraic degree of a vectorial Boolean function, S = (f0, . . . , fn−1),
is defined as the maximum degree of its coordinates:
deg(S) = max
0≤i<n
deg(fi).
2.1.6 Implementations
Even if some ciphers as Noekeon are “so clean and simple that they
can be memorized by an average person” [49], the encryption must be
performed by a device. Two main families of implementations exist.
• Hardware implementations build circuits by assembling logic gates.
Generally, it leads to an efficient and optimized implementation of
one function. The development of a hardware implementation is
long and expensive.
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• Software implementations use an integrated circuit that can ma-
nipulate information according to a sequence of instructions. Hen-
ce, the circuit can be programed by a user, i.e. following a sequence
of instructions in order to execute a large range of functions.
In the rest of this thesis, we mostly deal with secure implementations
of block ciphers in software.
2.2 Side-channel attacks
Generally, the security proofs of cryptographic primitives are done in
the black box model, i.e. the adversary only accesses the input and/or
the output of the computation. In Side-Channel Attacks (SCA), the
adversary can, in addition, observe the device while it executes the op-
erations. Such physical attacks have been known since the 90’s [6, 113].
Hence, it is not the primitive that is attacked, but its implementation.
While an electronic device computes an algorithm, several physi-
cal observables are emitted (e.g. time [113], power consumption [114],
electromagnetic radiations [158]). These physical observables can be de-
pendent on the data processed by the algorithm. For a cryptographic
algorithm, it may depend on the secret key. In the rest of the the-
sis, we focus on power consumption leakage. The efficiency of a side
channel attack is generally measured by its measurement complexity,
i.e. the amount of physical leakage required to recover the secret key.
Side-channel attacks are practical attacks, they generally executed on
common desktop computer, hence the time and memory required to
mount an attack is generally constrained.
2.2.1 Power traces
Power traces can be monitored by an oscilloscope connected to the power
supply of the device. A trace l can be modeled as a deterministic part (d)
that depends on the data processed, the operation performed and the
resources used and a probabilistic (a.k.a. noisy) part N :
l(t) = d(t) +N.
Generally N is assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution.
An example of power trace of a full AES execution without key
scheduling is represented in Figure 2.6. This trace comes from the
open source AES FURIOUS implementation3 executed on an AVR AT-
MEGA644p microcontroller.
3http://point-at-infinity.org/avraes
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Figure 2.6: Full AES leakage trace.
In some of the side-channel attacks difference between several execu-
tions are used to discriminate the key. Such attacks are called Differen-
tial Power Analysis (DPA) [114]. This thesis is mostly about protection
against DPA.
2.2.2 General description
The majority of SCA are based on divide-and-conquer strategy, i.e. use
a leakage about a part of the state and perform an exhaustive search on
that part. SCA generally work in three phases described in Figure 2.7.
• Prediction. For each possible subkey the adversary predicts the
possible internal state, according to the public inputs.
• Modeling. Next, the adversary models the expected observation for
each prediction, i.e. the output of the estimated leakage function.
• Comparison. Finally, the adversary compares the different models
to the leakages, and assigns a score to each of the possible subkey.
During the prediction phase, an enumeration among all the possible
cases is performed. Hence, the set of possible values must be efficiently
enumerable. In practice, the size of the subkeys is four or eight bits.
DPA attacks can be classified according three main criteria: profiled
vs. non profiled, univariate vs multivariate and the order.
• In a profiled attack scenario, the adversary can perform a learning
phase before the attack. During this learning phase, she has access
to a device with similar properties as the devices she will attack,
and can modify the parameters of the implementation. In a non-
profiled attack, this learning phase does not exist. Hence, the
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xi
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k∗i
S-box y∗i
predict
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S-box yi
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leak(yi)
k∗i
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ki
leak
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distinguisher
ki
?
= k∗i
adversary
device
Figure 2.7: Description of a DPA attack.
profiled case generally provides better results at the cost of a more
important capability of the adversary.
• In a univariate attack the adversary considers only one point in
time in the traces for the attack. In a multivariate attack, she uses
at least two different points in the traces.
• The order of the attack is the smallest statistical moment of the
leakage distribution that is exploited by the attack. If the sensitive
data is unprotected, then the information usually lies in in the
mean (i.e. the first moment). When an attack is based on a
higher -order moment, we refer to it as a d-th order attack, where
d refers to the order of the moment. The security order of an
implementation is the higher d such that the d-th statical moment
that is independent of the sensitive data.
Any intermediate substate that depend on a part of a key and the
inputs could be used to mount an attack. Such intermediate substate
are usually called sensitive or secret data.
2.2.3 Template attacks
Template Attacks (TA) are the most effective SCA in a theoretic sen-
se [38]. They belong to profiled attacks and can be used in univariate
or in multivariate settings. In multivariate settings, they can capture
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a large range of statistical moments. When the profiling phase allows
recovering the leakage function, they exploit all the information on the
selected points.
During the learning phase the adversary builds a leakage model,
usually denoted as templates, that corresponds to the estimation of the
probability density function corresponding to each possible value of a
target internal state. The probability density function can be of any
form, usually they are captured by Gaussian functions or mixture of
Gaussian function. For example, if we assume that the leakage function
is composed of a fixed part and a Gaussian noise, Gaussian template
can be built by estimating the mean and the variance of the leakage
of each intermediate value x. We denote the (estimated) mean of the
intermediate value x by µˆx and its variance by σˆx.
Then, during the attack phase, for each trace l, she can estimate the
likelihood to observe this leakage at time t for each x as:
Pˆr[l(t)|x] ∼ N (µˆx, σˆx),
where N (µˆx, σˆx) stands for the Gaussian distribution of mean µˆx and
variance σˆx.
For standard DPA, we typically attack the intermediate value zi =
S(pi ⊕ ki), with pi the subplaintext that is known and ki the secret
subkey. Hence the adversary can easily estimate the likelihood for each
subkey candidate k∗i by using Bayes theorem:
Pˆr[k∗i ] =
∏
j
Pˆr[k∗i |p, lj(ti)].
Where ti is the vector of the points of interest (POI) of the i-th
subkey and lj is the j-th leakage trace.
As for all divide and conquer attacks, attacks must be performed for
all the subkeys of the key and then combined to recover the master key.
2.2.4 Perceived information
The Perceived Information (PI) aims to capture the leakage quality in a
worst-case scenario. This implies computing the following information
theoretic metric:
PI(S;Ls) = H[S]−
∑
s∈S
Pr[s]
∑
ls∈L
Pr
chip
[ls|s] · log2 Pr
model
[s|ls],
In this thesis, the distribution of the chip is captured generally by a
Gaussian in univariate case and a mixture of Gaussian in multivariate
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setting. Following the discussion in [165] and when we are considering
simulated experiments, the probability distributions Prchip and Prmodel
will be identical, this implies that the PI will be identical to the (clas-
sical) Mutual Information (MI) in most cases. By plotting the MI/PI
metrics in function of the noise variance, we can directly obtain intu-
ition about the order of leakage, which simply corresponds to the slope
of these curves [182].
2.3 Masking
Masking is one of the frequently considered solutions to enforce resis-
tance against side-channel [37, 83]. The main idea is to randomize the
internal state in such a way that the observation of a limited number of
points will not leak information about the secret key. To this end, the
secret data are shared, following more or less standard secret sharing
techniques [118, 176], and computations are done on the shares. If the
leakages on the shares are independent, then an adversary must combine
the leakages of different shares and hence she must estimate a higher-
order moment of the leakage distribution. The attack requires thus more
traces. The number of traces actually increases exponentially with the
number of shares and with the noise as basis [37, 154, 182].
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Figure 2.8: Illustration of a masking scheme.
2.3. Masking 19
2.3.1 General description
A secret sharing scheme is composed of two algorithms Open and Share.
In its basic form, the secret sharing allows storing some secret among dif-
ferent participants, this secret can be recover only if a minimal number
of people wants to recover the secret. It depends on two main param-
eters: the total number of shares and the number of shares required to
reveal the secret.
Secret sharing is also convenient in Multi-Party Computation (MPC)
protocol where the private information must be spread among the partic-
ipants, and computation should be performed while preserving privacy.
Generally, MPC protocols must stay secure even if some participants are
malicious. In masking, all participants are honest, hence more efficient
implementation can be obtained. In particular, the number of shares
and the minimum number of shares required to recover the secret are
equal.
One easy way to share a secret s among d + 1 people is to pick d
random value {si}di=1 and then compute s0, such that for a function
f, f(s0, . . . , sd) = s. For example, we can use for f the Boolean XOR [94],
the interpolation [176], the field multiplication [73], the arithmetic ad-
dition [81] or the inner product [10].
2.3.2 Boolean masking
To mask a sensitive value s, with a d-order Boolean masking, d random
values {si}di=1 are drawn uniformly and the last share is computed as
s0 = s⊕ s1⊕ · · · ⊕ sd. From this definition, it is easy to see that any set
of d si is independent of s. The pseudo-code of Boolean sharing is given
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Boolean sharing ∈ F2n .
Require: Sensitive value s, an order d.
Ensure: Shares si such that s = s0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sd.
1: s0 ← s
2: for i from 1 to d do
3: si ∈R F2n
4: s0 ← s0 ⊕ si
5: end for
6: return (s0, ..., sd)
The gadget to open a sharing (i.e. to reveal the sensitive value) is
described in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 Opening a Boolean sharing.
Require: Shares si such that s = s0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sd, an order d.
Ensure: Sensitive value s.
1: for i from 1 to d do
2: s0 ← s0 ⊕ si
3: end for
4: return s0
Once the sensitive values are shared, the objective is to perform com-
putations on these shared values such that the opening of the computed
shares will be the same as the computation on the sensitive data.
A first proposal in masking was proposed by Ishai et al. [94], next
denoted as the ISW scheme. In their paper, they first remark that
any Boolean circuit can be represented by a succession of AND and
NOT gates.
NOT gates can be easily implemented on Boolean shares. The de-
scription is given in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 NOT gates on shares.
Require: Shares si such that s = s0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sd, an order d.
Ensure: Shares si such that NOT(s) = s0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sd.
1: s0 ← NOT(s0)
2: return (s0, . . . , sd)
The trickiest part is to perform an AND gate without revealing in-
formation about the sensitive data. For that, Ishai et al. proposed a
solution that performs the AND between each pair of shares and adds
some randomness in order to keep the security order. The solution is
described in Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 4 AND of two masked secrets ∈ F2.
Require: Shares xi and yi such that x = x0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xd and y = y0 ⊕
· · · ⊕ yd, an order d.
Ensure: Shares wi such that AND(x, y) = w = w0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ wd.
1: for i from 0 to d do
2: for j from i+ 1 to d do
3: ri,j ∈R F2
4: rj,i ← (ri,j ⊕ AND(xi, yj))⊕ AND(xj , yi)
5: end for
6: end for
7: for i from 0 to d do
8: wi ← AND(xi, yi)
9: for j from 0 to d, j 6= i do
10: wi ← wi ⊕ ri,j
11: end for
12: end for
13: return (w0, ..., wd)
In [94], the authors also introduce the probing model that can be
used to prove that an adversary observing at most d wires of the circuit
will obtain no information about the sensitive data.
While the ISW scheme is the first effective masking scheme to be
secure against higher-order attacks, it suffers from efficiency issues for
implementation of the AES in software. Actually, they suggest a solution
for Boolean circuit that they decomposed in AND NOT gate circuit that
leads to large overhead as the AES representation .
In 2010, Rivain and Prouff [169] presented an efficient version of
ISW scheme for the AES (next denoted as RivP). The main benefit in
efficiency for this scheme comes from the fact that they consider circuits
on an extension of F2. This can be achieved for any kind of function,
indeed in our case any function can be describe by a polynomial [36, 172].
They propose then to replace the ANDs by field multiplication and use
efficient evaluation of F2-linear functions (which consist in evaluating
the function over each share, see Algorithm 5).
Algorithm 5 Secure evaluation of a F2-linear function g.
Require: Shares (xi)i satisfying ⊕ixi = x.
Ensure: Shares (yi)i satisfying ⊕iyi = g(x).
1: for i from 0 to d do
2: yi ← g(xi)
3: end for
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The solution for field multiplication is described in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 Multiplication of two masked secrets ∈ F2n .
Require: Shares xi and yi such that x = xd ⊕ · · · ⊕ x0 and y = yd ⊕
· · · ⊕ y0.
Ensure: Shares wi such that xy = w = wd ⊕ · · · ⊕ w0.
1: for i from 0 to d do
2: for j from i+ 1 to d do
3: ri,j ∈R F2n
4: rj,i ← (ri,j ⊕ xi × yj)⊕ xj × yi
5: end for
6: end for
7: for i from 0 to d do
8: wi ← xi × yi
9: for j from 0 to d, j 6= i do
10: wi ← wi ⊕ ri,j
11: end for
12: end for
13: return (wd, ..., w0)
However, an additional constraint comes with that technique. Name-
ly, the first sharing input of the multiplication gadget must be indepen-
dent of the second one. They propose to achieve this constraint by using
a refresh gadget that transforms a sharing into a new sharing with some
randomness.
Later Coron et al. [45] found a flaw in the scheme of Rivain and
Prouff. This flaw comes from the composition of different gadgets that
lead to an exploitable lower order attack. It exploits leakages from the
refresh gadget and a secure multiplication. To avoid this flaw, they
suggest using Algorithm 7 instead of a succession of a refreshing and
a secure multiplication (Algorithm 6). This method is next denoted as
CPRR. We also refer this technique to bilinear multiplication.
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Algorithm 7 Secure evaluation of a product of h(x) = x× g(x).
Require: shares (xi)i satisfying ⊕ixi = x.
Ensure: shares (yi)i satisfying ⊕iyi = h(x).
1: for i from 0 to d do
2: for j from i+ 1 to d do
3: ri,j ∈R F2n
4: r′i,j ∈R F2n
5: t← ((((ri,j ⊕ h(xi⊕ r′i,j))⊕ h(xj ⊕ r′i,j))⊕ h((xi⊕ r′i,j)⊕ xj))⊕
h(r′i,j))
6: rj,i ← t
7: end for
8: end for
9: for i from 0 to d do
10: yi ← h(xi)
11: for j from 0 to d, j 6= i do
12: yi ← yi ⊕ ri,j
13: end for
14: end for
Finally, for efficiency reasons, Kim et al. [105] proposed to use the
Canright representation of the AES S-box [34] (this solution is next de-
noted as KHL). Such a representation allows using tabulated field mul-
tiplication. Hence, more efficient software implementation can generally
be achieved with this technique.
2.3.3 Polynomial masking
The polynomial masking schemes [82, 156] are based on Shamir’s secret
sharing [176]. The Share algorithm is described in Algorithm 8.
Algorithm 8 Polynomial sharing ∈ F2n .
Require: Sensitive value s, an order d, a list of point {pi}.
Ensure: Shares si such that s = Open(s0, . . . , sd, p0, . . . , pd).
1: for i from 1 to d do
2: ci ∈R F2n
3: end for
4: for i from 0 to d do
5: si ← s⊕ c1pi ⊕ · · · ⊕ cdpdi
6: end for
7: return (s0, ..., sd)
The Open algorithm is an interpolation. The masking is F2-linear.
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Hence, the S-box is still the trickiest part. This is done with a se-
cure multiplication. The multiplication describe in Algorithm 9 comes
from [156], next denoted as RocP. In addition to the masking order
security, it also provides security in a circuit with glitches. Glitches
are due to delay in the propagation of different values. Hence the gate
changes more than once in a clock cycle. Thus, of Glitches can reduce
the masking security order [125].
Algorithm 9 Multiplication of two masked secrets x and y.
Require: Share xi and yi such that the evaluation of the interpolation
gives the secret.
Ensure: Share wi such that the evaluation of the interpolation gives
the secret xy.
1: for i from 1 to 2d+ 1 do
2: tmpi ← xi × yi
3: for j from 1 to d do
4: aj ∈R F2n
5: end for
6: for j from 1 to 2d+ 1 do
7: Qji ← tmpi ⊕ a1 × αj ⊕ · · ·+ ad × αdj
8: end for
9: wi ← 0
10: for j from 1 to 2d+ 1 do
11: wi ← wi ⊕ λij ×Qij
12: end for
13: end for
14: return (wd, ..., w0)
Where λij are coefficients of the interpolation λ
i
j =
∏
0≤k≤d
xj ⊕ xk
xi ⊕ xk
(with k 6= i), they can be calculated during the implementation phase
and allow a reduction of the polynomial degree from 2d to d. Indeed
Algorithm 15 performs first a polynomial multiplication and then a re-
sharing of a secret hidden in a polynomial of degree 2d to a polynomial
of degree d.
2.3.4 AES S-box representation
The previous masking schemes (ISW, RivP,CPRR and RocP) give
the tool to perform a secure implementation. But we need to find a rep-
resentation of the S-box that can be used. As previously said, the AES
S-box is the composition of the inversion and an affine transformation
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(which is an F2-linear operation combined with a constant addition).
Hence, the trickiest part to protect is the inversion. RivP suggested
using the description of the inversion presented in Algorithm 10.
Algorithm 10 Inversion based on multiplication over F28 .
Require: x ∈ F28 .
Ensure: y = x−1 = x254 ∈ F28 .
1: z ← x2
2: y ← z × x
3: w ← y4
4: y ← y × w
5: y ← y16
6: y ← y × w
7: y ← y × z
8: return y
2.3.5 Multiplicative masking
The AES is composed of two kinds of operations the F2-linear as XOR
operation or the operation from the MixColumns and the multiplicative
operation that are localized in the inversion part of the S-box. From
this observation, Genelle et al. [72, 73] suggested protecting the AES
with a masking scheme dependent on the kind of operation they want to
protect and switch from one to the other masking scheme. Performing
inversion with multiplicative masking consists in inverting each mask.
They suggested a secure way switching from one masking scheme to
the other. The main issue is the 0 as, in multiplicative sharing, it cannot
be masked. For that, they suggested using a Dirac function:
δ0(x) =
{
1 if x = 0,
0 otherwise.
They add the Dirac evaluation to the sharing, hence 0 goes to 1, the
other values are not affected. Switch the masking scheme, perform the
inversion where 1 goes to 1, perform the reverse switch and subtract the
result of the previous Dirac function. In such a way, they can perform
the inversion and keep 0 maps to 0. This is represented in Figure 2.9.
The conversion algorithm from Boolean to multiplicative sharing is
described in Algorithm 11, and the invert conversion is described in
Algorithm 12. The masking scheme obtained by this method is next
denoted as GPQ.
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Algorithm 11 Boolean to multiplicative sharing.
Require: Share xi such that x = xd ⊕ · · · ⊕ x0.
Ensure: Share zi such that z = z
−1
d × · · · × z−11 × z0.
1: z0 ← x0
2: for i from 1 to d do
3: zi ∈R F∗2n
4: z0 ← z0 × zi
5: for j from 1 to d− i do
6: U ∈R F2n
7: xj ← zi × xj
8: xj ← xj ⊕ U
9: z0 ← z0 ⊕ xj
10: xj ← U
11: end for
12: xd−i+1 ← zi × xd−i+1
13: z0 ← z0 ⊕ xd−i+1
14: end for
15: return (zd, ..., z0)
Algorithm 12 Multiplicative to boolean sharing.
Require: Share zi such that z = z
−1
d × · · · × z−11 × z0.
Ensure: Share xi such that x = xd ⊕ · · · ⊕ x0.
1: x0 ← z0
2: for i from 1 to d do
3: xi ∈R F2n
4: x0 ← x0 ⊕ xi
5: x0 ← x0 × z−1i
6: for j from 1 to i do
7: xj ← xj × z−1i
8: U ∈R F2n
9: xj ← U ⊕ xj
10: x0 ← x0 ⊕ xj
11: xj ← U
12: end for
13: end for
14: return (xd, ..., x0)
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Figure 2.9: Secure implementation of the inversion with the switch
method.
2.3.6 Table recomputation
Table recomputation is another way to securely perform the S-box layer
of any ciphers [4, 134, 153]. The core idea of recomputation is to use an
input mask and an output mask in order to perform the S-box for all
values with the input and output mask and then put the result in dif-
ferent registers according to the masked input. The method is described
in Algorithm 13. We use the function
compare(a, b) =
{
0 if a = b,
1 otherwise.
Algorithm 13 Computation of a masked S-box output from a masked
input.
Require: A masked value s = x⊕m, an input mask m, an output mask
m′, a look-up table S for the S-box.
Ensure: The masked S-box output S(x)⊕m′.
1: R0 ← m′
2: R1 ← m′
3: for a from 1 to 2n − 1 do
4: cmp← compare(a,m)
5: Rcmp ← Rcmp ⊕ S(s⊕ a)
6: end for
7: cmp← compare(R0, R1)
8: return R0 ⊕ (cmp×R1)
This technique can be used for any S-box and has been extended to
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higher-order protection [41]. But they suffer from efficiency problems
for large S-boxes and S-box design to reach a small cost in masked
implementation.
2.4 Other countermeasures
Masking is a common and widely studied countermeasure against SCA.
Its security has been proved in different settings [61, 60, 154] and also
studied in practice [182]. But other countermeasures exist and can be
combined with masking to enforce the security of implementations.
2.4.1 Shuﬄing
Shuﬄing randomizes the order of the instructions of an implementation.
Hence a point in trace could be dependent on several instructions. In
that sense, shuﬄing aims to emulate hardwares, since leakage of a subkey
is among the set of leakages of all the subkeys.
Shuﬄing has been implemented to protect the AES [91, 188]. The
main parameter influencing its security is the number of permutations
randomizing each operation. Taking the simple example of the AES S-
boxes, one can choose between executing them according to a random
index (among 16 possible ones) that is just incremented, or according
to a random permutation (among 16! possible ones). It has been shown
in [188] that the first solution (although cheaper) may lead to very ef-
ficient attacks. In particular, an implementation protected with such a
Random Start Index (RDI) may be as weak as an unprotected one for
low noise levels. As a result, in this thesis we will only consider shuﬄing
based on a random permutation.
A schematic representation of the SubBytes layer in unprotected case
and protected with shuﬄing is represented in Figure 2.10 and pseudo
code of shuﬄing is given in Algorithm 14. We can see that in the un-
protected case, the adversary knows when a subkey is used, while in the
shuﬄed case, the adversary does not know at which time a subkey is
used since the order of the execution varies from one execution to the
other.
In Algorithm 14, r[i]4 will give the inter part of the division, and mod
give the remainder of the Euclidean divisions. shuﬄe is a function that
shuﬄes a table.
Besides the generation of a permutation vector (that is common to all
solutions), different alternatives exist to implement a shuﬄed AES. The
straightforward method requires an indirect indexing of the operands.
That is, a counter is used to index a permutation vector, and the result is
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Figure 2.10: S-boxes execution paths: unprotected device (u boxes,
blue), shuﬄing with randomized permutation (p boxes, red).
Algorithm 14 Shuﬄed implementation of the AES S-box layer.
Require: The internal state s[4][4], the AES S-box S[256].
Ensure: The updated state s[4][4].
1: r[16] = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15}
2: shuﬄe(r)
3: for i from 1 to 16 do
4: s[ r[i]4 ][r[i] mod 4]← S[s[ r[i]4 ][r[i] mod 4]]
5: end for
6: return s
used to index the operand vector. Thus, instead of operating on registers
directly, two RAM accesses are required for each (read or write) access
to operands. This naturally leads to quite large cycle counts. A more
efficient solution proposed at ASIACRYPT 2012 [188] is to randomize
the execution path. For this implementation, the assembly code of ev-
ery transform is split into 16 independent blocks of instructions. Each
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of these 16 blocks is augmented with a label. This allows identifying
its address in ROM. Furthermore, every transform is associated with an
array of 17 16-bit words, where the first 16 words hold the addresses of
the 16 blocks, and the 17-th holds the address of the return instruction.
During the execution of the cipher, the addresses are first re-ordered
according to a previously generated permutation. Then, whenever en-
tering a transform, a pointer is set to the beginning of the array in order
to execute its 16 blocks of instructions in random order.
While masking forces the adversary to estimate higher moments,
shuﬄing obliges the adversary to combine several leakage points. How-
ever, there is still information in the mean. Hence, shuﬄing is considered
as a way to augment the noise.
2.4.2 Leakage resilience
Leakage resilient can be seen as a complementary approach to mask-
ing. Indeed, masking (and shuﬄing) reduces the amount of information
leaked. But, with sufficient measurements (and limited computational
power), a successful attack can always be performed. The aim of leakage
resilience is to limit the total amount of information that an implementa-
tion will leak. Hence, a successful attack can be mounted only if enough
computational power is available.
In secret key cryptography, most leakage resilient constructions use
re-keying strategies, i.e. the key is changed after a limited number of
computations, as first suggested by Kocher [112]. Examples of primitives
include Pseudo-Random Generators (PRGs) [63, 66, 148, 179, 180, 195,
196] and Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs) [2, 59, 66, 133, 180, 195].
In this thesis, we will consider the block cipher-based PRG and
PRF illustrated in Figures 2.11 and 2.12, respectively. For every master
key k(i), the PRG produces a new master key k(i+1) and n − 1 strings
c(i),0, c(i),1, . . . , c(i),n−2, both obtained by encrypting n public plaintexts
pjwith the block cipher E and the master key k(i).
For the PRF, we use the tree-based construction from Goldreich,
Goldwasser and Micali [78], where each step incorporates log2[n] input
bits and generates k(i+1) = Ek(i)(p
j). Following [133], the last stage is
optionally completed by a whitening step, in order to limit the data
complexity of attacks targeting the PRF output to one (e.g. when using
large n values, typically).
Quite naturally, there is a simple security versus efficiency tradeoff
for both types of constructions. In the first (PRG) case, we produce
a 128-bit output stream every nn−1 AES encryptions. In the second
(PRF) case, we produce a 128-bit output every 128log2[n]
AES encryptions
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Figure 2.12: Leakage-resilient PRF.
(+1 if output whitening is used). The details of these primitives are not
necessary for the understanding of this work. The only important feature
in our discussions is that the PRG construction is stateful while the PRF
one is stateless. As a result, the PRG limits the number of measurements
that a side-channel adversary can perform with the same key, while the
PRF limits his data complexity (i.e. the number of plaintexts that can
be observed). In practice, it means that in this latter case, the same
measurement can be repeated multiple times, e.g. in order to get rid
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of the physical noise through averaging. As discussed by Medwed et al.
in [133], Section 3, this may lead to significant difference in terms of
security against DPA.
Part I
Masking the AES

Chapter 3
Evaluation of State of the Art
Masking Schemes
In this chapter, we investigate the performance gap between masking
and MultiParty Computation (MPC) in the relevant case of AES im-
plementations in an 8-bit microcontroller. We considered two different
directions.
First, we compared a number of existing schemes.1 Our selection was
motivated by the two following criteria: (i) exclude “broken” proposals
(i.e. with low-order weaknesses), such as the multiplicative masking
in [79], the higher-order masking in [175] (broken in [44]), or Goubin
and Martinelli’s proposal in [82] (broken in [46]); (ii) exclude schemes
that do not systematically generalize to higher-orders, such as the affine
masking in [71, 190], the threshold implementations in [140],2 and several
ideas from the “early” DPA literature (see [123] for a survey).3
This essentially leaves with us the scheme introduced in the back-
ground Chapter, the boolean masking over extension of F2 RivP [169],
its optimization by Kim et al. using extension fields for the AES S-
box implementation in [105] (KHL), the switching between additive
and multiplicative masking GPQ [73], and the MPC-inspired proposal
RocP [170]. We implemented these different schemes up to the 10-th
security order, with results illustrating a large gap between the MPC-
inspired RocP (for which we additionally propose a slight optimization)
1Since I started this thesis, several new higher-order schemes were proposed. How-
ever, they do not influence the conclusion of this work , the most interesting directions
are [41, 45].
2Even if recent research has been done in that direction [24, 166]
3We also excluded the recently proposed “inner product” masking scheme
from [10], although it is certainly an interesting scope for further investigation. The
suggested masking scheme has shown to have a flaw [155] which was fixed in [9].
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and other masking schemes.
Motivated by the large performance gap, we investigated a standard
solution used in the MPC literature to improve performances, namely
“packed secret sharing” [70]. In particular, we evaluated the extent to
which the techniques proposed by Damg˚ard et al. in [51] could be used
to enhance the performances of shared AES implementations, and how
this performance gain depended on the order d. Intuitively, the idea of
packed secret sharing is to “hide” several secrets (e.g. key bytes) in a
high-degree polynomial, which leads to more efficient computations if
operations on these secrets can be performed in parallel. We show that
such a technique is indeed useful for protecting the AES S-boxes, and
exhibit the linear amortized complexity that it allows. Yet, we also show
that this amortized complexity only becomes beneficial for quite large
orders. Such large orders are not used nowadays but can be applicable
in the future.
Eventually, we tackled a usually neglected problem in the literature
on masking, namely the randomness requirements. First, we briefly dis-
cuss the impact of slight defaults in the Random Number Generator
(RNG) used to produce fresh shares. In particular, we provide an in-
formation theoretic evaluation of the cases where (i) the RNG has a
small bias, and (ii) a counter was used to generate equally likely but
predictable outputs. This evaluation naturally suggests that uniform
randomness is a strong requirement for the security of masking (and
MPC). Then, we evaluated the performances of our different masking
schemes again, including the cost of (strong-enough) randomness gener-
ation.
Overall, these results allow an implementer to decide which state-of-
the-art masking scheme to use and why, in function of his security goals
(in terms of order of the scheme and glitch-freeness), and performance
constraints.
Methodology. As clear from the previous introduction, our goal is to
compare the performances of a large number of masked implementations,
up to high security orders. Relying exclusively on optimized assembly
language was out of reach in this context. As a result, we systematically
took advantage of C language descriptions, and paid a particular atten-
tion in optimizing them in such a way that their compilation on an 8-bit
device was close enough to the one of published implementations. In
particular, we used the AVR-GCC compiler (with option -o2) to obtain
codes for an Atmel AtMega644p 8-bit microcontroller. And for each im-
plementation published by independent authors (e.g. in [73, 105, 169]),
we made sure that our performances were comparable up to a factor two
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in clock cycles. For this purpose, we relied on the optimization of certain
routines (e.g. for the masking of S-boxes) whenever needed. Further-
more, we systematically wrote our codes in two fashions: one unrolled
version optimized for speed and one compact version without loop un-
rolling. As for optimization criteria, we first focused on the cycle count,
and considered the 64Kb of our target device as a memory constraint
to reach. In view of the larger performance differences that will be put
forward between the investigated masking schemes and security orders,
we believe this methodology was sufficient to support our conclusions.
3.1 Comparison & improvement of existing
schemes
3.1.1 Description of selected schemes
In this first section, we aim to compare AES implementations protected
with various masking schemes. For this purpose, a preliminary observa-
tion is that the AES is composed of operations MixColumns, ShiftRows,
AddRoundKey and SubBytes. Since the Boolean and polynomial mask-
ing schemes on which we will focus are bytewise XOR-linear, the oper-
ations MixColumns, AddRoundKey and ShiftRows can be executed inde-
pendently on each share. As a result, we now focus on the description
of SubBytes for efficient masking. This operation executes 16 nonlinear
S-boxes in parallel, for which several representations exist.
For Boolean masked implementations and for the switching method
GPQ we used the standard representation, combining an inversion in
F28 and an affine transform. This is naturally motivated by the fact
that the Boolean masking is F2-linear. In this case, the most difficult
operation is the inversion, which is best achieved by exploiting secure
multiplications for RivP, as described in Algorithm 6. KHL is based
on similar ideas, but exploits subfields to reduce the cost of field mul-
tiplications and the amount of randomness. By contrast, in the case
of GPQ the switch allows moving from a Boolean masking scheme to
a multiplicative-linear one, which makes the inversion easy and defers
most of the complexity to the switch operation. Algorithms 11 and 12
describe how to perform this change securely.
The polynomial masking RocP essentially exploits core ideas from
the MPC literature. In particular, it shares the sensitive values in an
implementation using Shamir’s trick [176], and computes on these shares
securely using the results of Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Widgerson [17]. In
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this context, an important observation is that the scheme is not F2-
linear. As a result, the best S-box representation is in polynomial form,
namely 0x63 + 0x5 x−1 + 0x9 x−2 + 0xf9 x−4 + 0x25 x−8 + 0xf4 x−16 +
x−32 + 0xb5 x−64 + 0x8f x−128. Again, the most difficult part of this S-
box is the inversion, which can be implemented using 4 multiplications
and some squarings. Roche and Prouff described a multiplication for
polynomial masking in [170], describe in Algorithm 9. Since the focus
of their work was on glitch-freeness, they proposed to use a (2d+ 1, d)-
sharing for all operations, including linear ones (which allows separating
the implementation in several independent sub-circuits). However, the
(2d + 1, d)-sharing is only required to process multiplications. Hence,
for linear parts (addition) a (d + 1, d)-sharing is sufficient to perform
operations. In the following, we suggest a slight modification of this
proposal which essentially extends a (d + 1, d)-sharing to a (2d + 1, d)-
sharing in a glitch-free manner (as described in Algorithm 15). This
tweak will be denoted as RocP?. It allows us to perform the linear
operations with a lower degree sharing, and to divide by 2 the cost of
these operations in our masked implementations.
Algorithm 15 Expanding of a sharing
Require: A (d+ 1, d)-sharing (xi, yi)
d+1
i=1 .
Ensure: A (2d+ 1, d)-sharing (xi, ti)
2d+1
i=1 .
1: for j from 1 to d+ 1 do
2: tj ← yj
3: end for
4: for j from d+ 2 to 2d+ 1 do
5: for i from 1 to d+ 1 do
6: mji ∈R F2n
7: tmpji ← yi × λji
8: tmpji ← tmpji ⊕mji
9: end for
10: tj ← 0
11: for i from 1 to d+ 1 do
12: tj ← tj ⊕ tmpji
13: end for
14: for i from 1 to d+ 1 do
15: tj ← tj ⊕mji
16: end for
17: end for
18: return (xi, ti)
2d+1
i=1
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The coefficients λji =
∏
0≤k≤d
xj ⊕ xk
xi ⊕ xk (with k 6= i) are the evaluations
in xj of the Lagrangian of the (d + 1, d)-sharing. Since the points xi’s
are chosen before the execution of the masked implementation, these λji
can be precomputed. Interestingly, the different shares are always used
one at a time in Algorithm 15. Hence, just as in RocP, no glitches
can leak information on several shares and the implementation of this
algorithm can be based on separate sub-circuits. Namely, a first class of
sub-circuits calculates the masked values and sends the information at
the right time; a second class of sub-circuits combines the information to
obtain new shares. Note finally that our implementation does not take
advantage of the DFT technique proposed in [46] since for the security
degrees we considered, it did not lead to significant performance gains.4
3.1.2 Implementation result
We now compare the performances of the selected schemes, considering
both unrolled and compact implementations. As previously mentioned,
the use of unrolled codes allows reducing the execution time at the cost
of increased code size. Hence, it is limited to lower security orders in our
target devices. Figure 3.1 contains the execution times of the masked
AES implementation in unrolled version (up to security order 7, for
larger order the code size is larger than the 64KB program memory of
the targeted device). Figure 3.2 exhibits similar results in the compact
implementation case (up to security order 10). As can be observed, this
programming style has a significant influence on the cycle counts.
These first figures illustrate the significant performance gap between
“standard” masking schemes and the MPC-based solution RocP. We
also observe that our tweak for RocP leads to interesting gains, in
particular in the case of unrolled codes (indeed, step 4 in Algorithm 15
can be performed with a single table access in this case). Eventually,
the switching method GPQ provides the most efficient implementations,
which connects with previously published results and the intuition that
4For example, to evaluate a polynomial of degree 16 in 16 points, our basic method
requires 256 multiplications and 256 XOR’s. For the same evaluation with the DFT
solution, we have to reduce a 16-degree polynomial by a 16-degree polynomial, which
requires 17 multiplications, 16 XOR’s, and 1 inversion. Then two reductions of a
15-degree polynomial by an 8-degree polynomial have to be performed, each of them
requiring 72 multiplications, 64 XOR’s and 1 inversion. Eventually, the DFT tech-
nique corresponds to 321 multiplications, 256 XOR’s and 15 inversions in this case.
Since the maximum degree we will consider in our experiments is 12, and DFT-based
evaluations work best with powers of 2, we believe it will not lead to significant
improvements and focus on other possible optimizations in the next section.
40 Chapter 3. Evaluation of State of the Art Masking Schemes
2 3 4 5 6 7
2
4
6
8
10
·106
security order
n
u
m
b
er
of
cy
cl
es
Figure 3.1: Cycle counts for masked AES implementations: unrolled
codes. The curves are for KHL, the curves are for RocP, the
curves are for RivP, the curves are for RocP?, and the curves
are for GPQ.
the AES is particularly well suited to this solution, since it alternates
XOR-linear parts and multiplications. As for Boolean masking, the
advantage of the subfield representation in KHL is also observed.
3.2 More efficient MPC with packed secret
sharing
The section 3.1 suggests that the polynomial masking scheme RocP
suffers from significant performance overheads compared to GPQ, RivP
or KHL. Hence, despite its interesting security features (e.g. in terms of
glitch-freeness, or ability to prevent fault attacks), the gap between the
security orders that can be reached with one or the other type of masking
clearly benefits to the simplest solutions. Yet, the proposal by Roche
and Prouff was mainly based on early results in the MPC literature. As a
result, this section investigates whether some more recent optimizations
could be exploited to improve the performances of MPC-based masking.
In particular, we evaluate the opportunities to take advantage of packed
secret sharing. The main idea of this technique is to hide several secrets
in a higher-degree polynomial, by using several initial conditions (i.e.
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Figure 3.2: Cycle counts for masked AES implementations: compact
codes. The curves are for KHL, the curves are for RocP, the
curves are for RivP, the curves are for RocP?, and the curves
are for GPQ.
more than one secret is share in a polynomial). The opening is then
performed by evaluating the polynomials in the locations used by the
dealer. In general, such a solution is useful when there is exploitable
parallelism in the algorithm to execute. In the following, we will focus
on the parallelism available in the execution of the SubBytes transform.
3.2.1 Description of the packed secret sharing techniques
Intuition.
The packed secret sharing technique essentially consists in hiding sev-
eral secrets in the same polynomial, in order to distribute the cost of
computing a function over several masked secrets in parallel. Let t be
the number of secrets (e.g. corresponding to the number of S-boxes to
execute in our AES case), and d the threshold number (i.e. the security
order of the masking scheme). Suppose that a single masked S-box has
cost of O(d2) basic field operations (and assuming that all constants hid-
den by the O notation are small). A naive way to execute the t S-boxes
in parallel would require a cost of O(td2). By exploiting the proper-
ties of the packed secret sharing, this can be reduced to O((t + d)2).
42 Chapter 3. Evaluation of State of the Art Masking Schemes
As a result, for a fixed d and in a setting where t ' d operations are
executed in parallel, the complexity of the protected evaluation is in-
creased asymptotically by a linear factor compared to an unprotected
evaluation. Notice however that this improvement in complexity is only
achieved for circuits of sufficient size.
We illustrate the relationship between d and t, by paying attention
to cases where we fix one of the two parameters, and plot the (simpli-
fied) cost in function of the other parameter. For fixed d, we have a
linear complexity in the number of secrets for the single secret sharing,
while this complexity is quadratic when packing is used (see Figure 3.3).
Hence, for each security level there exists an interval of number of secrets
where the packing technique brings an advantage.
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
number of secrets
co
st
Figure 3.3: Cost for fixed d (here d = 4) in function of the number of
secrets. For single and packed secret sharing.
For fixed t, both the single and packed secret sharing have a quadratic
complexity in the masking order. Yet, the quadratic complexity is mul-
tiplied by a factor t in the first case. As a result, the packing technique
is gaining interest when the security order is large (see Figure 3.4).
How to multiply.
Using packed sharing does not allow using to use secure multiplications
based on Ben-Or et al. [17]. Indeed, to reduce the degree of the poly-
nomial their solution is to erase all the large monomials. This can be
3.2. More efficient MPC with packed secret sharing 43
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
security order
co
st
Figure 3.4: Cost for fixed t (here t = 4) in function of the masking order.
For single and packed secret sharing.
done if the secret is located in 0 (since the elimination of large monomi-
als does not change the secret in this case). But packed secret sharing
needs several locations for the secrets, which implies that the truncation
of polynomials becomes difficult to achieve, as best illustrated with the
following example. Let s1 (resp. s2) be a secret shared by a polynomial
P1(X) (resp. P2(X)). sl = Pl(0) =
∑
i
t
(l)
i
∏
j 6=i
xi
xj − xi , for l =1 or 2 .
Remark that we can write Pl(X) =
∑
0≤i≤d
a
(l)
i X
i. Ben-Or et al. et al.
calculate s1s2 by performing the product Q(X) = P1(X)P2(X). The
polynomial Q(X) has a degree 2d, but since the secret is located in 0, it
can be truncated by securely erasing all monomials larger than d. Note
that this secure erasure process requires us to combine different shares.
Hence the information exchanged in this step needs to be masked in
order to maintain the security order. Let this truncated polynomial be
denoted as Q|d(X). Then we have Q(0) = Q|d(0). All other evaluations
can be affected by the erasure of the largest monomials.
A natural solution to avoid this problem is to rely on a different mul-
tiplication algorithm. For example, we can use the proposal by Damg˚ard
et al. [51], described in Algorithm 16. In brief, this multiplication masks
the result with a random polynomial, opens the result and finally re-
moves the random polynomial, for a complexity in O(d2). More pre-
cisely, let n = d+ t and Open / Share refer to the operations that allow
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Algorithm 16 Polynomial opening multiplication
Require: A (n, d)-sharing of y and z : (xi, yi)
n
i=1 and (xi, zi)
n
i=1.
Ensure: A (n, d)-sharing of y × z : (xi, ti)ni=1 .
1: for i from 1 to n do
2: ri ∈R F2n
3: end for
4: Use Alg. 15 on (xi, ri)
n
i=1,(xi, yi)
n
i=1 and (xi, zi)
n
i=1
5: for i from 1 to 2n− 1 do
6: pi ← yi × zi ⊕ ri
7: end for
8: (s1, . . . , st)← Open((x1, p1), . . . , (x2n−1, p2n−1))
9: (t1, . . . , tn)← Share(s1, . . . , st)
10: for i from 1 to n do
11: ti ← ti ⊕ ri
12: end for
13: return (xi, yi)
n
i=1
recovering several shared secrets and distributing them among partici-
pants. The first step in Algorithm 16 is the same as in Ben-or et al,
i.e. we simply calculate Q(X) = P1(X)P2(X). Then the reduction step
is different. The polynomial Q(X) is masked by a random polynomial
R(X), which is done by adding the shares ri’s in step 6. Afterwards,
the polynomial Q+R(X) is evaluated in the positions where the secrets
are located, in order to recover the masked product of the secrets (step
8). Let {vk}nk=1 be the set of locations for the different secrets. Remark
that to determine R(vk), we must estimate n points of R(X), which
allows maintaining the d-th order security. Eventually, the k secrets are
shared in a new polynomial Q′(X) (in step 9), that is of degree n and
corresponds to a sharing of Q+R(vk). Hence, it just remains to remove
the random polynomial R to obtain a sharing of Q(vk) of degree at most
n (i.e. a sharing for the products of the secrets), which is done in step 11
of the algorithm.
Squaring issues.
The problem of moving the position of shares between participants when
squaring also becomes more critical when exploiting packed secret shar-
ing. Indeed when using polynomial masking (e.g. based on Shamir’s se-
cret sharing), the square function is also a bit more difficult to implement
than in the Boolean case. Let s = P (0) =
∑
ti
∏
j 6=i
xj
xj − xi . To calculate
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the square of s, the participants have to compute s2 =
∑
y2i
∏
j 6=i
x2j
x2j − x2i
.
But without special care, this operation moves the position of the shares
between participants (while the execution of linear operations can only
be performed if the shares are located at the same place). In [170],
the authors propose to use a set S of location points that are stable by
Frobenius application to avoid this problem. That is, for our case we
select points such that x2 = y and then let the participants exchange
shares (which is possible in the context of masking where all partici-
pants are on the same chip and assumed to be honest - but not in the
general MPC case). That is, we now have to face the fact that multi-
ple secrets are hidden in several positions, which can also move. Since
the secrets need to be located at the same position to be combined, we
cannot use a stable set of secrets like proposed for sharing in [170]. As
a result, we avoid the squaring problem directly by implementing them
with secure multiplications. One consequence of this choice is that it is
also interesting to use a modified addition chain for the inversion, in or-
der to minimize both the number of multiplications and squarings. We
used the one described in [52] for this purpose, which requires 11 secure
multiplications (including the squarings).
Full AES.
We face one more problem when extending the packing towards the full
AES. Namely the operations MixColumns and ShiftRows need to move
secrets that are hidden in the same polynomial. Hence, and in order to
benefit both from the performance gains of packed secret sharing during
the execution of the S-boxes and from the linear parts, we decided to
switch to single secret polynomials after each execution of SubBytes. To
switch from t polynomials of degree d+1 (with secrets located in position
0) to a single polynomial of degree d+t (with secrets located at positions
vk), we first move the positions of all the secrets from 0 to vk (secret
per secret). Next, we multiply the resulting polynomial by another
polynomial that cancels at positions vj 6=k and equals 1 in vk. Eventually,
we add all polynomials together to obtain a single polynomial of degree
d + t and containing t secrets. For the inverse operation (i.e. moving
from one polynomial to t polynomials), we first move each secret from
position vk to position 0. Then we erase all monomials of high degree
in order to keep a polynomial of degree d. Eventually, we refresh the
masking by adding a polynomial sharing of zero. These two operations
are detailed in Algorithms 17 and 18. Note that step 5 in Algorithm 17
allows us to obtain a (n, d)-sharing from a (d+ 1, d)-sharing. Aki is the
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evaluation on xi of the polynomial Ak(X) =
∏
i 6=k
X−vi
vk−vi . It is easy to
check that this polynomial verifies the condition of annihilation in vi for
i 6= k. Eventually, mki =
∏
j 6=i
xj
vk−xj allows us to move the location of a
secret from 0 to vk, since m
k
i =
∏
j 6=i
xj
xi−xj (
∏
j 6=i
vk−xj
xi−xj )
−1. As a result, the
reconstruction with
∏
j 6=i
vk−xj
xi−xj will give the same secret as the evaluation
in zero of the original polynomial. Similarly, dki =
∏
j 6=i
vk−xj
xj
allows us to
move the location of the secret for vk to zero.
Algorithm 17 Switch from t single-secret polys to 1 packed secret poly
Require: t (d+ 1, d)-sharings of sk : (xi, y
k
i )
d+1
i=1 .
Ensure: A (n, d)-sharing of {sk}tk=1 : (xi, ti)ni=1.
1: for k from 1 to t do
2: for i from 1 to d do
3: yki = y
k
i ×mki
4: end for
5: Use a modified Alg. 15 on (xi, y
k
i )
d+1
i=1
6: for i from 1 to d do
7: yki = y
k
i ×Aki
8: end for
9: end for
10: for k from 1 to t do
11: for i from 1 to t+ d do
12: ti = ti ⊕ yki
13: end for
14: end for
15: return (xi, ti)
n
i=1
3.2.2 Implementation result
We now compare RocP?, with an MPC-inspired masking exploiting
Algorithm 16, for various amounts of secrets hidden per polynomial.
In order to evaluate the extent to which the packed secret sharing is
exclusively useful for the execution of the AES S-boxes or if the switching
between single-secret polynomials and packed secret polynomials is an
efficient solution, we provide performance results both for 16 inversions
and for the full AES. Besides, and in order to reflect the impact of high
security orders, we focused on the compact versions of our codes (the
impact of unrolling is very similar to the one in the previous section).
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Algorithm 18 Switch from 1 packed secret poly to t single-secret polys
Require: A (n, d)-sharing of {sk}tk=1 : (xi, ti)ni=1.
Ensure: t (d+ 1, d)-sharings of sk : {(xi, yki )d+1i=1 }tk=1.
1: for i from 1 to t do
2: for k from 1 to d+ t do
3: yki = ti × dki
4: end for
5: for i from 1 to d do
6: ri ∈R F2n
7: end for
8: Use Alg. 15 on (xi, ri)
d+1
i=1
9: for i from 1 to d+ t do
10: yki = y
k
i ⊕ ri
11: end for
12: res = Open((x0, y
k
0 ), . . . , (xt+d, y
k
t+d)
13: (t1, . . . , td+1) = Share(0)
14: for k from 1 to d+ 1 do
15: yki = ri ⊕ res⊕ ti
16: end for
17: end for
18: return {(xi, yki )d+1i=1 }tk=1
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Figure 3.5: Cycle counts for MPC-based masking (compact codes): 16
inversions. The curves are for RocP?, the packed secret sharing
curves are represented by , , and for respectively 2, 4, 8
and 16 secrets. The curves are for the multiplication of Algorithm 16
with a single secret per polynomial.
The results in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 first exhibit that a change
of multiplication algorithm is anyway beneficial to performances in our
implementation context. In particular, it is interesting to notice that the
different asymptotic complexities for the multiplication in RocP? (cu-
bic in the security order) and the one of Algorithm 16 (quadratic in the
security order) are nicely reflected in the plots. The impact of packed se-
cret sharing is also put forward. It can be seen by the gap for small order
between single secret sharing and packed secret sharing. This is due to
the addition chain that has been changed. In particular, we can observe
the (expected) quasi-linear complexity of these schemes. Interestingly,
the results for the 16 inversions and for the full AES do not strongly
deviate, hence suggesting that the iterated execution of Algorithms 17
and 18 does not harm performances to the point where it would become
useless. Eventually, the security orders for which the quasi-linear com-
plexity of packed secret sharing materializes remain quite high (d = 10
for the full AES), hence suggesting that hiding a single secret per poly-
nomial remains the best approach in most practical settings.
Next, we tackled a usually neglected problem in the literature on
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Figure 3.6: Cycle counts for MPC-based masking (compact codes): full
AES (b). The curves are for RocP?, the packed secret sharing
curves are represented by , , and for respectively 2, 4, 8
and 16 secrets. The curves are for the multiplication of Algorithm 16
with a single secret per polynomial.
masking, namely the randomness requirements. First, we briefly discuss
the impact of slight defaults in the Random Number Generator (RNG)
used to produce fresh shares. In particular, we provide an information
theoretic evaluation of the cases where (i) the RNG has a small bias,
and (ii) a counter was used to generate equally likely but predictable
outputs. This evaluation naturally suggests that uniform randomness
is a strong requirement for the security of masking (and MPC). Then,
we evaluated the performances of our different masking schemes again,
including the cost of (strong-enough) randomness generation.
3.3 Randomness requirements and impact on
performances
Before to conclude, we would like to briefly investigate the issue of ran-
dom number generation that is usually neglected in the evaluation of
masking schemes. This is an important issue since the amount of ran-
domness required to mask each non-linear operation within the AES
while maintaining a security of order d is again quadratic in d. For this
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purpose, we will start by providing some information theoretic intuition
regarding why strong randomness is indeed needed. In particular, we
will show that this randomness has to be uniform, and that different de-
viations from this requirement imply weaknesses appearing for low and
high measurement noise levels, respectively. Then, we will re-evaluate
the performances of the best masking schemes we analyzed in this pa-
per, considering a realistic performance penalty for the generation of
each random byte.
3.3.1 How good must the randomness be?
In order to answer this question, we first repeated exactly the informa-
tion theoretic analysis described in [178] and applied to the masking
countermeasure in [182]. It leads to the information theoretic curves for
the unprotected S-box and the 1st-order masked one in Figure 3.7. As
detailed in these previous works, such information theoretic curves pro-
vide an evaluation of the worst-case security level of a countermeasure
(i.e. the security level in front of an adversary with a perfect knowledge
of the leakage distribution). In the case of masking, the order of the
countermeasure is reflected in the slope of the curve (i.e. one for the
unprotected S-box, 2 for the 1st-order masked one). We then consid-
ered two additional scenarios where the randomness was not as perfect
as expected.
In the first place, we considered the random number to be pre-
dictable, with an easy relation from pseudo-random value. In partic-
ular, we took the simple case where the 16 S-boxes were masked with a
counter, that can take all the values of the secret. In this context, an
observation already made in [188] in the context of the shuﬄing counter-
measure is that an adversary will be able to target the 16 masks jointly.
That is, since there are only 256 possible start values, she can evaluate
the likelihood of the 256 sequences of 16 mask leakages, and use them
in her template attack. Just as for the case of shuﬄing, the impact
of such an imperfection of the randomness is that for low noise levels,
all the masks will be recovered with probability one, as illustrated in
Figure 3.7. As a complement, we also considered the case where the
randomness was slightly biased in the same figure. Interestingly, it is
well known that such biases directly create a lower-order weakness (e.g.
like the “zero problem” in multiplicative masking [79]). But in fact, de-
pending on the strength of the bias, this first-order weakness may or not
be the best way to attack. That is, as illustrated in the figure, a small
first-order weakness will only dominate at the noise level for which its
bias is significant in front of the second-order information that is anyway
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Figure 3.7: Information theoretic evaluation of masking schemes.
available. The lower green curve excludes 132 mask values, the higher
1
16
mask values. The combination of these observations naturally suggests
that both for low and high noise levels, exploiting biased or predictable
randomness is not an option for masking.
3.3.2 Implementation result
Since strong randomness is anyway required for masking to lead to its
expected security improvements, we finally repeated our performance
evaluations assuming a reasonable cost for producing each random byte.
Namely, we considered 10 cycles for each of these generations (excluding
the memory accesses), which corresponds both to the typical quantity
that we found for security chips of the same manufacturer as our target
device, and to the execution of two AES rounds for producing 16 bytes
of pseudorandomness. Besides, and in order to optimize the random-
ness requirements, we also modified the addition chain for the inversion
in order to minimize this additional criteria, as proposed in [52]. We
then compared the schemes of Section 3.1 again, namely RivP, KHL,
GPQ and RocP?, as well as the MPC-based scheme using the multi-
plication of Algorithm 16 using a single secret per polynomial, and the
best packed sharing scheme from the previous section (i.e. the most
efficient solution for each security degree), considering compact codes.
As illustrated in Figure 3.8, the cost of the random generation shifts the
performance curves. But since all algorithms have a cost in randomness
that is quadratic in the order of the masking scheme, this shift does
not contradict the previous observations. One can just observe that the
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order for which packed secret sharing becomes a useful alternative is
delayed by one. For the rest, the gap between RivP, KHL, GPQ and
MPC-based masking remains large, but has been significantly reduced
thanks to our optimizations.
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Figure 3.8: Cycle counts for masked AES implementations with time
to generate random. The curve is for KHL, the curve is for
RocP?, the curve is for RivP, the curve is for GPQ, the
curve is for the multiplication of Algorithm 16 with a single secret
per polynomial and the curve is for the best packed secret sharing.
3.4 Conclusion
The choice of a masking scheme to protect AES implementations is a
delicate tradeoff between security and performances. In this chapter,
we provided a careful comparison of different state-of-the-art proposals
for this purpose, together with a cautionary note regarding the impor-
tance of relying on strong randomness in this context. We hope that
it will help designers to choose the solution that best fits their security
and performance constraints. Interestingly, and despite the intuitive
connection between these problems, our results show that specialized
masking schemes that only guarantee higher-order side-channel security
have significantly better performances than general MPC-inspired solu-
tions. Yet, the latter ones provide interesting security features, e.g. the
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glitch-freeness previously discussed by Roche and Prouff, or the ability to
prevent fault attacks (i.e. to resist active adversaries). Quite naturally,
MPC also benefits from a huge literature, and more optimization efforts
could certainly be considered to further reduce the gap between these
two problems. The use of somewhat homomorphic encryption taking
advantage of a preprocessing phase to reduce asymptotic complexities
can be mentioned as an example [54], in particular since it has been
shown to provide efficient implementations of the AES [53]. Also, the
parallelism we exploit in this work was internal to the AES (i.e. based
on its 16 S-boxes). This is natural since embedded applications usually
encrypt only a small amount of plaintexts. But in other scenarios where
many plaintexts have to be encrypted concurrently, it would be possible
to take advantage of this additional (external) parallelism.

Chapter 4
Efficient Representation for
Boolean Masking
In this chapter we refine the notion of S-box masking complexity in-
troduced in [36] and further studied in [172]. We still link it to the
minimum number of non-linear multiplications needed to evaluate the
S-box, but we do not include bilinear multiplications in this counting.
We justify this choice thanks to the analysis in [45] which shows that
the complexity of the latter multiplications is between the one of general
non-linear multiplications (costly) and the one of F2-linear multiplica-
tions (cheap). For all exponentiations in F2n , with n ∈ {4, 6, 8}, we give
the new masking complexities and afterwards we illustrate, for the AES
and DES S-boxes, the effective gain obtained by using the corresponding
new addition-chain exponentiation [80]. This work raises the need for
new polynomial evaluation algorithms minimizing the number of mul-
tiplications which are neither linear nor bilinear. It could also be of
interest to study whether specialized (efficient) schemes cannot be dedi-
cated to the secure processing of other types of non-linear multiplications
(which are not linear or bilinear but have some helpful properties).
4.1 Existing schemes for elementary operations
In this section, it is assumed that the S-box to protect manipulates data
of bit-length n (typically n ∈ {4, 8, 16}). Depending on the kind of
operation to process, these data can be viewed as elements of the vector
space Fn2 defined over the field (F2,⊕,&), where ⊕ is the XOR operation
and & the AND operator. Or, they can be defined as elements of the
field F2n ∼= (F2[X]/p(X),⊕,×), where p(X) is an irreducible polynomial
of degree n and × denotes the polynomial multiplication modulo p(X).
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As recalled in the previous chapter, the current most efficient solu-
tion to secure an S-box against higher-order SCA is to rewrite it as a
polynomial function over F2n and to split its evaluation as a sequence
of F2-linear operations and multiplications. Indeed, whatever d, d-th-
order secure schemes exist for these two types of operations. Note that,
some mask refreshing must be done sometimes between different calls to
these algorithms in order to guarantee the security of the whole process.
Since, mask refreshing has a minor impact on the efficiency improve-
ment proposed in this chapter we do not recall here the mask refreshing
algorithm and we exclude it from the description of the S-box secure
evaluation procedures (for more details about this point we suggest the
reading of [45, 169]).
Starting from Lagrange’s interpolation formula, [36] and [172] intro-
duce S-box evaluation techniques which are only based on Algorithms 5
and 6 (and a third algorithm used to refresh the sharings when the
input sharings correspond to dependent variables). Because the com-
plexity of the d-th-order secure multiplication is quadratic, whereas the
one of an F2-linear function is linear, the polynomial evaluation strate-
gies try to minimize the number of calls to Algorithm 6. However,
Coron et al. have shown that multiplications of the form x × g(x),
with g being F2-linear, can be evaluated securely and more efficiently
than standard multiplications [45]. This observation naturally raises
the following new question: can we improve the complexities of the S-
box evaluation strategies in [36, 172] by replacing, as much as possible,
standard multiplications by multiplications in the form x× g(x).
The complexity of Algorithm 7 remain quadratic but, for many typ-
ical application contexts, the constant terms are much smaller than in
Algorithm 6. Indeed, the processing of h can be tabulated on standard
embedded processors as long as n 6 10, whereas the field multiplica-
tions × occurring in Algorithm 6 cannot if n > 5. In the following,
functions/operations which can be evaluated thanks to Algorithm 5 or
Algorithm 6 will be said to be of Type-I or Type-III respectively. Func-
tions of the form x× g(x) with g F2-linear will be said to be of Type-II.
Table 4.1 summarizes the cost of the three algorithms in term of XORs,
field multiplications and look-up table accesses (referred to as LUT ac-
cess).
4.1. Existing schemes for elementary operations 57
Table 4.1: Cost of different algorithms.
XOR Multiplication LUT access
Algorithm 5 0 0 d+ 1
Algorithm 6 2d2 + 2d d2 + 2d+ 1 0
Algorithm 7 5d2 + 5d 0 2d2 + 3d+ 1
In most classical architectures, a memory access (or a XOR) can
be done in 1 or 2 CPU clock cycles, whereas the processing of a field
multiplication with the CPU instructions set only requires between 20
and 40 cycles.
In Algorithm 19, we recall how a multiplication over an extension
of F2 can be carried out. Since we consider extensions of the form
F2n ∼= F2[X]/p(X) where the coefficients of p(X) are in F2, we denote
by ~p the binary vector whose coordinates are the coefficients of p(X)
(from MSB to LSB). The operation t stands for the shift of t bits and
the i-th bit of a binary vector b is denoted by b(i).
Algorithm 19 Field multiplication naive way
Require: Field elements a, b in F2n ∼= F2[X]/p(X), the binary repre-
sentation ~p of p(X).
Ensure: The field element c such that c = a× b
1: tmp← a
2: c← 0
3: for i from 0 to degree(p(X)) do
4: if b(i) = 1 then
5: c← c⊕ tmp
6: end if
7: tmp← tmp 1
8: if tmp(degree(p(X))) = 1 then
9: tmp← tmp⊕ ~p
10: end if
11: end for
For fields of small dimension (e.g. n ≤ 4), the multiplication can be
tabulated. Then, only one access to a double entry table is required to
perform the multiplication in an efficient manner. If the field is composed
of 2n elements, the table will have 22n elements of size n. For larger fields
(e.g. n > 4) the size of such a table becomes larger than the memory
available in an embedded system. Hence, other evaluation methods are
applied, such that the so-called log/alog tables method. This method is
based on the fact that the non-zero elements of F2n can all be represented
as a power of a primitive element which is a root of p(X). The log table
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is used to get this power for each x ∈ F2[X]/p(X), whereas the alog table
is used to get the element of F2[X]/p(X) that corresponds to a given
power. Under this representation, multiplying two non-zero elements x
and y, simply consists in processing alog(log(x) + log(y) mod 2n − 1).
Algorithm 20 Field multiplication with log/alog tables
Require: Field elements a, b.
Ensure: c such that c = a× b
1: d← log[a]
2: e← log[b]
3: c← d+ e mod 2n − 1
4: c← alog[c]
This explains why replacing Type-III operations by Type-II ones
leads to a significant efficiency improvement when n ∈ [5; 10]. Based
on this observation, in the next section we propose new sequences of
operations that lead to a more efficient processing of power functions
than the state of the art solutions [36, 172].
4.2 New proposal for power functions evalua-
tion
Considering the fact that the processing of power functions in the form
x1+2
s
(which corresponds to the Type-II operation x× x2s) is more ef-
ficient than the one of other power functions, we followed an approach
close to [36] in order to exhibit the most efficient processing for any
power function defined in F2n for n ≤ 8. Namely, for every power func-
tion x 7→ xα, by exhaustive search we exhibit a sequence of operations
of types I, II and III, which minimizes first the number of Type III op-
erations, and then the number of Type II operations. This amounts
to find, for each exponent α, the shortest addition chain [110] with the
supplementary constraint that multiplications by 2t, for any integer t,
or additions in the form v+ 2tv are for free.1 We recall that an addition
chain for α ∈ N is an increasing sequence of integers v0, ..., vs such
that v0 = 1, vs = α and for any j 6= 0 there exist two indices i < j
and k < j (not necessarily different) s.t. vj = vi + vk. The length of
such a sequence is defined as the total number of additions (including
multiplications by 2) needed to get vs = α from v0 = 1, with only opera-
tions between elements of the sequence. The definition of length used in
1In the context of exponentiation processing, these chains are sometimes also re-
ferred to as addition-chain exponentiation (see for instance [80]).
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[36, 172] excludes multiplications by 2. For the reasons discussed previ-
ously, we extend the classical definition of the addition chain by adding
the operation v 7→ (1 + 2t)v for any integer t. Moreover we assume
that this operation is also excluded from the sequence length definition
(indeed it corresponds to the function ht+1 : x
v 7→ x(1+2t)v). The cor-
responding new length definition is referred to as extended length in the
following. Our purpose is to minimize it. This point is the main (and
important) difference with the (shortest) sequences investigated in [36].
Our results are given in Tables 4.2, 4.4 and 4.3 for n = 4, 6 and 8, where
the exponents are grouped into classes. Each class, say Cj , corresponds
to the set of exponents which can be obtained by multiplying j by a
power of 2 (modulo 2n − 1).
Table 4.2: Smallest cost to process xα with operations of types II and
III in F24 .
Type-II Type-III Exponent α
0 0 C0 = {0},C1 = {1, 2, 4, 8}
1 0 C3 = {3, 6, 12, 9}, C5 = {5, 10}
1 1 C7 = {7, 14, 13, 11}
For the case of operations in F26 , like for the DES S-boxes. We report
on the cost of our extended addition chain in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Smallest cost to process xα with operations of types II and
III in F26 .
Type-II Type-III Exponent α
0 0 C0 = {0},C1 = {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32}
1 0 C3 = {3, 6, 12, 24, 48, 33}, C5 =
{5, 10, 20, 40, 17, 34}, C9 = {9, 18, 36}
2 0 C11 = {11, 22, 44, 25, 50, 37},C15 =
{15, 30, 60, 57, 51, 39} C27 = {27, 54, 45}
1 1 C7 = {7, 14, 28, 56, 49, 35} C13 =
{13, 26, 52, 41, 19, 38},C21 = {21, 42}
C31 = {31, 62, 61, 59, 55, 47, }
2 1 C23 = {23, 46, 29, 58, 53, 43}
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Table 4.4: Smallest cost to process xα with operations of types II and
III in F28 .
Type-II Type-III Exponent α
0 0 C0 = {0},C1 = {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128}
1 0 C3 = {3, 6, 12, 24, 48, 96, 192, 129},
C5 = {5, 10, 20, 40, 80, 160, 65, 130},
C9 = {9, 18, 36, 72, 144, 33, 66, 132},
C17 = {17, 34, 68, 136}
2 0 C15 = {15, 30, 60, 120, 240, 225, 195, 135},
C21 = {21, 42, 84, 168, 81, 162, 69, 138},
C25 = {25, 50, 100, 200, 145, 35, 70, 140},
C27 = {27, 54, 108, 216, 177, 99, 198, 141},
C45 = {45, 90, 180, 105, 210, 165, 75, 150},
C51 = {51, 102, 204, 153}, C85 = {85, 170}
3 0 C63 = {63, 126, 252, 249, 243, 231, 207, 159},
C95 = {95, 190, 125, 250, 245, 235, 215, 175},
C111 = {111, 222, 189, 123, 246, 237, 219, 183}
4 0 C39 = {39, 78, 156, 57, 114, 228, 201, 147},
C55 = {55, 110, 220, 185, 115, 230, 205, 155},
C87 = {87, 174, 93, 186, 117, 234, 213, 171}
1 1 C7 = {7, 14, 28, 56, 112, 224, 193, 131},
C11 = {11, 22, 44, 88, 176, 97, 194, 133},
C13 = {13, 26, 52, 104, 208, 161, 67, 134},
C19 = {19, 38, 76, 152, 49, 98, 196, 137},
C37 = {37, 74, 148, 41, 82, 164, 73, 146}
2 1 C23 = {23, 46, 92, 184, 113, 226, 197, 139},
C29 = {29, 58, 116, 232, 209, 163, 71, 142},
C31 = {31, 62, 124, 248, 241, 227, 199, 143},
C43 = {43, 86, 172, 89, 178, 101, 202, 149},
C47 = {47, 94, 188, 121, 242, 229, 203, 151},
C53 = {53, 106, 212, 169, 83, 166, 77, 154},
C59 = {59, 118, 236, 217, 179, 103, 206, 157},
C61 = {61, 122, 244, 233, 211, 167, 79, 158},
C91 = {91, 182, 109, 218, 181, 107, 214, 173},
C119 = {119, 238, 221, 187}
3 1 C127 = {127, 254, 253, 251, 247, 239, 223, 191}
Remark. As the cost of Type-I operations is negligible compared to the
cost of operations of types II and III, we chose not to give them in
Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
Remark. The costs given in Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 have been obtained
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by first minimizing the global number of Type-II and Type-III operations,
and then by minimizing the number of Type-III multiplications. It can be
noticed that other minimization strategies could be applied. For instance,
if the goal is to minimize the number of Type-III multiplications, then
it can be checked that x254 can be evaluated without any such operation:
first process x63, then (x+x63)3 = x189 +x127 +x65 +x3, and eventually
process x189, x65 and x3, and subtract them to (x+ x63)3 to get x254 =
(x127)2 (which gives a processing without Type-III operations and 9 Type-
II operations).
For the exponentiation x 7→ x254 (the non-linear part of the AES S-
box), we found the extended addition chain (1, 2, 5, 25, 125, 127, 254)
whose extended length is 1. This sequence indeed requires only 1 op-
eration of Type-III(+) (to get 127), 2 operations of Type-I (×) (to get
and 2 and 254) and 3 operations of Type-II (×(1 + 22)) (to get 5, 25
and 125)). It may moreover be observed that the sequence involves the
same operation v 7→ (1 + 2t)v (for t = 2) each time, which reduces the
memory required to implement the solution.
The extended addition chain used for the AES S-box is represented
in Figure 4.1.
1
2
5 25 125
127 254
Type-II
Type-II Type-II
Type-III
Type-III
Type-I Type-I
Figure 4.1: AES S-box extended addition chain.
Algorithm 21 shows how to use the extended addition chain to eval-
uate the exponentiation x254 in the field F28 .
Remark. According to the discussion conducted in Section 2, the secure
processing of Algorithm 21 will simply be done by replacing the input x by
a sharing (xi) of it and by replacing a Type-I operation, a Type-II oper-
ation and a Type-III operation by calls to Algorithm 5, Algorithm 7 and
Algorithm 6 respectively. Each internal result (x or y), as well as the
output x254, will consequently be replaced by a sharing. Moreover it can
62 Chapter 4. Efficient Representation for Boolean Masking
Algorithm 21 Exponentiation to the 254
Require: x.
Ensure: y = x254.
y ← x2 Type-I
x← x× x4 Type-II
x← x× x4 Type-II
x← x× x4 Type-II
y ← y × x Type-III
y ← y2 Type-I
be checked that there is no need to insert a mask refreshing procedure be-
tween the different steps to ensure the security of the whole process. This
is another advantage compared to implementations proposed in [169] and
[45].
For DES, we take advantage of the S-box representation proposed
in [172]. In that paper it is shown that all DES S-boxes can be calculated
with 7 non-linear multiplications. They can indeed be represented by a
polynomial of the form:
PDES(x) = (x
36 + p1(x))× (((x18 + p2(x))× p3(x)) + (x9 + p4(x)))
+ ((x18 + p5(x))× p6(x) + (x9 + p7(x))),
where the polynomials pi(x) are of degree at most 9, and can be obtained
by successive Euclidean polynomial divisions. Hence, only monomials of
degree lower than 9 plus x18 and x36 are required to calculate any DES
S-box. To compute these powers, we found an extended addition chain
of extended length 1. Represented in Figure 4.2, it allows calculating
monomials x, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x18 and x36, where it can
be checked that only 3 Type-II operations and 1 Type-III operation are
needed.
Eventually, once monomials have been calculated, each pi(x) can
be evaluated by processing the sum
∑
j≤9 pi,jx
j with (pi,j)j denoting
the coefficients of the polynomial pi(x). After that, 3 additional Type-
III operations are required to calculate PDES. These 3 multiplications
are the 3 polynomial multiplications in PDES. As a result, any DES S-box
can be computed using 4 Type-III operations and 3 Type-II operations.
The full processing description is summed-up in Algorithm 22.
Remark. As for Algorithm 21, the secure processing of Algorithm 22
will simply be done by replacing the input x by a sharing (xi) of it
4.2. New proposal for power functions evaluation 63
1
2
3
5
4 8
6
7
9 18 36
Type-I
Type-I Type-I
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Type-II
Type-III
Type-III
Figure 4.2: DES monomials extended addition chain.
Algorithm 22 DES S-boxes
Require: x1, pi,j coefficients of polynomial pi.
Ensure: p2 = PDES(x).
x2 ← x21 Type-I
x4 ← x22 Type-I
x8 ← x24 Type-I
x3 ← x1 × x21 Type-II
x6 ← x23 Type-I
x9 ← x1 × x81 Type-II
x18 ← x29 Type-I
x36 ← x218 Type-I
x5 ← x1 × x41 Type-II
x7 ← x2 × x5 Type-III
for i = 1 to 7 do
pi ← 0
for i = 1 to 7 do
pi ← pi ⊕ pi,j × xj Type-I
end for
end for
p2 ← p2 + x18 Type-I
p2 ← p2 × p3 Type-III
p2 ← p2 + x9 Type-I
p2 ← p2 + p4 Type-I
p1 ← p1 + x36 Type-I
p2 ← p2 × p1 Type-III
p5 ← p5 + x18 Type-I
p5 ← p5 × p6 Type-III
p5 ← p5 + x9 Type-I
p5 ← p5 + p7 Type-I
p2 ← p2 + p5 Type-I
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and by replacing a Type-I operation, a Type-II operation and a Type-
III operation by calls to Algorithm 5, Algorithm 7 and Algorithm 6 re-
spectively. Moreover it can be checked that we only need to add a mask
refreshing procedure before the secure processing of p2 × p3 and p5 × p6.
This is another advantage compared to implementations proposed in
[172] which need many more refreshings.
Remark. Remark that having an optimal representation of a polyno-
mial that has exponents in different classes (as for the DES S-boxes) is
quite challenging, which explains the poorer efficiency compared to the
AES S-box. Quite naturally, we expect that further research should al-
low improving this (since smaller S-boxes should generally be easier to
mask).
4.3 Efficiency comparisons & simulations
In this section, we compare, for different orders d = 1, 2, 3, the efficiency
of our new extended addition chain with that of previous techniques to
securely process the AES S-box and the first DES S-box (similar results
can be obtained for the other ones).
For the AES S-box, we implemented the schemes proposed in [169]
(RivP) and [45] (CPRR). We also implemented the scheme in [105]
(KHL), which follows a Tower Fields approach to improve the timing
complexities. Essentially, it consists in using the isomorphism between
F28 and (F24)2 to have processing only in F24 where the multiplication
can be tabulated. Since our approach, described in the previous section,
is advantageous when the field multiplication cannot be tabulated, we
did not consider to combine it with Tower Fields approach.
The implementations are performed in C and compiled for ATMEGA
644p microcontroller thanks to the compiler avr gcc with optimisation
flag -o2. We also carried out some implementations directly in assembler
for the same micro-controller.
For AES and DES the results are given in Table 4.5 and 4.6 respec-
tively.
Table 4.5: Clock cycles for an execution of masked AES S-box for AT-
MEGA644p.
Solution [C] d = 1 [C] d = 2 [C] d = 3 [Assembly] d = 1
RivP 753 1999 3702 623
KHL 897 1805 3077 565
CPRR 540 1376 2554 431
here 488 1227 2319 338
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Table 4.6: Clock cycles for an execution of masked DES S-box for AT-
MEGA644p.
Solution C d = 1 C d = 2 C d = 3
Addition chain [172] 2001 4646 8182
Extended addition chain 1623 3574 7413
In Table 4.7, we compare, on ATMEGA644p, the practical costs of
the Type-II and Type-III multiplications. For d = 1, we can see that
Type-II multiplications are around 2.5 (when implemented in Assembly)
or 2.4 (when implemented in C) faster than Type-III multiplications.
This means that, on ATMEGA644p, replacing N Type-III multiplica-
tions by N ′ Type-II multiplications leads to a global efficiency gain as
long as N ′/N ≤ 2.4. This ratio becomes 2.8 for d = 2 and 2.3 for d = 3.
Table 4.7: Clock cycles for Type-II and Type-III operations over F28 .
Operation C d = 1 C d = 2 C d = 3 [Assembly] d = 1
Type-III 146 430 802 136
Type-II 61 152 344 54
As already pointed out, the interest of exchanging Type-III multipli-
cations by Type-II ones is only advantageous when the field (Type-III)
multiplications cannot been tabulated (i.e. when n ≥ 5). Hence, for the
4-bit PRESENT S-box, our approach does not lead to practical efficiency
improvement.
4.4 Conclusion
By exploiting an idea introduced by Coron et al. at FSE 2013, we have
shown in this chapter that Carlet et al.’s masking scheme can be im-
proved when the S-box dimensions are too large to allow the tabulation
of field multiplications. For this purpose, we introduced a new type of
addition-chain exponentiation which combine three operations (multi-
plications by 2s, multiplications by 1 + 2s and additions) instead of two.
For the AES and DES S-boxes, our improvement leads to an efficiency
gain between 35% and 55%. Our work also opens avenues for further
research of polynomial evaluation techniques minimizing the number of
multiplications which are neither F2-linear nor F2-bilinear.

Part II
Proof assumption errors

Chapter 5
Low Entropy Masking Scheme
A central condition for masking security to hold is that all the shares are
uniformly distributed, which implies strong randomness requirements
in masked implementations [85]. Starting from this observation, a re-
cent line of works - denoted as Low Entropy Masking Schemes (LEMS)
in the following- has investigated possibilities to maintain the secu-
rity order of masked implementations with reduced randomness require-
ments [20, 35, 120, 138]. LEMS can be seen as 2-sharing schemes, with
the particularity that any n-bit sensitive value x is randomized with a
mask variable M chosen within a subset (aka code) of the 2n possible
masks. In this setting, preserved security orders can be obtained with
reduced randomness requirements under two important conditions:
1. Adversarial condition. The attacks performed are only univariate,
i.e. they exploit exclusively the leakage of the masked value x⊕M .
2. Implementation condition. The leakage function’s deterministic
part is linear in the bits of x⊕M (such as, e.g. for the Hamming
weight function).
These results directly raise the question whether such conditions are re-
alistic - i.e. whether LEMS can give rise to actual security improvements
in practical scenarios. In order to answer this question, this chapter pro-
vides a systematic evaluation of these assumptions, leading to two main
results.
1. On the adversarial condition. In general, it is of course natural to
consider multivariate attacks, since the shares used in any masked
implementation have to be generated on chip, which possibly leaks
information. We analyze such bivariate attacks and show that
despite the reduced number of masks, LEMS still provide first-
order security in this case (with a slight security degradation). We
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further confirm that if an adversary is limited (for some reasons)
to univariate attacks, LEMS allow ensuring security orders of 2 or
3, as previously demonstrated by Carlet et al. [35] and Nassar et
al. [138].
2. On the implementation condition. We show that as soon as the
leakage function’s deterministic part deviates from a purely linear
one, the security guarantees provided by LEMS vanish, even in the
univariate attack context. We further illustrate that the security
order of the countermeasure is reduced according to the degree
of the leakage function, e.g. that a quadratic leakage function is
less damaging than a cubic one, quartic one, . . . and additionally
provide an explanation of this phenomenon (see Section 5.2.2).
Summarizing, the first (adversarial) condition may not be a too big
issue in practice. Given that maximum 2-share implementations are
considered,1 LEMS are a theoretically relevant solution to mask under
the assumption of linear leakage functions, since it maintains the security
order of univariate (resp. bivariate) attacks to two or three (resp. one).
By contrast the second (implementation) condition seems more difficult
to fulfill, since the shape of a leakage function is typically hard to control
by cryptographic designers. We conclude that despite its theoretical
interest, the deployment of LEMS in actual embedded devices should be
considered with care, and standard masking schemes are generally safer
to implement because of easier-to-verify hardware assumptions.
5.1 State of the art of LEMS
The main goal of LEMS is to guarantee high security orders for masked
implementations, with less randomness requirements than traditional
masking schemes. For this purpose, the mask M (which is bitwise added
to the sensitive datum s) is chosen as part of a sub-set of the definition
set of s. Different solutions have been published in the literature. In the
rest of the chapter, we will use the code proposed in [20], next referred
to as C16, and to the one proposed in [138], next referred to as C12. Both
subsets are designed for 8-bit sensitive values (i.e. are typically applica-
ble to protect the registers of 8-bit devices). Following previous analyzes,
LEMS with C12 is expected to provide security against first- and second-
order attacks, while LEMS with C16 is expected to provide security
against first-, second- and third-order attacks (under the adversarial and
implementation conditions stated in introduction). Codes are specified
1Current results in LEMS do not provide generalizations to more shares.
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as: C12 = {0x03, 0x18, 0x3f, 0x55, 0x60, 0x6e, 0x8c, 0xa5, 0xb2, 0xcb,
0xd6, 0xf9}, and C16 = {0x10, 0x1f, 0x26, 0x29, 0x43, 0x4c, 0x75, 0x7a,
0x85, 0x8a, 0xb3, 0xbc, 0xd6, 0xd9, 0xe0, 0xef}. Both were selected over
the lowest size set that provides the required security order, while the
first one minimizes the mutual information metric defined in the next
subsection as additional criteria.
5.2 Information theoretic analysis of LEMS
5.2.1 Hamming weight leakages
Our Information Theoretic (IT) analysis of LEMS and its comparison
with other masking schemes are in Figures 5.1, 5.2, from which the
following observations can be extracted.
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Figure 5.1: Information theoretic analysis of different masking schemes,
univariate attacks. The curve ( ) is for the unprotected case. The
curves ( , and ) are for LEMS with C12, C16 and a badly
chosen code, respectively.
Starting with the univariate case in Figure 5.1, we first observe that
information leakage is only available if a strict subset of the 2n possible
masks is available (e.g. the curves ( ) and ( ) are stuck to zero
in this case, hence not represented in this part of the figure). We also
note that a badly chosen code (e.g. C = {0x00, 0x01, 0x02, . . . , 0x0B})
leads to first-order univariate weaknesses for the LEMS countermeasure,
as witnessed by the slope of the curve ( ) that is parallel to the one of
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the unprotected implementation ( ). This confirms the requirement
to use uniform randomness in the security proofs of standard masking
schemes, e.g. [94, 154]. By contrast and as expected, the LEMS coun-
termeasure with codes C12 and C16 enforces second- and third-order
security against univariate side-channel attacks (i.e. curve ( ) has
slope 3 and curve ( ) has slope 4). Interestingly, we also see that C12
leads to a slightly smaller information leakage than C16 for low noise val-
ues - which is also expected since minimizing the information leakages
was considered as an additional optimization criteria in the selection of
C12 only.
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Figure 5.2: Information theoretic analysis of different masking schemes,
bivariate attacks. The curves ( , and ) are for LEMS with
C12, C16 and a badly chosen code, respectively. The curve ( ) is for
masking with the full set (only non-zero in the bivariate case). The
curve ( ) is for the bivariate attack using approximated Gaussian
templates (in place of Gaussian mixtures) for masking with the full set.
Next in the bivariate case, Figure 5.2, we first observe that most
attacks (i.e. using all masks with Gaussian or Gaussian mixture model-
ing, and using C12 or C16) converge towards the same slope as the noise
increases. The slope of these curves is 2 implying first-order security
in all these cases The curve ( ) is again a counter-example, because
of a badly chosen code. So an important conclusion is that the first
(adversarial) condition mentioned in introduction for LEMS to provide
improved security against univariate attacks does not imply a penalty in
the security order when considering bivariate attacks. By contrast, we
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observe a small security degradation for small noise values, i.e. a con-
stant information leakage loss between curves ( ), ( ) and ( ),
similar to the difference between C12 and C16 in univariate attacks. In-
terestingly, we also observe the impact of incorrect modeling for these
small noise values. That is, when considering Gaussian mixture leakage
models - as for curve ( ) - we see a “wave” in the information theo-
retic curve that is not found when simplifying the mixtures into a simpler
Gaussian model - as for curve ( ). This wave can be explained by the
fact that characterizing the full distribution with a Gaussian mixture al-
lows exploiting higher-order moments that are easy to estimate for low
noise values (and hard to estimate with more noise). By contrast, the
Gaussian modeling only exploits two statistical moments (i.e. mean vec-
tor, covariance matrix), leading to less (and more regular) information
leakage. A similar reason makes the Gaussian modeling impossible to
apply to univariate attacks against LEMS with C12 and C16: since such
attacks only leak in the third- and fourth-order moments of the condi-
tional leakage distributions, a Gaussian model with only two statistical
moments will not be able to characterize this information.
5.2.2 Polynomial leakages
The previous subsection provided IT curves under the assumption that
the implementation constraint mentioned in introduction is fulfilled.
Since such a constraint may be difficult to verify in practice, we now
investigate the consequences of a leakage function deviating from purely
linear. For this purpose, we replace the previously used Hamming weight
leakage function by a polynomial of higher degree. Such a polynomial is
of the form L(s) :=
∑
i aisi+
∑
i
∑
j bi,jsi×sj+
∑
i
∑
j
∑
k ci,j,ksi×sj×sk,
where si denotes the i-th bit of the sensitive value s, and ai, bi,j and
ci,j,k are some constants. For simplicity, we will consider the case where
∀i ai = a ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, j bi,j = b ∈ {0, 1} and ∀i, j, k ci,j,k = c ∈ {0, 1}.
The results of our investigations in this advanced context are plotted
in Figure 5.3. The main conclusion is that the security guarantee claimed
by LEMS does not hold in this case. Interestingly, we can even observe
a relation between the degree of the leakage function polynomial and the
security order. Namely, the higher the degree, the lower the order - see,
e.g. curves ( , , ). This relation can be explained as follows.
Say the leakage corresponding to s ⊕M in the LEMS countermeasure
only contains information in its fourth-order moment (as for C16). Since
M is not uniform, we know that raising this leakage to the fourth power,
i.e. computing (Llin(s ⊕M) + N1)4 will lead to first-order information,
while raising the noise to the fourth power as well. Say now the leakage
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Figure 5.3: IT analysis for polynomial leakage functions and LEMS with
C16. The curve ( ) is for the Hamming weight leakage function. The
curve ( ) is for the leakage function with a=0, b=1 and c=0. The
curve ( ) is for the leakage function with a=0, b=0 and c=1. The
curve ( ) is for the leakage function with a=1, b=1 and c=1. The
curve ( ) is for the unprotected case in the previous subsection.
function is not linear anymore, but quartic. Then the same first-order
information will be found in samples of the form Lquart(s ⊕M) + N1,
i.e. without amplifying the noise. More generally, if the leakage function
only contains terms of a single degree, the security order of LEMS will
be divided accordingly. For example, the curve ( ) for which L has
degree 3 has slope 4/3, the curve ( ) for which L has degree 2 has
slope 4/2=2, . . . As for leakage functions with terms of various degrees,
the situation is intermediate, e.g. the curve ( ) for which L has degree
3 but contains terms of degree 1 and 2, has slope between the previous
ones.
5.3 Security analysis of LEMS
We now confirm the previous IT evaluations with security analyses. For
this purpose, we compute 1st-order success rates (as defined in [178])
estimated over 10000 independent experiments, in various scenarios.
These results aim to translate information leakages into a number of
measurements to recover the key. Note that higher-order success rates
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could be considered as well (to express the tradeoff between time and
data complexities in side-channel attacks). However, they do not reveal
more intuition regarding the security of LEMS vs. masking.
5.3.1 Univariate attacks
Our first experiments correspond to univariate template attacks with
different noise levels, and are given in Figures 5.4,5.5. A preliminary
observation is that, as in the previous section, Gaussian templates are
not able to exploit information in this case (i.e. only Gaussian mixture
models lead to successful key recoveries). Next and more importantly,
the two parts of the figure clearly illustrate that the impact of estimating
higher-order statistical moments in masking and LEMS mostly reveals
itself as noise increases (as already highlighted in [182]). That is, the
difference between the success rates attacking an unprotected implemen-
tation vs. LEMS with C12 or C16 is more significant in the right part
of the figure. This confirms the information theoretic evaluations in the
previous section, where the slope of the different curves also becomes
stable as noise increases.
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Figure 5.4: Univariate template attacks with Gaussian mixture leakage
model, σ2=10−4. The curves ( ) are for LEMS with C12. The curves
( ) are for LEMS with C16. The curves ( ) are for the unprotected
implementation.
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Figure 5.5: Univariate template attacks with Gaussian mixture leakage
model, σ2=10. The curves ( ) are for LEMS with C12. The curves
( ) are for LEMS with C16. The curves ( ) are for the unprotected
implementation.
5.3.2 Bivariate attacks
To conclude this work, we also paid attention to the efficiency of bi-
variate template attacks with Gaussian mixture modeling, as reported
in Figures 5.6, 5.7. Here, the most revealing feature is that, as already
indicated by the information theoretic analysis in the Figure 5.2, both
LEMS and masking with the full set have the same security order. As
a result, the impact of noise on the separation between the success rate
curves is the opposite of the one in the previous subsection. Namely,
as noise increases, these curves get closer. This effect is particularly
significant in attacks using Gaussian modeling, i.e. curves ( ) - be-
cause it implies a significant loss of information for low noise values (see
Figure 5.2). Besides, and as they all correspond to the estimation of a
second-order moment in the leakage probability distribution, the data
complexity of these attacks is naturally lower than the one when consid-
ering univariate attacks against LEMS with C12 and C16 in Figures 5.4,
5.5. This eventually confirms that while LEMS indeed provides inter-
esting security guarantees against univariate attacks, their worst-case
security level is only obtained by analyzing bivariate ones.
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Figure 5.6: Bivariate template attacks with Gaussian mixture leakage
model, σ2=10−4. The curves ( ) are for LEMS with C12. The curves
( ) are for LEMS with C16. The curves ( ) and ( ) are for
masking with the full set, using Gaussian and Gaussian mixture leakage
modeling, respectively.
Wrapping up
The consequences of our analysis for LEMS are contrasted. First, while
its adversarial condition may not always be practically relevant, the
investigations in Section 5.2.1 and 5.3.2 suggest that the countermeasure
remains an interesting alternative to mask with reduced randomness
requirements, even if adversaries exploit bivariate leakages (as there is no
penalty for the security order in this case). By contrast, the observations
in Section 5.2.2 suggest that the security of LEMS is highly dependent
on the (hard to control) leakage function. In particular, the apparition
of higher-degree terms in this function directly implies an exploitable
penalty in the security order of the countermeasure.
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Figure 5.7: Bivariate template attacks with Gaussian mixture leakage
model, σ2=10. The curves ( ) are for LEMS with C12. The curves
( ) are for LEMS with C16. The curves ( ) and ( ) are for
masking with the full set, using Gaussian and Gaussian mixture leakage
modeling, respectively.
Chapter 6
Independence of the Leakages
Masking security proofs (such as given, e.g. for the CHES 2010 scheme of
Rivain and Prouff [169]) ensure the so-called dth-order property, which
requires that every tuple of at most d intermediate variables in the im-
plementation is independent of any sensitive variable. Ensuring this
property (ideally) guarantees that the smallest key-dependent statisti-
cal moment in the leakage distribution is d + 1. It has been shown (in
different, more or less specialized settings [37, 60, 154, 182]) that the
data complexity of side-channel attacks against such implementations
increases exponentially with the number of shares. More precisely, in
the usual context of (close to) Gaussian noise, this data complexity is
proportional to (σ2n)
d, with σ2n the noise variance. In practice though,
security proofs for masking heavily rely on an independence assumption.
Namely, the (ideal) hope is that the leakage function manipulates the
shared intermediate variables independently. Whenever this assumption
is not fulfilled, all bets are off regarding the security of the implemen-
tation. For example, a leakage function that would re-combine the dif-
ferent shares would directly lead to an implementation that is as easy
to attack as an unprotected one. As a result, the main question for
the proofs in [37, 60, 154] to provide concrete security improvements is
whether this assumption is respected in practice.
Unfortunately, experiments have shown that the independent leak-
age assumption does not always hold in actual hardware and software.
Many physical effects can be the cause of this issue. For hardware im-
plementations, glitches are a well-identified candidate [125]. For soft-
ware implementations, the problem more frequently comes from memory
transitions (e.g. captured by a Hamming distance model) [42]. From
this empirical observation, different strategies could be followed. One
can naturally try to enforce independent leakages at the hardware or
80 Chapter 6. Independence of the Leakages
software level, but current research rather concludes negatively in both
cases [42, 135]. A more promising approach is to deal with the prob-
lem at the algorithmic level. For example, threshold implementations
and solutions based on multi-party computations can provide “glitch-
resistance” [141, 170]. But the first solution is rather specialized to
hardware devices (see, e.g. [25, 136] for applications to the AES), while
the second one implies strong performance overheads [85]. In the follow-
ing, we pursue a third direction for the software case, and investigate
the security guarantees that can be obtained if we simply ignore the
problem.
For this purpose, we start by formalizing the types of leakage func-
tions that can be encountered in practice (namely value-based vs. tran-
sition based, generic vs. specific). As any formalization effort, we do not
claim that it perfectly corresponds to actual measurements. Yet, we will
show that it captures some important physical effects to a sufficient ex-
tent for our conclusions to be supported by practical experiments. Next,
our first contribution is to provide a couple of reductions from security
claims obtained for one type of leakage functions to security claims for
another type. Our most interesting result shows that a dth-order secu-
rity proof obtained against value-based leakages leads to a bd2cth-order
security proof against transition-based ones.
Besides their theoretical interest, we believe these conclusions are
important for security engineers, since they answer a long standing open
question regarding the automated insertion of countermeasures against
side-channel attacks. Our proofs and experiments suggest that a single
C code of a masked block cipher can indeed provide concrete security
on two different devices, at the cost of an artificially increased number
of shares. The overheads caused by this increased order correspond to
the “cost of lazy engineering”, which is to balance with the significant
gains in terms of development time that automation allows. As a result
and maybe most importantly, these results validate an important line
of research trying to exploit compilers to replace the manual insertion
of countermeasures by expert developers [15, 137, 161]. Our findings
suggest that such an approach can be feasible for masking.
6.1 Definitions
Following previous works on masking, we denote any key-dependent in-
termediate variable appearing in an unprotected implementation as a
sensitive variable. Taking the example of the secure multiplication of
two shared secrets in Algorithm 1 in [169], a and b are sensitive vari-
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ables.
We further denote as intermediate variables the set of all the vari-
ables appearing in a masked implementation, bar loop counters. These
intermediate variables should not be sensitive if masking is well imple-
mented, since each share should be independent of the key in this case.
For example, the set of intermediate variables in Algorithm 1 in [169] is
given by:
V = {ai} ∪ {bi} ∪ {ri,j} ∪ {ai × bj} ∪ {ri,j ⊕ ai × bj}
∪ {aj × bi} ∪ {(ri,j ⊕ ai × bj)⊕ aj × bi} ∪ {ai × bi}
∪ {ai × bi ⊕i−1j=0 [(ri,j ⊕ ai × bj)⊕ aj × bi]⊕dj=i+1 ri,j}. (6.1)
The security proof of the masking scheme in [169] (and following works)
was typically obtained for value-based leakage functions that we define
as follows:
Definition 6.1.1 (Value-based leakage functions). Let V be a set of
intermediate variables and L(.) = Ld(.) +N be a leakage function made
of a deterministic part Ld(.) and an (additive) random noise N . This
leakage function is value-based if its deterministic part can only take
values v ∈ V as argument.
By contrast, the flaws in [42] come from the fact that the software
implementation considered by the authors was leaking according to a
Hamming-distance model. The following transition-based leakage func-
tions aim at formalizing this issue:
Definition 6.1.2 (Transition-based leakage functions). Let V be a set
of intermediate variables and T := {v ⊕ v′ | v, v′ ∈ V} ∪ V be the set
of all the transitions between these intermediate variables. A leakage
function L(.) is transition-based if its deterministic part Ld(.) can only
take values t ∈ T as argument.
Note that this type of transitions, based on the bitwise XOR between
the values v and v′, is motivated by practical considerations (since it gen-
eralizes the Hamming distance model). Yet, even more general types of
transitions, e.g. the concatenation v||v′, would not change our following
conclusions – it would only make the bound of Theorem 6.2.5 more tight
in certain cases (see next).
We further define generic vs. specific leakage functions as follows:
Definition 6.1.3 (Generic leakage functions). A value-based (resp. tran-
sition-based) leakage function associated with an intermediate variable
v ∈ V (resp. transition t ∈ T ) is generic if its deterministic part is a
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nominal mapping from this variable to a leakage variable ld ∈ Ld, such
that the set of deterministic leakages Ld has the same cardinality as the
set of values V (resp. transitions T ).
The identity mapping is a typical example of generic leakage func-
tion1.
Definition 6.1.4 (Specific leakage functions). A value-based (resp. tran-
sition-based) leakage function associated with an intermediate variable
v ∈ V (resp. transition t ∈ T ) is specific if its deterministic part is a
mapping from this variable to a leakage variable ld ∈ Ld, such that the
set of deterministic leakages Ld has smaller cardinality than the set of
values V (resp. transitions T ).
The frequently considered Hamming weight and distance functions
are typical examples of specific (value-based and transition-based) leak-
age functions.
6.2 Reductions
From these definitions, a natural question is whether a proof of security
obtained within one model translates into a proof in another model.
As we now detail, three out of the four possible propositions are trivial
(we recall them for completeness). The last one is more intriguing and
practically relevant.
Lemma 6.2.1. A proof of dth-order side-channel security obtained with-
in a generic model implies a proof of dth-order security in a specific
model.
Proof. This directly derives from Definitions 6.1.3 and 6.1.4. By mov-
ing from one to the other, we only reduce the amount of information
provided to the adversary (since we reduce the cardinality of the set of
possible deterministic leakages).
Lemma 6.2.2. A proof of dth-order security obtained within a specific
model does not imply a proof of dth-order security in a generic model.
Proof. A counterexample can be found in [86] for low-entropy masking
schemes.
1This definition differs from the one of “generic power model” in [14] since it relates
to the leakage function, while the latter one relates to the adversary’s model.
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Lemma 6.2.3. A proof of dth-order side-channel security obtained with-
in a transition-based model implies a proof of dth-order security in a
value-based model.
Proof. Similarly to Lemma 6.2.1, this directly derives from the Defini-
tions 6.1.2 and 6.1.1. By moving from one to the other, we only reduce
the amount of information provided to the adversary (since we reduce
the input range of the leakage function).
We will need the following lemma to prove our last result.
Lemma 6.2.4. The information obtained from any subset of at most
bd2c elements in a set T can be obtained from a subset of d elements in
a set V.
Proof. Let ST ⊂ T such that #(ST ) < bd2c. We show that ∃ SV ⊂ V
such that #(SV) < d, and ST can be built from SV as follows (with
#(.) the cardinality of a set). ∀t ∈ ST , if t ∈ V, then SV = SV ∪ {t},
else ∃ v, v′ ∈ V such that t = v ⊕ v′ and SV = SV ∪ {v, v′}. Since
#(ST ) < bd2c, and we add at most 2 elements in SV per element in ST ,
we directly have that #(SV) < d.
It directly leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 6.2.5. A proof of dth-order side-channel security obtained
within a value-based model implies a proof of bd2cth-order security in a
transition-based model.
Proof. If there existed a subset of transitions ST with less than bd2c
elements which can be used to mount a successful side-channel attack,
then there would exist a subset SV with less than d elements that can be
used to mount a successful side-channel attack as well. As this second
attack is impossible by hypothesis, such a set ST cannot exist and the
implementation is at least bd2cth-order secure.
This bound is tight for Boolean masking. If x = v0⊕v1⊕. . . vd−1⊕vd,
we can see that x = t0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ tb d
2
c, with ti = v2i ⊕ v2i+1 for 0 ≤ i < bd2c
and tb d
2
c = vd if d even, and tb d
2
c = vd−1 ⊕ vd if d is odd. By contrast, it
is not tight for other types of masking schemes such as inner product or
polynomial [10, 156]. However, it would be tight even for those masking
schemes in the context of concatenation-based transitions (i.e. if using
v||v′ rather than v ⊕ v′ in Definition 6.1.2).

Part III
Block ciphers design

Chapter 7
General Masking Schemes
As remarked in the previous chapters, the most difficult computations
to mask are the ones that are non-linear over the group operation used
to share the sensitive variables (e.g. the S-boxes in a block cipher).
Asymptotically, the time complexity of masking such non-linear opera-
tions grows at least quadratically with the order d. As a result, a wide
work of research have focused on specializing masking to certain algo-
rithms (most frequently the AES Rijndael, see e.g. [33, 144]), in order
to reduce its implementation overheads. More recently, the opposite ap-
proach has been undertaken by Piret et al. [149]. In a paper presented at
ACNS 2012, the authors suggested that improved SCA security could be
achieved at a lower implementation cost by specializing a block cipher
for efficient masking. For this purpose, they started from the provably
secure scheme proposed by Rivain and Prouff at CHES 2010 (RivP),
and specified a design allowing better performances than the AES Rijn-
dael as the order of the masking increases. Remark that the conclusions
are done for RivP but remain valid for other masking schemes as poly-
nomial masking. More precisely, the authors first observed that bijective
S-boxes that are at the same time easy to mask and have good properties
for resisting standard cryptanalysis (e.g. linear [128], differential [22],
algebraic [47]) are remarkably close to the AES S-box. As a result, they
investigated the gains obtained with non-bijective S-boxes and described
a Feistel network with a Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) based
round function taking advantage of this S-box. One interesting feature
of this approach is that its impact on the performances of block cipher
implementations will grow with the physical security level (informally
measured with the order d). That is, it enables performance gains that
become more significant as we move towards physically secure imple-
mentations.
In this chapter, we complement this first piece of work and further
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investigate design principles that could be exploited to improve the secu-
rity of block cipher implementations against SCAs thanks to the masking
countermeasure. In particular, we investigate two important directions
left open by Piret et al.
First, we observe that non-bijective S-boxes usually lead to simple
non-profiled attacks (as their output directly gives rise to “meaningful
leakage models” [189]). As shown by Whitnall et al., we even have a
proof that generic (non-profiled) SCAs against bijective S-boxes cannot
exist [193]. This naturally gives a strong incentive to consider bijective
S-boxes in block ciphers that are purposed for masked implementations.
Hence, we analyze the possibility to trade a bit of the classical S-box
properties (linearity, differential profile, algebraic degree) for bijective
and more efficient masking.
Second, we observe that the previous work from ACNS 2012 focused
on the S-box design in order to allow efficient masking. This is a natural
first step as it constitutes the only non-linear element of most block
ciphers. Yet, it is also appealing to investigate whether the algorithm
structure could not be modified in order to limit the total number of
S-boxes executed during an encryption. We investigate this possibility
and suggest that irregular designs in which only a part of the state goes
through an S-box in each round can be used for this purpose, if the
diffusion layer is adapted to this setting.
Our results show that each of the principles we propose (i.e. the
modified S-box and structure) can be used to reduce the total number
of non-linear operations in an AES-like block cipher - yet with a stronger
impact of the second one.1 We then describe a new block cipher for effi-
cient masking, that combines these two ideas in order to further reduce
the total complexity corresponding to non-linear operations in the ci-
pher. We call this cipher Zorro in reference to the masked fictional
character. We further provide a detailed security evaluation of our pro-
posal, considering state-of-the-art and dedicated cryptanalysis, in order
to determine the number of rounds needed to obtain a secure cipher.
Because of the irregular structure of Zorro, this analysis borrows recent
tools from hash function cryptanalysis and describes new techniques for
providing security bounds (e.g. against linear and differential cryptanal-
ysis). We conclude with performance evaluations exhibiting that Zorro
already leads to interesting performance gains for small security orders
d = 1, 2, 3.
1This observation is highly reduced by recent result [11].
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7.1 Performance evaluation metrics
Masking an implementation implies performance overheads, both in
terms of number of operations to perform and randomness to gener-
ate. As previously mentioned, linear operations in a d-th order secure
block cipher execution simply have to be performed d + 1 times (i.e.
for each share independently). Hence, it is generally the cost of the
non-linear operations that dominates in the performance evaluation of
masking. In particular, two main criteria can be used to evaluate how
friendly is an S-box regarding Boolean masking. First, the number of
multiplications directly matters, as described in Algorithm 6. Second,
we also have to pay attention to any operation (even XORs) performed
on pairs of dependent variables. In order to maintain the d-th order
security, the masks of these dependent variables must be kept indepen-
dent, which can be achieved by refreshing the shares (i.e. XORing them
with new random variables). As the generation of many random bytes
can become expensive in low-cost devices, the number of additional ran-
dom masks required to execute the S-box securely also has to be counted
as a performance metric.
Example 7.1.1. In [169], Rivain and Prouff compute the inverse in F28
using 4 multiplications and need to refresh the mask 2 times. As a result,
they require 2d2 + 4d random bytes, 4d2 + 8d + 4 field multiplications
and some linear transformations to compute the AES S-box in a d-th
order secure manner.
7.2 Bijective S-boxes that are easier to mask
In this section we aim at finding an 8-bit S-box having both a small
masking cost and good cryptographic properties regarding the criteria
presented hereafter. For this purpose, we will use the number of field
multiplications and amount of randomness needed to execute a shared
S-box as performance metrics. As discussed in Section 7.1, reducing
this number directly leads to more efficient Boolean masking using the
state-of-the-art scheme RivP. Interestingly, it is also beneficial for more
advanced (polynomial) masking schemes inspired from the multiparty
computation literature, such as proposed by RocP. So our proposal
is generally suitable for two important categories of masking schemes
that (provably) generalize to high security orders. For reference, we
first recall that the AES S-box consists in the composition of an in-
version of the element in the field F28 and an affine transformation A:
SAES : x 7→ A(x−1). Starting from this standard example, a natural
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objective would be to find an S-box that can be masked with a lower
cost than the AES one (i.e. an S-box that can be computed using less
than 4 multiplications [169]), and with similar security properties (i.e.
a maximum of the differential spectrum close to 4, a maximum of the
Walsh spectrum close to 32, and a high algebraic degree). Since there are
28! permutations over F28 , an exhaustive analysis of all these S-boxes is
computationally unfeasible. Hence, we propose two different approaches
to cover various S-boxes in our analysis. First, we exhaustively consider
the S-boxes having a sparse polynomial representation (essentially one
or two non-zero coefficients). Next, we investigate some proposals for
constructing 8-bit S-boxes from a combination of smaller ones. In par-
ticular, we consider a number of solutions of low-cost S-boxes that were
previously proposed in the literature.
7.2.1 Exhaustive search among sparse polynomials
Monomials in F28.
We use the same equivalence relation as in Section 4.2. Only 16 classes
out of the 34 lead to bijective functions. A list of the different security
criteria corresponding to these monomials can be found in Table 7.1.
It shows that the AES exponent (class of exponent 127) has the best
security parameters and the largest number of multiplications. Our goal
is to find an S-box with a lower number of multiplications, maintaining
good (although not optimal) security features. In this respect, exponents
7, 29 and 37 are of interest.
Table 7.1: Masking cost and security properties of S-boxes S(X) = Xe.
α deg Prdiff Prlin α deg Prdiff Prdiff
C1 1 1 1 C37 3 2
−5.41 2−2
C7 3 2
−5.41 2−2 C43 4 2−3.09 2−1.41
C11 3 2
−4.67 2−2 C47 5 2−4 2−2.41
C13 3 2
−4.41 2−2 C53 4 2−4 2−2
C19 3 2
−4 2−2.41 C59 5 2−4.41 2−2
C23 4 2
−4 2−2 C61 5 2−4 2−2
C29 4 2
−4.67 2−2 C91 5 2−4 2−3
C31 5 2
−4 2−3 C127 7 2−6 2−3
Binomials in F28.
We also performed an exhaustive search over all the S-boxes defined by
a binomial. Note that in this case, an additional (refreshing) mask is
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required for the addition because of the dependency issue mentioned in
Section 7.1. Again, we were only concentrating on S-boxes that can be
computed in less than 4 multiplications. The number of such binomials
was too large for a table representation. Hence, we provide a few exam-
ples of the best improvements found, with binomials requiring 2 and 3
multiplications.
• 2 multiplications. We found binomials having properties similar
to monomials X7 and X37, with better non-linearity (a maximum
of the Walsh spectrum between 64 and 48). Binomial 8X97 +X12
is an example.
• 3 multiplications. In this case, we additionally found several bi-
nomials reducing both the maximum value of the Walsh spectrum
(from 64 to 48) and the maximum value of the differential spec-
trum (from 10 to 6) compared to the monomial X29. Binomial
155X7 +X92 is an example.
7.2.2 Constructing 8-bit S-boxes from smaller ones
As the exhaustive analysis of more complex polynomial representations
becomes computationally intractable, we now focus on a number of al-
ternatives based on the combination of smaller S-boxes. In particular,
we focus on constructions based on 4-bit S-boxes that were previously
proposed in the literature, and on 7-bit S-boxes (in order to benefit from
the properties of S-boxes with an odd number of bits).
Building on F24 S-boxes.
This is the approach chosen by the designers of PICARO. Namely, they
selected an S-box that can be computed using only 4 secure multiplica-
tions over F24 . This S-box has good security properties, except that its
algebraic degree is 4 and that it is non-bijective.
In general, constructing 8-bit S-boxes from the combination of 4-bit
S-boxes allows decreasing the memory requirements (e.g. when S-box
computations are implemented as look-up tables), possibly at the cost of
an increased execution time (as we generally need to iterate these smaller
S-boxes). That is, just putting two 4-bit S-boxes side-by-side allows no
interaction between the two nibbles of the byte. Hence the maximum
of the Walsh spectrum and the maximum of the differential spectrum
of the resulting 8-bit S-box are 24 times larger than the one of its 4-bit
building block. This weakness can be mitigated by using at least two
layers of 4-bit S-boxes interleaved with nibble-mixing linear operations.
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For instance, the KHAZAD [12] and ICEBERG [181] ciphers are using
8-bit S-boxes obtained from three applications of 4-bit S-box layers,
interleaved with a bit permutation mixing two bits of each nibble (as
illustrated in Figure 7.1(a)). The resulting S-boxes show relatively good
security properties and have maximal algebraic degree. Unfortunately,
these proposals are not good candidates to improve the performances of
a masked implementations, since six 4-bit S-boxes have to be computed
to obtain one 8-bit S-box. As any non-linear permutation in F24 requires
at least 2 multiplications, even using only two layers would cost more
secure multiplications than the AES S-box.
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Figure 7.1: (a): ICEBERG S-box. (b) 4-round Feistel network without
linear mixing layer. (c) 4-round Feistel network with linear mixing layer.
(d) Combination of 7-bit S-boxes with linear mixing layer.
Another natural alternative to double the size of an S-box is to build
on a small Feistel network, as illustrated in Figure 7.1(b). Note that in
this case, we need to perform at least 3 rounds to ensure that security
properties against statistical cryptanalyses will be improved compared to
the ones of the underlying 4-bit S-box. Indeed, let us choose a differential
(or linear) mask with all active bits in the left part of the input; then
after 1 round we obtain the same difference in the right part; hence the
differential (or linear) approximation probability after two rounds will
be the one of the small S-box again. In fact, an exhaustive analysis
revealed that 4-round networks are generally required to obtain good
cryptanalytic properties. However, it also turned out that adding a
linear layer could lead to improved results for S-boxes that are efficiently
masked. That is, as illustrated in Figure 7.1(c), we can add an invertible
8× 8 binary matrix to mix the bits of the two Feistel branches between
each round. Such a layer allows improving the differential and linear
properties of the S-box, with limited impact on the cost of its masked
implementations (since the transform is linear).
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Example 7.2.1. We instantiate the 4-round Feistel network of Fig-
ure 7.1(c) with a 4-bit S-box corresponding to the monomial X3, and
add the 8-bit linear transformation on the left at the end of each round.
The corresponding 8-bit S-box has a maximum differential spectrum of
10, a maximum of the Walsh spectrum equal to 64 and an algebraic
degree of 7. It can be computed using 4 secure multiplications in F24 .
Example 7.2.2. We instantiate the 4-round Feistel network of Fig-
ure 7.1(c) with a 4-bit S-box corresponding to the polynomial 8X +
7X2 + 7X3 + 14X4 + 3X6 + 6X8 + 9X9 + 5X12 (which can be computed
with 1 multiplication), and add the 8-bit linear transformation on the
right at the end of each round. The corresponding 8-bit S-box has a
maximum differential spectrum of 8, a maximum of the Walsh spectrum
equal to 64 and an algebraic degree of 6. It can also be computed using
4 secure multiplications in F24 .
Summarizing the previous investigations, Table 7.2 compares the
security properties and number of secure multiplications of the proposed
S-boxes to the other 8-bit S-boxes built from F24 ones mentioned at the
beginning of the section. The new S-boxes proposed (i.e. Example 7.2.1
and Example 7.2.2) have the same number of multiplications as the
PICARO S-box. They have the additional advantage of being invertible
and have better linear and algebraic properties, at the cost of a worse
differential spectrum.
Table 7.2: Comparison of F28 S-box built from F24 S-box.
Ex.7.2.1 Ex.7.2.2 PICARO KHAZAD ICEBERG
Perm. yes yes no yes yes
# mul. 4 4 4 18 18
deg(S) 7 6 4 7 7
max ∆S 10 8 4 8 8
max ΩS 64 64 68 64 64
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Exploiting F27 and linear layers.
We finally investigated the use of a smaller S-box in F27 . This choice
was motivated by the fact that S-boxes in F2n with n odd provide better
security properties against differential cryptanalysis than S-boxes acting
on an even number of bits. For instance, the existence of Almost Perfect
Non-linear permutations (aka APN permutations) is still an open prob-
lem for even values of n while many have been constructed for odd values
of n. Hence, we expect that low-cost S-boxes acting on 7 bits will exhibit
relatively good security properties. As in the previous paragraph, mov-
ing from a 7-bit to an 8-bit S-box can be done by combining the 7-bit
S-box with an 8-bit linear transform. That is, we used the S-box in Fig-
ure 7.1(d), where the 7-bit S-box is applied twice, separated by a linear
transformation to mix bits in between. This implies that good masking
properties could only be obtained if the 7-bit S-box uses only a single
multiplication. We found several 8-bit S-boxes using 2-multiplications
based on this design, having 64 as maximum of the Walsh spectrum, 10
as maximum of the differential spectrum and 4 as algebraic degree.
Example 7.2.3. We use the monomial X3 as 7-bit S-box and the linear
transform.
7.2.3 Comparing proposed S-boxes to the AES one
To conclude this section, we compiled the results we obtained in Ta-
ble 7.3, in which most of our performance and security metrics are re-
ported. As explicit with the column “additional operations”, such a
table is admittedly limited in providing precise estimates of the exact
implementation costs, as these costs are always technology-dependent.
Yet, it provides general indications about S-box candidates for efficient
masking, and also complements the work of Piret et al. in providing
some interesting bijective proposals.
7.3 Reducing the number of S-box executions
The previous section discussed how to reduce the number of multipli-
cations per S-box execution in a block cipher, by trading cryptanalytic
properties for more efficient masking. A complementary approach in
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order to design a block cipher that is easy to mask is to additionally
reduce the total number of S-box executions. For this purpose, a natu-
ral solution is to consider rounds where not all the state goes through
the S-boxes. To some extent, this proposal can be viewed as similar
to an NLFSR-based cipher (e.g. Grain [90], Katan [31], Trivium [32]),
where the application of a non-linear component to the state is not ho-
mogeneous. For example, say we consider two n-bit block ciphers with
s-bit S-boxes: the first (parallel) one applies n/s S-boxes in parallel in
each of its R rounds, while the second (serial) one only applies a single
S-box per round, at the cost of a larger number of rounds R′. If we
can reach a situation such that R′ < R · ns , then the second cipher will
indeed require less S-boxes in total, hence be easier to protect against
side-channel attacks. Of course, the number of S-box executions in the
serial version does not have to be stuck at one, and different trade-offs
are possible. In general, the relevance of such a proposal highly depends
on the diffusion layer. For example, we have been able to conclude that
wire crossing permutations (like the one of PRESENT [26]) cannot lead
to any improvement of this type (see Subsection 7.3.1). By contrast, an
AES-like structure is better suited to our goal. The rationale behind
this intuition essentially relates to the fact that the AES Rijndael has
strong security margins against statistical attacks, and the most seri-
ous concerns motivating its number of rounds are structural (e.g. [109]).
Hence, iterating simplified rounds seems a natural way to prevent such
structural attacks while maintaining security against linear/differential
cryptanalysis. Furthermore, the impact of linear hulls and differentials
in ciphers with strong diffusion could ideally lead to reductions in the to-
tal number of S-box executions required to reach a cipher that is secure
against statistical attacks. In the following, we show that a modified
AES cipher with 4 S-boxes per round (rather than 16) is indeed a good
candidate for this purpose. We then put our results together in order to
specify our new block cipher Zorro.
7.3.1 Wire crossing permutations
We argue why wire-crossing permutations are not a good choice for re-
ducing the number of S-boxes execution. For this purpose, let us consider
such a permutation acting on 128 bits and 8-bit S-boxes (the following
reasoning identically applies to any other choice of parameters). The
parallel approach consists in applying 16 S-boxes in one round while the
serial approach boils down to applying one S-box per round for a larger
number of rounds. As a result, we directly have that at least 16 serial
rounds are required to obtain a security similar to the one of a single
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parallel round (if less than 16 rounds are performed, then at least one
output bit will be equal to an input bit due to the wire-crossing per-
mutation). Worse, if the permutation is chosen such that each bit has
passed through an S-box after 16 serial rounds, then the 16 groups of 8
bits can be computed independently. In other words, the whole cipher
would be the concatenation of sixteen 8-bit ciphers in this case, and we
would at least need 17 rounds to obtain a security level similar to the
parallel approach. The same kind of observation holds when applying
more than one S-box per round.
7.3.2 Preliminary investigations: how many S-boxes per
round?
As in the previous section (about S-boxes that are easier to mask), an
exhaustive analysis of all the round structures that could give rise to
less S-box executions in total is out of reach. Yet, and as this num-
ber of S-box executions mainly depends on the SubBytes operations, we
considered several variants of it, while keeping ShiftRows, MixColumns
and AddKey unchanged. For this purpose, we have first analyzed how
some elementary diffusion properties depend on the number and posi-
tions of the S-boxes within the state. Namely, we considered (1) the
number of rounds so that all the input bytes have passed at least once
through an S-box (NrSbox); (2) the number of rounds so that all the
output bytes have at least one non-linear term (NrNlin); and (3) the
maximal number of rounds so that an input difference has a non-linear
effect in all the output bytes (NrDiff). In all three cases, these numbers
of rounds should ideally be low. They are given in Table 7.4 for different
S-box configurations. While such an analysis is of course heuristic, it
indicates that considering four S-boxes per round, located in a single
row of the state matrix seems an appealing solution. In the following,
we will carefully analyze the security of this setting in front of various
cryptanalysis techniques. Our goal will be to show that an AES-like
block cipher where each round only applies four “easy-to-mask” S-boxes
as found in the previous section can be secure. In particular, we will
select the number of rounds as R′ = 24, so that we have (roughly) twice
as less S-boxes executed than the original AES Rijndael (i.e. 24× 4 vs.
10× 16).
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NrSbox NrNlin NrDiff
1 S-box 3 2 4
4 S-boxes, 1 line 2 1 3
8 S-boxes, 2 lines 2 1 3
4 S-boxes, 1 column 3 1 3
4 S-boxes, 1 diagonal 2 2 3
4 S-boxes, 1 per column 2 2 3
4 S-boxes, Square 3 2 4
Table 7.4: Diffusion properties for different SB∗ configurations. Sym-
metric configurations provide the same results.
7.3.3 The block cipher Zorro: specifications
We will use a block size and key size of n = 128 bits, iterate 24 rounds
and call the combination of 4 rounds a step. Each round is a com-
position of four transforms: SubBytes∗, AddConstant, ShiftRows, and
MixColumns, where the last two ones are exactly the same operations
as in the AES Rijndael, SubBytes∗ is a variant of SubBytes where only
4 S-boxes are applied to the 4 bytes of the first row in the state ma-
trix, and AddConstant is a round-constant addition. It is limited to the
first state row. Constants can be generated “on-the-fly” according to
{i, i, i, i << 3}, where i is the round index and << the left shift opera-
tor. We additionally perform a key addition AddKey before the first and
after each step. As for the selection of the S-box, we will use Exam-
ple 7.2.1 from the previous section, and just add the constant 0xB2 to
remove a fixed point. The latter choice is motivated by best trading effi-
ciency (e.g. operations in F24 can be tabulated) and security (regarding
statistical and algebraic attacks). Eventually, and order to maintain high
implementation efficiency, we did not design any complex key scheduling
and simply add the master key each time AK is called - as in the block
cipher LED [88]. Using less key additions than in LED is justified by the
exclusion of related-key attacks from our security claims (see the paper
for more detailed analysis [74]). As for other lightweight block ciphers
such as NOEKEON [49] or PRINCE [27], we believe that related-key at-
tacks are not relevant for the intended use case (e.g. challenge-response
authentication in smart cards), and mainly focused on the generation
of a good permutation in the single key setting. A schematic view of
the full cipher is given in Figure 7.2. Reduced-round versions (used
in the following) maintain at least three steps, with number of rounds
following the pattern: 4-4-4-4-4-4, 4-4-4-4-4-3,4-4-4-4-4-2, 4-4-4-4-4-1,
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4-4-4-4-4, . . .
Figure 7.2: Block cipher Zorro: light gray operations are AES-like, dark
gray ones are new.
7.4 Security analysis
Despite its AES-like flavor, the irregular structure of the block cipher
Zorro makes it quite different than most recently proposed SPNs. As a
result, its security evaluation also requires more dedicated cryptanalysis
than usually considered when designing such regular ciphers. In this
section, we provide a preliminary investigation of a number of standard
and less standard attacks against Zorro, paying a particular attention
to different solutions to exploit the modified non-linear layer SB∗. While
further studies by external cryptanalysts would certainly be welcome, we
hope that the following analysis provides reasonable confidence that the
proposed structure can lead to a secure block cipher - and will trigger
more research in this direction.
7.4.1 Linear/differential cryptanalysis.
In general, security against linear [128] and differential [22] cryptanal-
ysis can be estimated by counting the number of active S-boxes [50].
Based on the specifications in the previous section, we would need to
pass through 28 (resp. 32) S-boxes in order to reach a security level
of 2128 against differential (resp. linear) cryptanalysis. Nevertheless,
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since less than 16 S-boxes are applied per round, simple bounds based
on the MDS property of the diffusion layer cannot be obtained such as
for the AES. An easy shortcoming is that trails that do not start in
the first state row will be propagated through the second round with
probability one. Besides, since the S-boxes only apply to one out of
the four input bytes of MC in each round, the number of active S-boxes
also progresses more slowly. As a result, the main question for bound-
ing security against these statistical attacks is to determine the extent
to which actual characteristics can take advantage of this feature, by
keeping a maximum number of inactive S-boxes. For this purpose, we
propose a technique inspired by hash functions cryptanalysis, that finds
the best balance between this number of inactive S-boxes and the num-
ber of freedom degrees for the differential (or linear) paths. Taking the
example of differential cryptanalysis, we first consider a fully active in-
put state (we discuss next how to adapt our reasoning to other input
differences) and a fixed (unknown) key. In this case, we have 16 + 16
degrees of freedom at the beginning of the differential path (in bytes, i.e.
we have 232∗8 possible trials to test if the differential path is verified).
A first observation is that, in order to have x inactive S-boxes in the
next round, we need to verify at least x byte conditions through the MC
operation, which will spend x bytes of the freedom degrees available.
Conversely, we have that verifying x byte conditions through MC can de-
sactivate at most x S-boxes in the following rounds.2 Our bounds then
follow from the fact that desactivating an S-box is only possible as long
as degrees of freedom are available (otherwise there will be no solutions
for the differential path). That is, we can consider that for each round
i we can ask xi conditions to be verified through the MC transform, and
that at most xi S-boxes will not be activated in the following rounds
because of these conditions. Hence, the following inequalities have to be
verified to find a valid path. They represent the degrees of freedom still
available after r rounds, and the cumulated number of active S-boxes
(that must be smaller than 28 as previously pointed out):
r∑
i=1
xi < 32, and 4× r −
r∑
i=1
xi < 28.
For the sake of simplicity, we can just consider the average number of
conditions x¯ that we can impose at each round. We then observe that the
2For example, consider the case where the first output byte of MC is inactive,
meaning that we have one active S-box less in the next round. For more S-boxes to
be inactive, we would have to pay more conditions on MC. Alternatively, say MC has
only one active output difference per column (hence implying x = 12 byte conditions).
Then, we will have at most 6 inactive S-boxes in the next two rounds, before coming
back to the whole active state with 6 < x.
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highest number of rounds is achieved for r = 14 and x¯ = 32/14 = 2.285,
where we have 24 active S-boxes and no more freedom degrees available
(for 15 rounds, the number of active S-boxes exceeds 28). Eventually, we
note that when the initial state is not completely active, e.g. taking only
Y possible differences, we have that with cin = log2(2
16∗8/Y )/8 byte
conditions we will be able to desactivate at most cin S-boxes. Hence,
the inequalities taking all possible input differences into account become:
r∑
i=1
xi < 32− cin, and 4× r −
r∑
i=1
xi − cin < 28.
They provide the same result as before: 14 rounds is the upper bound
for building a classical differential path.3 A similar reasoning for linear
cryptanalysis leads to an upper bound of 16 rounds (out of 24).
7.4.2 Truncated differential attacks
In view of the non-linear transformation in Zorro, a natural extension
of differential cryptanalysis to investigate is the use of dedicated trun-
cated differentials [107]. In particular, the most damaging truncated
differential patterns are those that would exclude active bytes affected
by non-linear operations. For this reason, we analyzed the possible exis-
tence of cycles of differences that verify transitions from three active rows
of the state to another three active rows state with probability one for
any number of rounds (i.e. excluding non-linear operations). Such pat-
terns are represented in Figure 7.3, where big squares represent states,
small squares represent bytes, highlighted ones are affected by non-linear
transformations and gray bytes are the ones with a non-zero difference.
Truncated differentials only following the pattern of the figure would
never go through the S-boxes. Quite naturally, staying in this pattern
for several rounds implies more conditions, but if an input difference
exists so that it follows the pattern for some rounds before regenerating
this first input difference again, this would imply that the pattern can
be followed for an infinite number of rounds as a cycle would have been
created. If no cycle exists, we have essentially 4 byte constraints per
round for 12 unknowns, and we run out of degrees of freedom to verify
the pattern after 3 rounds. As a result, we essentially have to ensure that
no cycle has been created, that would prevent differences from affecting
the first state row for an infinite number of rounds. The probability that
3Note that despite these bounds to being possibly loose for small number of rounds,
they also guarantee security against boomerang attacks. Namely, we have at least
9 active S-boxes after 10 rounds, which would correspond to best differentials with
probabilities p, q ≈ 242 in a boomerang attack (leading to p2q2 ≈ 2−168).
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such a cycle exists is small (about 264−96 + 232−96 + 2−96 ≈ 2−32). Yet,
in order to be sure they do not exist, we performed an exhaustive search
over all the 3-row input differences, and checked whether they generate
a cycle or end by spreading the difference. The naive cost of such a
search is 212∗8 = 296. We describe a time and memory efficient alterna-
tive in Subsubsection 7.4.2. It allowed us to verify that the pattern of
Figure 7.3 can be verified for at most two rounds.
SB* SR MC SB* SR MC
Figure 7.3: Two rounds of truncated differential pattern.
Exhaustive search for the truncated differential
We investigate the number of rounds for which a truncated pattern with
no difference in the first row (see Figure 7.3) can be found. Instead of
testing all the 296 possible input differences at once, we will process col-
umn by column. The main idea is that when considering a column with
only three input active bytes, given two of these bytes differences, there
exists one and only one byte difference for the third active byte such that
the output of MC applied to this column will have a 0 difference on the
first row. We easily derive from this fact that there exists 216 column
differential patterns having no difference in the first byte before and after
the application of MC. At this point we could form the (216)4 differentials
and test them to see what is the maximum number of rounds for which
the truncated pattern is preserved. This would cost 264 which is still
too large and thus we will try to reduce the complexity by determin-
ing the differentials for which the truncated pattern is preserved after
2 rounds before launching any exhaustive search. We denote by c0...3
the differences in the columns at the beginning of the second round and
by c0...3i the four bytes of differences from column ci. To compute the
differential obtained in column i after the second round we have to know
the 4 bytes of the form cji+j (due to SR). Since we know that for any i,
c0i = 0, then computing the differential only requires the knowledge of
3 bytes. Moreover, since we are looking for differentials preserving the
truncated pattern, 2 bytes determine the value of the third one. The
idea is then to use a hash table to match couples of columns. More pre-
cisely: (i) for any of the 232 differential values for (c0, c1) determine the
values of c32 and c
1
3 such that the columns 2 and 3 will have zeros in the
first coordinate after MC (ii) store in a hash table the 232 corresponding
values (c30, c
1
1, c
3
2, c
1
3) (iii) for any of the 2
32 differential values for (c2, c3)
determine the values of c30 and c
1
1 such that the columns 0 and 1 will
have zeros in the first coordinate after MC (iv) match these values with
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the ones in the hash table and keep the matching tuples. The tuples
obtained correspond to differentials such that the truncated pattern re-
mains valid after 2 rounds. The expected number of such tuples is 232
times 232 for the number of configurations times 2−32 for the probability
that two configurations match that is 232, that can be obtained with a
time complexity of 232. We now have a small enough number of differ-
entials to test. Eventually, we attached an additional third round to all
these differentials and we could not find any one corresponding to the
truncated pattern after these 3 rounds.
7.4.3 Derivative and algebraic analysis
A standard requirement for iterated block cipher constructions is that
a few rounds allow reaching the maximum algebraic degree (here 127).
Nevertheless, as in the previous sections standard techniques for esti-
mating this degree (e.g. [28]) do not directly apply. In the following, we
approximate that the state-bit equations expressed as function of their
input-bit variables reach their maximum degree after 6 rounds. For this
purpose we first observed that while being of degree 7, the chosen S-box
has four of its coordinates of degree 6 (and the four components of de-
gree 7 share the same degree-7 term). Taking into account the particular
structure of the SB∗ layer, we have deduced the following relation for es-
timating the degree of the bits of the state. Assuming that at round r,
the bits from the first row have degree dr0 and the others d
r
1,2,3, then the
degrees obtained after the next S-box application are dr+10 ≤ dr0 +6dr1,2,3
and dr+11,2,3 ≤ dr0. Since the initial values are d00 = d01,2,3 = 1, we directly
obtain that after 5 rounds, the bound is larger than 128 and thus the bit
degrees should be close (or equal to) 127. Following, and in order to ver-
ify the validity of these equations, we have additionally checked in detail
what happens during the third round. Starting with the S-box output,
we found that their degree is 53, which is quite close to the 55 obtained
with our previous estimation. We further noticed that the monomials
of degree 53 of these 4 bytes have 28 variables in common (which cor-
responds to the terms that reached degree 7 after the first SB∗ layer).
Amongst the 25 remaining variables, 20 are exclusive of each monomial,
and the remaining five can take various values. Several monomials of
degree 53 can also be generated after the S-boxes, and because of the
symmetry of the construction, we can ensure that after each S-box, the
5 remaining variables take at least 10 different values. This means that
in the (unlikely) worst-case scenario where round 4 would not increase
the degree, two rounds later the sixth round will multiply for sure the
four terms of degree 53 (because of the MC of round 4 and the SR of
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round 5). Hence, we can guarantee that the degree will reach at least
28+20∗4+10 = 118 at this stage. As from round 4 on, all the variables
appear in all the bytes, each S-box will at least add one new variable to
the highest-degree term. This means that the maximum degree is surely
reached in round 6.
Cube testers. We also launched a heuristic analysis of higher-order
derivatives within Zorro. For this purpose, we used the cube testers
introduced in [8] and next improved in [57, 106] by imposing condi-
tions that allow detecting non-random properties for more rounds and
recovering some key bits. Cube testers embrace other analysis tools
(e.g. [65, 68]) and essentially aim at (statistically) detecting some non-
random properties of some bits in the derivatives of some cipher state
equations. As previously discussed, the reduced number of S-boxes in
SB∗ leads the degree of the internal state bits to grow more slowly and
less homogeneously than for the AES. Hence, we have performed several
tests to check the number of rounds for which we could distinguish our
construction from a random one. In particular, we have looked for linear
dependencies, neutrality of variables and balancedness in the super-poly
terms associated to the cube tested. Experiments were performed for
several trade-offs between the number of samples (up to 224) and the size
of the cubes (up to 216). We also tested different cubes, but we obtained
similar results with most of them. The most adequate ones turned out
to be either corresponding to any couple of bytes in the 4× 4 matrix, or
corresponding to a set of bits located at the same position in the state
bytes. The minimum numbers of rounds such that no particular weak-
ness was detected are reported in Table 7.5, for different S-box choices
and number of S-boxes per round. The highest number of rounds that
we could distinguish was 7, which could be done using 28 samples and a
cube of size 216. Considering more samples or cubes did not allow us to
extend the distinguisher to any more rounds. This is to compare with
4 rounds that could be distinguished for the AES Rijndael. Hence, this
experiment suggests that 24 rounds of Zorro should provide a similar
security level as the AES with respect to this type of properties.
Table 7.5: Minimum number of rounds for which the cube tester did not
find weaknesses.
2-byte cubes 16-bit cubes
SB SB∗ SB SB∗
AES S-box 4 6 4 6
Zorro S-box 4 6 5 7
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7.5 Cryptanalysis
A number of independent works have attempted and succeeded in crypt-
analyzing Zorro, taking advantage of its non-conventional design. The
most severe weaknesses are a differential trail with probability less than
2128 and weak keys dues to an invariant subspace attack.
As far as differential attacks are concerned, the first example was
exhibited by Wang et al. [192]. This attack works with time complexity
2108 and data complexity 2112. It is based on an iterated differential
characteristic that exploits the fact that the AES MixColumns(M) is of
order 4 (i.e. M4 = Id). Other differential trials have been exhibited
since. Actually in [11] Bar-On et al. presented a generic algorithm
to test the resistance against linear and differential attacks of ciphers
with partial substitution layers. However, Bar-On et al. left open the
possibility to obtain a cipher with partial substitution layers, that uses
less S-boxes than a cipher with full substitution layers, and remains
secure against linear and differential attack.
As far as weak keys are concerned, they mainly related to invariant
subspace attacks, which lead to dense sets of 2−32 weak keys [87, 117].
These weak keys are due to invariant subspaces [116] and internal dif-
ferential attacks [87].

Chapter 8
Boolean Masking Scheme
Resistance against side-channel attacks has been considered as an op-
timization goal for low-cost ciphers, as exemplified by PICARO [149]
and Zorro [74]. Both proposals aim at designing to efficient masked
implementations. Both ciphers lead to performance gains over the AES
Rijndael which become more significant as the number of shares in-
creases.
These previous works led to several useful observations regarding the
relation between masking and the linear/non-linear operations used in
block ciphers. In this chapter, we aim to complement them by focus-
ing on two important scopes for further research they left open. First
from the performance point-of-view, both PICARO and Zorro mini-
mize the number of field multiplications per encrypted plaintext. This
is a natural direction as it leads to improvements applicable to both
Boolean [169] and polynomial [156] masking schemes. Yet, further spe-
cialization to Boolean masking could potentially lead to additional gains.
For example, the S-boxes of lightweight ciphers PRESENT [26] and
NOEKEON [49] require three multiplications in F24 . This makes them
less suitable than Zorro and PICARO for polynomial masking. But
they have efficient representations minimizing the number of AND gates
which could be exploited in Boolean masked implementations. Next
from the security point-of-view, both designs are based on somewhat
unusual Feistel/SPN structures (in order to deal with non-bijective S-
boxes in [149], and to minimize the number of S-boxes per round in [74]).
So another (quite pragmatic) open question is whether we can design
ciphers for efficient masking based on more standard techniques (e.g.
directly exploiting the wide-trail strategy [50] as other lightweight algo-
rithms).
In this context, we base our investigations on two additional observa-
tions. First, Boolean masking is particularly efficient when applied to op-
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erations that are linear over F2 (since such operations can be performed
independently on each share). As a result, and in contrast with many
existing block ciphers, it appears interesting to have linear diffusion lay-
ers implemented as look-up tables, since they can be straightforwardly
exploited for any number of shares.1 In addition field multiplications for
diffusion layers are generally perform with look-up tables, by using look-
up table diffusion we reduce the implementation cost. Second, since our
focus is on software implementations, we also have a strong incentive for
simple and regular designs where computations are always performed
on well aligned data. For example, manipulating bits and bytes such
as in PRESENT raises additional challenges for the implementers (to
guarantee that the bit manipulations do not leak more information than
the byte ones). These observations combine into the conclusion that a
bitslice cipher with look-up table-based diffusion layers and non-linear
S-boxes with efficient gate-level representation seems an excellent can-
didate for efficient Boolean masked software implementations.
Following, our contributions are threefold. First, we separately an-
alyze S-boxes and linear layers meeting the previous objectives, and
compare a number of constructions from the cryptanalytic and efficient
masking points-of-view. Interestingly, this part of our study confirms
the previous observation that if side-channel resistance via masking is
added as a block cipher design criteria, the balance between linear and
non-linear operations has to be changed towards more linear ones. More
linear operations are interesting for all application where non-linear op-
eration are expensive, e.g. MPC and fully homomorphic encryption and
the family block ciphers “LowMC” [5]. Such investigations open a large
space of possible ciphers that we define as LS-designs (essentially made
of a combination of look-up table-based L-boxes and bitslice S-boxes).
We then argue that such designs have interesting properties for efficient
masking. For this purpose and for concreteness, we specify two instances
of 128-bit block ciphers and analyze their security against a number of
standard cryptanalytic techniques. Doing so, we took care to make our
studies as generic as possible (i.e. leading to conclusions for LS-designs
rather than for their instances). We also considered the impact of choos-
ing involutive or non-involutive components, and show that the first ones
mainly lead the security guarantees provided by the wide-trail strategy
to be tighter. That is explain for differential in Subsection 8.3.1. Even-
tually, we compare the performances of our two example instances with
the ones of the AES, PICARO, Zorro and NOEKEON on an 8-bit mi-
crocontroller (and argue that they also behave well on desktop CPUs
1Masking non-linear look-up tables has a cost that is quadratic in this number [41].
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with SIMD units). Overall, these results confirm the interest of bitslice
ciphers in the context of physically secure implementations, as hinted
in [48]. While the instances of designs we suggest are not yet optimal
(because of the hardness of finding optimal L- and S-boxes) and do re-
quire more analysis, their performances are comparable to (or slightly
better than) the ones of NOEKEON which is known to have an ex-
tremely compact gate-level representation [103]. Therefore, we believe
LS-designs formalize an interesting family of ciphers combining excellent
performances (also for unprotected implementations), strong security
guarantees, regularity/simplicity and efficient masking, i.e. properties
that generally benefit to resistance against side-channel attacks and are
also appealing for more general applications.
8.1 Design rationale
8.1.1 Bitslice S-boxes
In this first subsection, we analyze various S-boxes having an efficient bit-
slice representation. Our comparisons will consider various sizes (namely
4-bit, 8-bit and 16-bit), in order to study their tradeoff with the different
diffusion layers in the next subsection. They will also take into account
both standard cryptographic properties (such as the non-linearity, dif-
ferential profile and algebraic degree of which the definitions are recalled
in Subsection 2.1.5) and masking efficiency considerations. For this pur-
pose, and following the techniques of ISW, we will simply consider the
number of AND and XOR gates needed for each S-box. As already men-
tioned, the cost of XOR gates is linear in the number of shares in the
masking scheme, while it is quadratic for AND gates (which will therefore
count as a more important criterion in our evaluations). Note that since
we are only concentrating on non-linear S-boxes, each Boolean function
defining them has to be linearly independent of the other ones. As a
result, we need at least the same number of AND gates as output size of
the S-box to reach this goal.
Why bitslicing? From Algorithm 6, it is easy to see that the difference
of performance between Boolean and polynomial masking can (at least
partially) be explained by the implementation efficiency of the underly-
ing non-linear operation. As explained in Section 4.1, an AND gate can
usually be performed in a single clock cycle on most computing devices.
By contrast, a field multiplication generally requires the use of log/alog
tables (if large fields are considered) which will typically account for 20
to 40 clock cycles in embedded microcontrollers. These numbers can
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be improved when small fields are considered, e.g. multiplication can
be tabulated if elements are represented with less than 4 bits, but even
in this case the non-linear operations will require 3 to 5 cycles. As a
result, masking at the gate-level in a bitslice manner as we investigate
next should bring performance improvements.
We now present a couple of S-boxes with efficient gate-level represen-
tation. The main challenge is that the enumeration of S-boxes is rapidly
out of reach as their size increases. Besides, finding the best gate-level
description of a large S-box is also a hard problem. As a result, we will
start from the 4-bit case for which exhaustive analysis is possible, and
then take advantage of heuristics from the block cipher literature, in
order to turn these 4-bit S-boxes into larger ones.
4-bit S-boxes.
The result of an exhaustive search of optimal bitslice S-boxes can be
found in [186]. Its main result is that the so-called “Class 13” is the
best option for this purpose, and can be implemented with 4 non-linear
gates and a total of 9 instructions, with the best differential and linear
probabilities that can be reached. It is represented in Figure 8.1 (a).
The only limitation of “Class 13” is that it is not involutive. We ran a
similar exhaustive search with a slightly larger instruction set (including
nor gates, nand gates, and more copy instructions) while restricting the
number of non-linear gates to 4. As a result, we could find an involutive
S-box with similar properties as the Class 13 one: it is represented in
Figure 8.1 (b). Note that the use of Toffoli gates (defined in [185])
allows seeing this S-box as a generalized Feistel network, which explains
the involution property.
From 4-bit S-boxes to larger ones.
Various constructions can be considered for this purpose, ranging from
ad hoc (scaling 4-bit S-boxes to 8-bit ones) to generic solutions (scaling
s-bit S-boxes to 2s-bit ones). As in Section 7.2, we analyzed a couple of
natural candidates and report on the most interesting results.
In the first (ad hoc) case, we considered a proposal coming from the
Whirlpool hash function (which only requires four 4-bit S-boxes) and
generalized it by considering a linear layer between the two levels of
S-boxes (see Figure 8.1 (c)). Since our goal is to minimize the number
of AND gates, such a solution was better than proposals with six 4-bit
S-boxes as in the KHAZAD block cipher [12].
Alternatively, we looked at Feistel networks such as used in the
MISTY block cipher [130] and represented in Figure 8.1 (d). A mini-
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Figure 8.1: (a) Non involutive 4-bit S-box with optimal bitslice represen-
tation. (b) Involutive 4-bit S-box with optimal bitslice representation.
(c) Construction of 8-bit S-boxes from 4-bit ones as in the Whirlpool
hash function [167]. (d) Construction of 2s-bit S-boxes from s-bit ones
as in the MISTY block cipher [130].
mum of three rounds were considered in order to avoid trivial weaknesses
with respect to linear and differential cryptanalyses. One advantage of
such a construction is that it directly gives rise to involutive compo-
nents. Besides, it has been shown that three rounds of such a network
allow squaring the linear and differential probabilities of the round func-
tion, on average over the keys. Note however that the impact of this
averaging only appears for 16-bit (or larger) S-boxes (i.e. when apply-
ing the MISTY structure twice, recursively), because the impact of the
linear hull effect only becomes significant from this size on [142]. The
exhaustive search over all the 16-bit S-boxes having the structure of Fig-
ure 8.1 (d) was too computationally intensive and we only report on the
best candidate we found. Note that for 8-bit S-boxes, we additionally
investigated unbalanced Feistel networks built from 3- and 5-bit ones
(as also proposed with the MISTY cipher), which provided a slightly
improved non-involutive candidate (with one AND gate less).
The results of our different S-box searches are summarized in Ta-
ble 8.1. For comparison purposes, we also reported the same metrics for
the NOEKEON S-box, and the bitslice representation of the AES S-box
proposed in [29].
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8.1.2 Table-based diffusion layers
In a bitslice implementation of a block cipher, the same register i holds
the i-th bit of several S-box inputs/outputs. In this context, we are
focussing on linear diffusion boxes (next denoted as L-boxes) that mix
bits inside these registers and can be applied to them in parallel. From an
implementation point of view, computing an L-box will just correspond
to a table access. Yet, and compared to the usual case of non-linear
tables, we can benefit from more flexibility. Namely, since the table is
linear, it can be decomposed into several smaller tables. This can be
useful in order to only store tables that are adapted to the memory
characteristics of the target platform. For instance, a 16-bit L-box can
be implemented as four 8-bit to 8-bit look-up tables and two XORs.
Our comparisons of diffusion layers will mainly be based on the branch
number. Thanks to this number, we can directly evaluate the linear and
differential properties of any design based on a combination of S-boxes
and L-boxes according to the wide-trail strategy. We define the branch
number of an L-box L as:
B(L) = min
x 6=0
(|x|+ |L(x)|).
It follows that the linear branch number and the differential branch
number of our diffusion layer is also B(L). This guarantees that any
non-trivial trail in two consecutive cipher rounds will have at least B(L)
active S-boxes (see [50, Th. 1]). Note that an l-bit L-box with branch-
number b is equivalent to a binary linear code with parameters [2l, l, b]
(length 2l, dimension l, distance b). Therefore, we can use results from
coding theory to design our L-boxes, such as [84].
8-bit L-boxes. The highest branch number possible for an 8-bit L-box
is 5. We ran an exhaustive search and we found 225.2 candidates with
such a branch number, including 33 involutions. They activate at least
5/16 of the S-boxes.
16-bit L-boxes. The highest branch number possible for a 16-bit L-box
is 8. It is not feasible to run an exhaustive search, but there are several
known codes with parameters [16, 8, 8]. In particular, it is possible to
build a quite structured 16-bit involution with branch number 8 from a
systematic generator of the Reed-Muller code RM(2, 5), as represented
in the left part of the figure below (a non-involutive candidate is given
on the right part of the same figure). This kind of L-boxes activates at
least one fourth of the S-boxes over two rounds.
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32-bit L-boxes. For a 32-bit L-box, the optimal branch number is
not known. The best known code gives a branch number of 12, and the
known upper bound shows that it is impossible to reach a branch number
higher than 16. Therefore the best known option will only activate 12/64
of the S-boxes.
We show a comparison of the best known L-box diffusion layer and
the AES diffusion layer in Table 8.2. This shows that L-box diffusion
layers do not have as good security bounds as AES-like diffusion layers
(mainly because they are obtained over two rounds rather than four), but
the ability to use a bitslice implementation is an important advantage
for side-channel resistance.
Alternatively if the state is considered as a vector of elements over a
larger field (the S-box outputs), the diffusion layer can be written as a
binary matrix. This approach was used previously, e.g. in the design of
ARIA [115].
Table 8.2: Comparison of linear layers.
# S-boxes Active S-boxes
8-bit L-box 8 5/16 (31.25%)
16-bit L-box 16 8/32 (25%)
32-bit L-box 32 12/64 (18.75%)
AES linear layer 16 25/64 (39.06%)
8.1.3 Which S-box with which L-box?
The composition of s-bit S-boxes and l-bit L-boxes directly gives rise to
various candidate n = l× s-bit ciphers. In this subsection, we illustrate
the tradeoffs resulting from these choices in a 64-bit case (with 8-bit and
16-bit L-boxes).
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4-bit S-box and 16-bit L-box. Using the components described pre-
viously, the best involutive S-box requires 4 linear operations and 4
non-linear ones, and achieves Prdiff = 2
−2 and Prlin = 2−1. Therefore,
we need at least 32 active S-boxes to have a secure cipher. Since we have
8 active S-boxes every 2 rounds using a 16-bit L-box, this corresponds
to at least 8 rounds. In an 8-bit CPU, it would require 64 non-linear
operations, 128 XORs and 128 table look-ups.
8-bit S-box and 8-bit L-box. Using the components described pre-
viously, the best involutive S-box requires 24 linear operations and 12
non-linear operations, and achieves Prdiff = 2
−4 and Prlin = 2−2. There-
fore, we need at least 16 active S-boxes to have a secure cipher. Since
we have 5 active S-boxes every 2 rounds using an 8-bit L-box, this cor-
responds to roughly 6 rounds. In an 8-bit CPU, it would require 72
non-linear operations, 144 XORs and 48 table look-ups.
Interestingly, we can see that the first option requires a total of 320
elementary operations, to be compared with only 264 ones for the second
one. By contrast, the first option has a reduced number of non-linear
operations, which will gradually dominate if a masked implementation
with large number of shares is considered. While somewhat specific,
this example confirms the trend already observed in [74] that the ratio
between the amount of linear and non-linear operations increases in
block ciphers that are easier to mask. Besides, it also shows that a small
L-box can activate a larger proportion of the S-boxes, but these larger
S-boxes are generally more expensive (if they are selected to have good
cryptographic properties). In this 64-bit comparison, the two effects
are of similar magnitude, but of course the conclusion dependents on
the block cipher size and on the knowledge we have about large bitslice
S-boxes and L-boxes.
8.2 LS-designs specifications
Following the previous section, we can define LS-designs as the family
of block ciphers specified in Algorithm 23. The description directly
suggests simplicity and regularity as one important advantage of such
ciphers: instances can be characterized by selecting a bitslice S-box S,
an L-box L, a number of rounds Nr and constants C(r). In the next
sections, we will consider two 128-bit instances of LS-designs in order to
illustrate their security against cryptanalysis and good implementation
properties. The bit-size was chosen both because of the observations
in [187] and in order to be comparable with NOEKEON (which is among
the best ciphers published so far for efficient bitslice representation).
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Algorithm 23 LS-design with l-bit L-boxes and s-bit S-boxes (n = l ·s)
x← P ⊕K;
for 0 ≤ r < Nr do
for 0 ≤ i < l do
x[i, ?] = S[x[i, ?]];
end for
for 0 ≤ j < s do
x[?, j] = L[x[?, j]];
end for
x← x⊕K ⊕ C(r);
end for
return x
Involutive instance (Robin). We take the S-box denoted as “MISTY
+ Class13” from Table 8.1 and the involutive L-box in Section 8.1.2.
The cipher has 16 rounds and constants are computed as [L(i) 0 . . . 0]
with i the round index.
Non-involutive instance (Fantomas). We take the S-box denoted
as “MISTY + 3/5-bit S-boxes” from Table 8.1 and the non-involutive
L-box in Section 8.1.2. The cipher has 12 rounds and uses the same
constants as Robin.
8.3 Security evaluation
We now investigate the security properties of LS-designs, trying to ex-
tract general conclusions that apply to our family of ciphers in the first
place. For concreteness, we will also consider more specific claims re-
lated to the aforementioned instances. In this respect, we note that
Robin and Fantomas were specified with slightly different goals. Namely,
the first one aims to have security margins similar to NOEKEON, while
the second was mainly defined in order to illustrate the impact of choos-
ing involutive components with respect to the efficiency limits that can
be expected with LS-designs. Note that we aim for single-key security
in both cases (i.e. exclude related-key and chosen key attacks from our
claims). In particular, there is a simple related-differential with a single
active S-box per round if the state difference can be corrected using a
key difference.
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8.3.1 Security against linear and differential cryptanaly-
sis
As explained in Section 8.1.2, the structure of the cipher gives a simple
upper bound on the maximum probability of differential characteristics,
and the maximum bias of linear trails. Any two-round trail activates at
least B(L) S-boxes, and this gives the following bounds for any 2r-round
trail:
Prlin(2r) ≤ Prmaxlin (S)r·B(L), Prdiff(2r) ≤ Prmaxdiff (S)r·B(L). (8.1)
With the parameters of Section 8.2, this gives:
Prlin(2r) ≤ 2−16·r, Prdiff(2r) ≤ 2−32·r.
Such bounds prevent simple linear and differential attacks based on a
trail over more than 8 rounds. We use 16 (resp. 12) rounds in Robin
(resp. Fantomas), so as to have a good (resp. less conservative) security
margin. We now study the tightness of these bounds, and how to build
optimal differential/linear trails.
Product trails for Robin. To study differential and linear trails, we
first consider a set of special states that can be written as the tensor
product of an s-bit vector (corresponding to the S-box input and denoted
with Greek letters) and an l-bit vector (corresponding to the L-box input
and denoted with Latin letters):
α⊗ x =

α0x0 α0x1 α0x2 α0x3 α0x4 · · · α0xl
α1x0 α1x1 α1x2 α1x3 α1x4 α1xl
α2x0 α2x1 α2x2 α2x3 α2x4 · · · α2xl
...
...
. . .
...
αsx0 αsx1 αsx2 αsx3 αsx4 · · · αsxl
 .
For those states, the S-box layer and the L-box layer act independently:
S-layer(α⊗ x) = S(α)⊗ x, L-layer(α⊗ x) = α⊗ L(x).
Hence we have the same behavior for differences and for linear masks.
Namely, we can build differential characteristics (resp. linear trails)
where the differences (resp. selection masks) are written as tensor prod-
ucts. In particular, if L[x] = y, and α  β with probability p through
the S-box, then x⊗ α y ⊗ β through one round with probability p|x|,
where |x| denotes the Hamming weight of x.
When the cipher is built as an involution, we further have β  α with
probability p, and L[y] = x, hence y⊗β  x⊗α through one round with
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SB LB SB LB
x⊗ α p=2
−2
x⊗ β y ⊗ β p=2
−6
y ⊗ α x⊗ α
Figure 8.2: Toy example of product trail for an involution-based 32-
bit cipher, with α = 0110, β = 1101, x = 00100000, y = 11000101,
Pr[α β] = 2−2.
probability p|y|, giving an iterated two-round trail (as illustrated with a
toy example in Figure 8.2). If α, β, x, and y are chosen optimally, this
path reaches the security bound of Equation (8.1), hence showing that
the bound is tight. Using the parameters of Robin, optimal choices of α
and β give p = 2−4, while optimal choices of x and y give |x|+ |y| = 8.
This directly leads to a two-round iterated differential characteristic with
probability 2−32 (or 2−128 for 8 rounds), and a two-round iterated linear
trail with bias 2−16 (or 2−64 for 8 rounds).
From involutive to non-involutive components. If we do not re-
strict the design to involutive S- and L-boxes, we can hope that the
bound given by Equation (8.1) will not be tight. More precisely, we ex-
pect that there should not be any trail reaching the minimal number of
active S-boxes with the optimal probability for every S-box transition.
For this purpose, we first count the number of active S-boxes for trun-
cated trails. That is, for each state we only care about which columns
are non-zero and build all the possible transitions. In this context, it
is important to note that a truncated input to the diffusion layer can
give several different truncated outputs, and does not necessarily behave
linearly. For instance, if we start from 00101000, we have to consider
five possible transitions:
L[00101000], L[00100000] ∨ L[00001000], L[00101000] ∨ L[00100000],
L[00101000] ∨ L[00001000], L[00101000] ∨ L[00100000] ∨ L[00001000].
More generally, the possible transitions are of the following form:
x0 ∨ x1 ∨ . . . ∨ xl  L[x0] ∨ L[x1] ∨ . . . ∨ L[xl]
Non-linear transitions will usually lead to states with more active
columns, but the extra degrees of freedom from the non-linearity allow
better trails than the product trails with only linear transitions. For
l = 8, we ran an exhaustive search over all L-boxes with branch number
5, and found that the best ones give trails with at least 53 active S-boxes
for 16 rounds (rather than 40 active S-boxes when L is an involution).
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For l = 16, building all the possible transitions for a fixed L-box is
already a hard problem, so we cannot test many different L-boxes. We
ran a randomized search by permuting the lines and columns of the
RM(2, 5) systematic generator used in Section 8.1.2. The best non-
involutive L-box we found (given in Section 8.1.2) gives truncated trails
with at least 64 active S-boxes over 12 rounds. More precisely, we can
compute the minimum number of active S-boxes with an involutive L-
box and our best non-involutive L-box as:
Rounds 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Involutive 1 8 9 16 17 24 25 32
Non-involutive 1 8 12 20 24 30 34 40
Rounds 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Involutive 33 40 41 48 49 56 57 64
Non-involutive 46 52 58 64 68 74 80 86
If we consider a 64-bit cipher with l = 16 and s = 4, we can go
further in the analysis and find the best differential trails with com-
pletely instantiated differences. We expect that this will again im-
prove the upper bound on the probability of trails, because in gen-
eral it is not possible to select a specific difference so that all S-box
transitions have maximal probability. We ran this search using an A∗
algorithm [89], with some additional ideas from Matsui’s branch-and-
bound algorithm [129]. We used the best truncated trails as heuristic
estimate for future path-cost in A∗, and refined it by computing the
best trails with increasing numbers of rounds. Once we know the prob-
ability of the best instantiated r-round trail, we update the heuristic
if some truncated r-round trails were expected to have a higher prob-
ability. Doing so, we found that some choices of L-box and S-box give
6-round trails with probability at most 2−64 and 8-round trails with
probability at most 2−90 (the candidate L-box in Section 8.1.2 together
with S-box S = {6, 1, 0, 7, E, 4, F, D, 5, B, 2, C, 3, 8, A, 9} is an example).
These values should be compared with 2−48 (resp. 2−64) if L and S
are restricted to involutions, and to the previous bound of 2−56 (resp.
2−80) for the same components using the analysis with truncated trails.
This indicates that LS-designs based on involutive components require
about 4/3 as many rounds as with non-involutive components to reach
a similar security level for these parameters (l = 16 and s = 4). The
computation took several days and dozens of gigabytes of RAM. We be-
lieve it gives a good indication about the relative security of involutive
vs. non-involutive ciphers that should also be valid with larger S-boxes,
even though we cannot run the search for optimal trails with l = 16 and
s = 8 in practice.
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Application to Fantomas. Using our search for truncated trail, we have
found the following bounds for linear and differential trails on Fantomas:
Prlin(6) ≤ 2−56, Prdiff(6) ≤ 2−112,
Prlin(7) ≤ 2−68, Prdiff(7) ≤ 2−136.
These bounds imply that linear and differential attacks on Fantomas can
only work with trails over 6 rounds or less, and we have a security margin
of 6 rounds. We expect that this bound is not tight, as shown by our
analysis of instantiated trails on a 64-bit LS-design (but we cannot run a
similar analysis on Fantomas in practice). In addition, we note that the
best attack on Robin is based on a truncated differential corresponding
to several simple trails, but this effect will be quite limited for Fantomas
because optimal trails do not have the strong structure of product trails
(on 6 rounds, the best truncated differential using a collection of product
trails has a probability of 2−117).
8.3.2 Algebraic attacks
In algebraic cryptanalysis, a cipher is expressed as a large system of
non-linear equations (typically over F2) and a solution for the system
is searched. Although it is possible to describe any algorithm in terms
of multivariate equations, solving them is an NP-hard problem already
for quadratic ones. The precise complexity of algebraic cryptanalysis is
difficult to evaluate and security against these attacks is usually argued
by exhibiting the size and number of unknowns in the systems, together
with a reasoning about the cipher’s algebraic degree.
S-boxes in LS-designs can be described in the same number of equa-
tions as the number of non-linear gates. Let e denote the number of
non-linear gates, l denote the size of the L-box and Nr by the number
of rounds. Then, the entire system for a fixed key LS-design consists of
(Nr · e · 128/l) quadratic equations in (Nr · 128 · 2) variables. That leads
to 3072 equations in 4096 variables for Robin and 2112 equations in 3072
variables for Fantomas (the AES has 6400 equations in 2560 variables).
We expect these numbers to be sufficient for both instances to be secure
against algebraic attacks, in view of the time and memory complexi-
ties needed to solve small-scale AES variants presented in [39]. As for
the algebraic degree, we used the work [28] to compute the cumulative
algebraic degree in function of the number of rounds. This algebraic
degree reaches maximum after five rounds for both Robin and Fantomas,
in which case a partition of size 2127 is required to construct zero-sum
distinguishers. More precisely, we have:
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# of rounds 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Robin 6 36 112 125 127 127 127 127
Fantomas 5 25 110 125 127 127 127 127
8.4 Performance evaluations
The main objective of LS-designs is to allow efficient and secure soft-
ware implementations for 8-bit micro-controllers. Therefore, we first
report on the performances of protected implementations of Robin and
Fantomas on an Atmel ATmega644p micro-controller, together with the
AES, Zorro, PICARO and NOEKEON.2 The results in Figure 8.3 (given
for different number of shares in the masking scheme) show that the
performances of Robin and NOEKEON (both involutive ciphers) are re-
markably close. They confirm that bitslice ciphers optimized for Boolean
masking allow more efficient implementations than previously obtained,
e.g. with the AES, Zorro or PICARO. They also illustrate the additional
gains that can be obtained by considering non-involutive components
(e.g. with Fantomas). Combined with a highly regular design, with all
operations operating on well-aligned 8-bit data, we believe this evalua-
tion supports the conclusion that LS-designs are promising ciphers for
side-channel resistance.
Besides, we also found that LS-designs are very efficient on desktop
CPUs with large SIMD units, at least for unprotected implementations.
Taking the example of Fantomas in counter mode, we can evaluate sev-
eral inputs in parallel and use the full width of SIMD units. Let us
describe in more details an implementation using SSSE3 instructions
with 128-bit registers. We will compute 16 instances of Fantomas in
parallel (with 16 different plaintexts), using 16 SSE registers, every reg-
ister containing one byte from each copy of Fantomas (8 registers for
the high order bytes, and 8 other registers the low order bytes). The
S-box layers compute two sets of 128 S-boxes in parallel, using 128-bit
wide bitwise operations; this takes 96 instructions. For the L-box layer,
we use the pshufb instruction as a 4-bit to 8-bit look-up table. The
16-bit L-box is decomposed as eight 4-bit to 8-bit look-up tables and
6 XORs;3 our implementation requires 280 instructions to compute 16
parallel linear layers (i.e. 128 16-bit L-boxes). With these figures, our
implementation of Fantomas runs at 6.3 cycles/byte (for long messages)
2LED and PRESENT have the same number of non-linear gates, but encrypt only
64-bit. So we do not expect them to bring improvements in our masked setting.
3This can be reduced to seven table look-ups for Robin, thanks to the L-box
structure.
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Figure 8.3: Encryption time for a 128-bit block in an Atmel At-
Mega644p.
on a Core i7 CPU (Nehalem micro-architecture). Thanks to the pshufb
instruction, the L-box layer is not subject to cache timing attacks.
As a point of comparison, the bitsliced AES implementation of Ka¨s-
per and Schwabe [100] would take respectively 326 and 102 cycles for
the same number of S-boxes and linear layers (the full AES takes 6.9
cycles/byte on the same CPU – this is the faster known implementa-
tion of AES of this CPU). On the one hand our S-box is much easier
to implement in a bitslice way than the AES S-box, since it was one
of our design goals. On the other hand, our linear-layer is optimized
for a table-based implementation, and more complex than the AES one.
It can still be implemented rather efficiently, but it becomes the dom-
inant factor in this implementation. This shows that LS-designs can
reach performances comparable to the AES on high-end CPUs, exclud-
ing implementations using hardware AES instructions. We also expect
reasonable performances on Atom or ARM Cortex-A CPUs, which are
used in some embedded systems and include a good vector engine with
a permutation instruction (SSSE3 and NEON, respectively). Moreover,
the latest Intel CPUs support 256-bit wide SIMD operation using AVX2
operations; we expect that this will give even better performances.4
4At the time of writing we haven’t had access to an AVX2-enabled CPU yet, and
the 256-bit version of pshufb is not available in the first version of AVX.
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Table 8.3: Implementation results with a parallel mode for long mes-
sages.
Fantomas Robin AES
wo AES-NI [100] wAES-NI
ARM Cortex A15 14.2 18.1 17.8 N/A
Atom 33.3 43.5 17 N/A
Core i7 Nehalem 6.3 8.1 6.9 N/A
Core i7 Ivy Bridge 4.2 5.5 5.4 1.3
8.5 Cryptanalysis
Robin has a weak keys set of density 2−32 [117]. These weak keys are due
to an invariant subspace that takes advantage of the involutive nature
of its components together with weak round constants. Actually, the
involutive components help finding self-similarities that allow invariant
subspaces.
Several ideas to fix the attack are presented in [96]. Mainly, adding
a key schedule could break the self-similarities, but this can be costly
and does not fit with the simplicity of design that motivated LS-design.
Another solution is to change the components of Robin L-box, S-box
or round constants. These modifications can remove the invariant sub-
spaces if the components are well chosen.
8.6 Conclusion
This chapter introduces LS-designs as an interesting family of secure and
efficient block ciphers, with good properties for masked implementations.
Since their instantiation mainly depends on the selection of good S-
and L-boxes, a natural scope for further research is to find better such
components, in particular for large bit-sizes (e.g. 8-bit and more for S-
boxes, 32-bit and more for L-boxes). Improvements in these lines would
directly lead to more optimized ciphers.
Besides, our current investigations mainly considered software im-
plementations. But the efficient gate-level representation of Fantomas
makes its potentially suitable for hardware implementations as well. As
a result, it would be interesting to study their threshold implementations
and compare the resulting performances with other algorithms that are
efficient in this setting, such as NOEKEON again [141] or more recent
designs like FIDES [23].

Part IV
Leakage resilience

Chapter 9
Masking and Leakage-Resilient
Primitives: One, the Other(s) or
Both?
In this chapter, we provide a comprehensive study about tradeoff be-
tween security and efficiency of masking and leakage resilient construc-
tion. For this purpose, we analyze whether cryptographic implemen-
tations can be security-bounded in the sense that the time complexity
of the best side-channel attack is lower-bounded, independently of the
number of measurements performed. Doing so, we first show that the
stateful leakage-resilient PRG in Figure 2.11 naturally leads to such se-
curity bounded implementations [56]. By contrast, this guarantee is
harder to reach with (stateless) leakage-resilient PRFs such as in Fig-
ure 2.12 [78]. The tweaked construction proposed in [133] (that takes
advantage of hardware parallelism) is in fact the only security-bounded
PRF we found in our experiments. Next, we put forward that better se-
curity at lower cost is obtained by using the leakage-resilient PRG alone
(i.e. without masking), while masking alone is the most efficient solution
to improve the security of stateless primitives whenever the implementa-
tions cannot be security-bounded. Therefore, our results underline that
both masking and leakage-resilient primitives can be useful ingredients
in the design of physically secure designs. However they also lead to the
counterintuitive observation that sometimes (in fact, frequently), these
solutions are better used separately, hence contradicting the usual in-
tuition that security against side-channel attacks is best obtained via a
combination of countermeasures.
Admittedly, these results are only obtained for a set of side-channel
attacks that are representative of the state-of-the-art. Hence, positive
observations such as made for the tweaked construction in [133] are
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not proven: they only indicate that the cryptanalysis of such schemes
may be hard with current knowledge. In the same lines, the differences
between leakage-resilient PRGs and PRFs do not contradict their proofs:
they only indicate that the (crucial) assumption of bounded leakage can
imply different challenges for hardware designers. Hence, instantiating
these primitives with the same AES implementation can lead to different
security levels.
9.1 Methodology & limitations
The main goal of this chapter is to provide sound techniques to eval-
uate how leakage-resilient PRGs/PRFs and masking combine. In this
section, we provide a brief description of the methodology we will use
for this purpose, and underline its limitations. The main two com-
ponents, namely performance and security evaluations, are detailed in
Sections 9.2 and 9.3, and then combined in Section 9.4. Our proposal
essentially holds in five steps that we detail below.
1. Fix the target security level. In the following, we will take the
AES Rijndael with 128-bit key as case study. Since a small se-
curity degradation due to side-channel attacks is unavoidable, we
will consider 120-bit, 100-bit and 80-bit target security levels for
illustration. We do not go below 80-bit keys since it typically
corresponds to current short-term security levels [160].
2. Choose an implementation. Given a cryptographic algorithm, this
essentially corresponds to the selection of a technology and possi-
bly a set of countermeasures to incorporate in the designs to evalu-
ate. In the following, we will consider both software and hardware
implementations for illustration, since they lead to significantly
different performance and security levels. As for countermeasures,
different types of masking schemes will be considered.
3. Evaluate performances / extract a cost function. Given an im-
plementation, different metrics can be selected for this purpose
(such as code size, RAM, or cycle count in software and area,
frequency, throughput or power consumption in hardware). Both
for software and hardware implementations, we will use combined
functions, namely the “code size × cycle count” product and the
“area / throughput” ratio. While our methodology would be per-
fectly applicable to other choices of metrics, we believe they are
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an interesting starting point to capture the efficiency of our dif-
ferent implementations. In particular for the hardware cases, such
metrics are less dependent on the serial vs. parallel nature of the
target architectures (see [103], Section 2).
4. Evaluate security / extract the maximum number of measurements.
This central part of our analysis first requires to select the attacks
from which we will evaluate security. In the following, we will
consider the “standard DPA attacks” described in [124] for this
purpose. Furthermore, we will investigate them in the profiled
setting of template attacks (i.e. assuming that the adversary can
build a precise model for the leakage function) [38]. This choice is
motivated by the goal of approaching worst-case evaluations [178].
Based on these attacks, we will estimate the security graphs in-
troduced in [187], i.e. compute the adversaries’ success rates in
function of their time complexity and number of measurements.
From a given security level (e.g. 120-bit time complexity), we will
finally extract the maximum number of measurements per key tol-
erated, as can be bounded by the PRG construction.1
5. Compute a global cost metric (possibly with an application con-
straint). In case of security-bounded implementations, the pre-
vious security evaluation can be used to estimate how frequently
we have to “re-key” within a leakage-resilient construction. From
this estimate, we derive the average number of AES encryptions to
execute per 128-bit output. By multiplying this number with the
cost function of our performance evaluations, we obtain a global
metric for the implementation of an AES-based design ensuring
a given security level. In case of security-unbounded implemen-
tations, re-keying is not sufficient to maintain the target security
level independent of the number of measurements performed by
the adversary. So the cost functions have to be combined with an
application constraint, stating the maximum number of measure-
ments that can be tolerated to maintain this security level.
Quite naturally, such a methodology is limited in the same way as
any performance and security evaluation. From the performance point-
of-view, our investigations only apply to a representative subset of the
(large) set of AES designs published in the literature. We paid attention
to state-of-the-art implementations and countermeasures, but applying
1Not the PRF which, as previously mentioned, can only bound the data complex-
ity.
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our methodology to more examples is naturally feasible (and desirable).
A very similar statement holds for security evaluations. Namely, we
considered standard DPA attacks as a starting point, and because they
typically correspond to the state-of-the-art in research and evaluation
laboratories. Yet, cryptanalytic progresses can always appear.2 Besides,
countermeasures such as masking may rely on physical assumptions that
are difficult to compare rigorously (since highly technology-dependent),
as will be detailed next with the case of “glitches”.
Note that these limitations are, to a large extent, inherent to the
problem we tackle, and our results also correspond to the best we can
hope in this respect. Hence, more than the practical conclusions that we
draw in the following sections (that are of course important for current
engineers willing to implement physically secure designs), it is the fact
that we are able to compare the performance vs. security tradeoffs
corresponding to the combination of leakage-resilient constructions with
masking that is the most important contribution of this work. Indeed,
these comparisons depend on the state-of-the-art implementations and
attacks that are considered to be relevant for the selected algorithm.
9.2 Performance evaluations
In this section, we provide our performance evaluations for unprotected
and masked AES designs. As previously mentioned, we will consider
both software and hardware examples for this purpose. In this context,
the main challenge is to find implementations that are (reasonably) com-
parable. This turned out to be relatively easy in the software case, for
which we selected a couple of implementations in 8-bit microcontrollers,
i.e. typical targets for side-channel analysis. By contrast, finding imple-
mentations in the same technology turns out to be more challenging in
hardware: transistor sizes have evolved from (more than) 130µm to (less
than) 65ηm over the last 15 years (i.e. the period over which most coun-
termeasures against side-channel attacks have been proposed). Hence,
published performance evaluations for side-channel protected designs are
rarely comparable. Yet, we could find several designs in a recent FPGA
technology, namely the Xilinx Virtex-5 devices (that are based on a
65ηm process).
The performances of the implementations we will analyze are sum-
marized in Table 9.1. As previously mentioned, our software cost func-
tion is the frequently considered “code size × cycle count” metric, while
2For example, the algebraic side-channel attacks introduced in [163, 164], while
somewhat unrealistic for now, would certainly lead to different security levels.
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we use the “area/throughput” ratio in the hardware (FPGA) case. As
for the countermeasures evaluated, we first focused on the higher-order
masking scheme proposed by Rivain and Prouff at CHES 2010, which can
be considered as the state-of-the-art in software [169]. We then added
the CHES 2011 polynomial masking scheme of Prouff and Roche [156]
(and its implementation in [85]), as a typical example of “glitch-resistant”
solution relying on secret sharing and multiparty computation (see the
discussion in the next paragraph). A similar variety of countermea-
sures is proposed in hardware, where we also consider an efficient, but
glitch-sensitive implementation proposed in [162], and a threshold AES
implementation that is one of the most promising solutions to deal with
glitches in this case [136]. Note that this latter implementation is based
on an 8-bit architecture (rather than a 128-bit one for the others). So
although our cost function is aimed at making comparisons between
different architectures that are more reflective of the performances of
algorithms and countermeasures, more serial implementations than this
one generally pay a small overhead due to their more complex control
logic.
Physical assumptions and glitches. As explicitly represented in
Table 9.1, countermeasures against side-channel attacks always rely on
a number of physical assumptions. In the case of masking, a central
one is that the leakage of the shares manipulated by the target im-
plementation should be independent of each other [94]. Glitches, that
are transient signals appearing during the computations in certain (e.g.
CMOS) implementations, are a typical physical default that can cause
this assumption to fail, as first put forward by Mangard et al. in [125].
Two possible solutions exist to deal with such physical defaults: either
by making it explicit to cryptographic engineers that they have to pre-
vent glitches at the physical level, or by designing countermeasures that
can cope with glitches.
Interestingly, the first solution is one aspect where hardware and
software implementations significantly differ. Namely, while it is usually
possible to ensure independent leakages in masked software, by ensuring
a sufficient time separation between the manipulation of the shares, it
is extremely difficult to avoid glitches in hardware [126]. Yet, even in
hardware the “glitch signal” is generally expected to be more difficult
to exploit by adversaries, especially if designers pay attention to this
issue [135]. In this context, the main question is to determine the am-
plitude of this signal: if sufficiently reduced in front of the measurement
noise, it may turn out that a glitch-sensitive masked implementation
leads to improved security levels (compared to an unprotected one).
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Since this amplitude is highly technology-dependent, we will use it as a
parameter to analyze the security of our hardware implementations in
the next sections. Yet, we recall that it is a safe practice to focus on
glitch-resistant implementations when it comes to hardware. Besides, we
note that glitches are not the only physical default that may cause the
independent leakage assumption to be contradicted in practice [151, 165].
9.3 Security evaluations
We now move to the core of our analysis, namely the security evaluation
of different implementations. For this purpose, we first need to discuss
the type of security evaluation we will conduct, which can be viewed as
a tradeoff between generality and informativeness. That is, one ideally
wants to reach general conclusions in the sense that they are independent
of the underlying device technology. A typical solution for this purpose
is to evaluate the “security order” of a countermeasure, as defined by
Coron et al. [44]. Evaluating the order is interesting because under the
independent leakage assumption mentioned in the last section, it can be
done based on the mathematical description of a countermeasure only.
Of course, the informativeness of such an abstract evaluation is limited
since (1) it indeed does not allow testing whether the independent leak-
age assumption is fulfilled, and (2) even if this assumption is fulfilled,
there is no strict correspondance between the security order and the se-
curity level of an implementation (e.g. measured with a probability of
success corresponding to some bounded complexities). This is because,
already for masking (i.e. the countermeasure that aims at increasing
the security order), and even if independent leakages are observed in
practice, the actual complexity of a side-channel attack highly depends
on the amount of noise in the measurements. And of course, some
countermeasures simply do not aim at increasing the security order, e.g.
shuﬄing [91].
One appealing way to mitigate the second issue is to perform so-
called “simulated attacks”. This essentially requires modeling the leak-
age corresponding to different sensitive operations in an idealized im-
plementation. For example, a usual approximation is to consider that
all the intermediate values during a cryptographic computation (such
as the S-boxes inputs and outputs for a block cipher) leak the sum of
their Hamming weight and a Gaussian distributed noise [123]. It is
then possible to accurately estimate the evaluation metrics proposed
in [178] (i.e. mutual information, success rate, guessing entropy) from
these mathematically generated leakages. Furthermore, we can use the
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noise variance as a security parameter and analyze its impact on the
time and data complexity of successful attacks. Quite naturally, such
an alternative still does not solve the first issue (i.e. the independent
leakage assumption), for which the only possibility is to evaluate the
real measurements of an actual implementation, in a given technology.
This latter solution is admittedly the most informative, but also the
least general, and is quite intensive for comparison purposes (since it
requires us to have access to source codes, target devices and measure-
ment setups for all the designs to evaluate). Interestingly, it has been
shown that simulated attacks can be quite close to real ones in the con-
text of standard DPA and masking [182]. So since our goal is to show
that there exist realistic scenarios where leakage-resilient PRGs/PRFs
and masking are useful ingredients to reach a given security level at the
lowest cost, we will use this type of evaluations in the following.
Note finally that performing simulated attacks could not be replaced
by computing explicit formulae for the success rate such as, e.g. [67, 168].
Indeed, these formulae only predict subkey (typically key bytes) recov-
eries while we consider security graphs for full 128-bit master keys. Be-
side, they are only applicable to unprotected devices so far, and hardly
capture masked implementations and the effect of key-dependent algo-
rithmic noise as we will consider next.
9.3.1 Evaluation setups
We will consider two types of setups in our evaluations: one for software,
one for hardware. As illustrated in Figure 9.1 in the case of a Boolean-
masked S-box implementation with two shares, the main difference is
that the software performs all the operations sequentially, while the
hardware performs them in parallel. We will further assume that the
leakage of parallel operations is summed [147]. As previously mentioned,
we will illustrate our analyses with a Hamming weight leakage function.
Additionally, we will consider a noise variance of 10, corresponding to
a Signal-to-Noise Ratio of 0.2 (as defined in [121]).3 This is a typical
value, both for software implementations [62] and FPGA measurement
boards [101].
Let us denote the AES S-box as S, a byte of plaintext and key as xi
and ki (respectively), the random shares used in masking as r
j
i (before
the S-box) and mji (after the S-box), the Hamming weight function as
HW, and Gaussian-distributed noise random variables N ji . From these
3The SNR corresponds to ratio between the signal variance (that equals 2 for the
Hamming weights of uniformly distributed 8-bit values) and the noise variance.
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Figure 9.1: Simulated leaking implementations. Left: software, right:
hardware.
notations, we can specify the list of all our target implementations as
summarized in Table 9.2.
A couple of observations are worth being underlined as we now discuss.
First, and as already mentioned, the main difference between soft-
ware and hardware implementations is the number of exploitable leak-
age samples: there is a single such sample per plaintext in hardware
while there are 16× (Nm + 1) ones in software (with Nm the number of
masks). Next, we only considered glitches in hardware (since it is gen-
erally possible to ensure independent leakage in software, by ensuring a
sufficient time separation between the manipulation of the shares). We
assumed that “first-order glitches” can appear in our Boolean-masked
FPGA implementation, and modeled the impact of the mask as an addi-
tive binomial noise in this case. We further assumed that the amplitude
of this first-order signal was reduced according to a factor f . This fac-
tor corresponds to the parameter used to quantify the amplitude of the
glitches mentioned in the previous section. Note that this modeling
is sound because the complexity of a first-order DPA only depends on
the value of its SNR (which is equivalent to correlation and informa-
tion theoretic metrics in this case, as proved in [124]). So even leakage
functions deviating from the Hamming weight abstraction would lead to
similar trends. Since the threshold implementation in [136] guarantees
the absence of first-order glitches, we only analyzed the possibility of
second-order glitches for this one, and modeled them in the same way as
just described (i.e. by considering the second mask M2i as an additive
binomial noise, and reducing the amplitude of the second-order signal by
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a factor f). Third, the chosen-plaintext construction of [133] is only ap-
plicable in hardware. Furthermore, we only evaluated its impact for the
unprotected implementation, and the 1-mask Boolean one with glitches.
As will become clear in the next section, this is because the data com-
plexity bound to 256 (that is the maximum tolerated by design in this
case) is only relevant when successful side-channel attacks occur for such
small complexities (which was only observed for implementations with
first-order signal).
For convenience, we denoted each implementation in our experiments
with three letters. The first one corresponds to the type of scenario con-
sidered, i.e. with Known (K) or carefully Chosen (C) plaintexts. The
second one indicates whether we are in a Software (S) or Hardware (H)
case study. The third one corresponds to the type of countermeasure
selected, i.e. Unprotected (U), 1- or 2-mask Boolean (B1, B2), 1-mask
Polynomial (P1) and 2-mask threshold (T2). The additional star sig-
nals finally reflect the presence of (first-order or second-order) glitches.
For example, KHB∗1 is an AES design protected with a 1-mask Boolean
scheme, implemented in an imperfect hardware leading to first-order
glitches, and analyzed in the context of known (uniform) plaintexts.
9.3.2 Template attacks and security graphs
Given the leakage functions defined in Table 9.2, a template attack first
requires building a leakage model. In the following, and for each byte of
the AES master key, we will consider Gaussian templates for unprotected
implementations, and Gaussian mixtures for masked implementations.
Note that in these models, all the noise (including the algorithmic one in
hardware implementations) is captured by the Gaussian distribution.4
We denote the number of measurements by q. Next and for each target
implementation, we will repeat 100 experiments. And for each value of
q in these experiments, we use a rank estimation algorithm to evaluate
the time complexity needed to recover the full AES master key [187].
Eventually, we will build “security graphs” where the probability of suc-
cess of the attack is provided in function of a time complexity and a
number of measurements.
Iterative DPA against constructions with carefully chosen plain-
texts. Note that while standard DPA attacks are adequate to an-
4While algorithmic noise is generated with a binomial distribution in our exper-
iments (as mentioned in the previous subsections), it is closely approximated by a
normal one, since combined with enough (simulated) physical noise that is Gaussian.
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alyze the security of unprotected and masked implementations in a
known-plaintext scenario, their divide-and-conquer strategy hardly ap-
plies to the PRF in [133], with carefully-chosen plaintexts leading to
key-dependent algorithmic noise. This is because the (maximum 256)
constants cj used in this proposal are such that all 16 bytes are always
identical. Hence, a standard DPA will provide a single list of probabil-
ities, containing information about the 16 AES key bytes at once. In
this case, we additionally considered the iterative DPA described in this
previous reference, which essentially works by successively removing the
algorithmic noise generated by the best-rated key bytes. While such
an attack can only work under the assumption that the adversary has
an very precise leakage model in hand, we use it as a representative of
worst-case attack against such a construction.
9.3.3 Experimental results
The security graphs are given in Figures 9.2 to 9.9 where we additionally
provide the maximum number of measurements tolerated to maintain
security levels corresponding to 2120, 2100 and 280 time complexity. Note
that in the aforementioned case of iterative DPA (Figure 9.9), the ad-
versary recovers the AES key bytes but still has to find their position
within the AES state, which (roughly) corresponds to 16! ≈ 244 possi-
bilities [16].
Figure 9.2: DPA-based security graphs for KHB1.
9.4 Security vs. performance tradeoffs
We now combine the results in the previous sections to answer our main
question. Namely, what is the best way to exploit masking and/or
leakage-resilient primitives to resist standard DPA in hardware and soft-
ware implementations?
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Figure 9.3: DPA-based security graphs for KSU (left) and KSB1 (right).
Figure 9.4: DPA-based security graphs for KSB2 (left) and KSP1 (right).
Figure 9.5: DPA-based security graphs for KHU (left) and CHU (right).
Figure 9.6: DPA-based security graphs for KHB1 (left) and KHB
∗
1/f = 1
(right).
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Figure 9.7: DPA-based security graphs for CHB∗1/f=1 (left) and KHT2
(right).
Figure 9.8: DPA-based security graphs for KHT∗2/f=1 (left) and repeat-
ing attacks (right).
Figure 9.9: Iterative DPA-based security graphs for CHU (left) and
CHB∗1/f = 1 (right).
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9.4.1 Leakage-resilient PRGs
Let M be the maximum number of measurements tolerated to maintain
a given security level for one of the implementations in section 9.3. The
re-keying in leakage-resilient PRGs is such that this number M is exactly
the one to be limited by design (i.e. the value N in Figure 2.11 bounds
M for the adversary), hence directly leading to security-bounded imple-
mentations. The global cost metric we use in this case can be written
as MM−1× cost function, where the first factor corresponds to the aver-
age number of AES encryptions that are used to produce each 128-bit
output string, and the second one is the cost function of Table 9.1.
A comparison of different leakage-resilient PRG implementations in
software (i.e. based on different unprotected and protected AES imple-
mentations) is given in Figures 9.10, 9.11. The main observation in this
context is that the straightforward implementation of the PRG with an
unprotected AES design is the most efficient solution. This is mainly
because moving from the smallest M value (i.e. M = 2, as imposed by
the 120-bit security level in the unprotected case - see Figure 9.3-left) to
large ones (e.g. M > 1000 for masked implementations) can only lead
to a gain factor of 2 for the global cost metric, which is not justified in
view of the performance overheads due to the masking. For a similar
reason (i.e. the limited interest of increasing M), the global cost metric
is essentially independent of the target security level in the figure. In
other words, there is little interest in decreasing this security level since
it leads to poor performance improvements.
Figure 9.10: LR-PRGs in software. 80-bit (left) and 100-bit (right)
security.
The hardware implementations, Figures 9.12, 9.13 lead to essentially
similar intuitions, as also witnessed by the limited impact of decreasing
the amplitude of the glitch signal with the f factor (see the KHB∗1 and
KHT∗2 implementations for which f = 10 in the latter figures).
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Figure 9.11: LR-PRGs in software. 120-bit security.
Figure 9.12: LR-PRGs in hardware. 80-bit (left) and 100-bit (right)
security
Figure 9.13: LR-PRGs in hardware. 120-bit (right) security.
9.4.2 Leakage-resilient PRFs
Security-unbounded implementations.
Let us now consider (stateless) leakage-resilient PRFs. As already men-
tioned, those constructions only bound the adversary’s data complexity.
The main observation in this case is that if random plaintexts are con-
sidered, such implementations can only be security-unbounded (with
the slight cautionary note that we give below). This fact can be easily
explained when the PRF is instantiated with an unprotected software
implementation of the AES. What happens then is that the adversary
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can repeat his measurements to get rid of the physical noise, and con-
sequently move from the security graph of Figure 9.3-left to Figure 9.8-
right. Such a “repeating” attack is exactly the one already mentioned
in [133] to argue that bounded data complexity is not enough to bound
(computational) security. In fact, it similarly applies to masked imple-
mentations. The only difference is that the adversary will not average
his measurements, but rather combine them. This is because, given
a leakage function (e.g. the Hamming weight one that leads to 9 dis-
tinguishable events) the distribution of the measurements in a masked
implementation will lead to the same number of distinguishable events:
the only difference is that more sampling will be necessary to distinguish
them (see the appendices in [183] for a plot of these distributions). So
if the number of measurements is not bounded, attacks with low time
complexities as in Figure 9.8 right part will always exist.
One important consequence is that using the PRF construction in
this context is essentially useless for all the AES implementations we
consider in this chapter. The only way to maintain a target security
level for such stateless primitives is to limit the number of measure-
ments by putting a constraint on the lifetime of the system. And this
lifetime will be selected according to the maximum number of measure-
ments tolerated that can be extracted from our security graphs, which
now highly depends on the countermeasure selected. In other words,
we can only evaluate the cost function and the security level attained
independently in this case, as illustrated in Figures 9.14, 9.15 for our
software instances. Here, we naturally come back to the standard result
that Boolean (resp. polynomial) masking increases security at the cost
of performance overheads that are roughly quadratic (resp. cubic) in the
number of shares. Note that the security level of the 1-mask polynomial
scheme is higher than the 2-mask Boolean one for the noise variance
we consider, which is consistent with the previous work of Roche and
Prouff [170].
Similar conclusions are obtained with hardware implementations,
Figures 9.16, 9.17, for which the impact of glitches is now clearly visible.
For example, a factor f = 10 essentially multiplies the number of mea-
surements by f for the Boolean masking with first-order glitches, and
f2 for the threshold implementation with second-order glitches.
Cautionary note. The statement that stateless leakage-resilient PRFs
can only be security unbounded if known plaintexts are considered es-
sentially relates to the fact that repeated measurements allow removing
the effect of the noise and the masks in a leaking implementation. Yet,
this claim should be slightly mitigated in the case of algorithmic noise
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Figure 9.14: LR-PRFs in software with KP. 80-bit (left) and 100-bit
(right) security.
Figure 9.15: LR-PRFs in software with KP. 120-bit security.
in hardware implementations. Indeed, this part of the noise can only be
averaged up to the data complexity bound that is imposed by the PRF
design. Taking the example of our hardware implementations where
all 16 S-boxes are manipulated in parallel, the SNR corresponding to
algorithmic noise can be computed as the ratio between the variance
of a uniformly distributed 8-bit values’s Hamming weight (i.e. 2) and
the variance of 15 such values (i.e. 30). Averaging this noise over M
plaintexts will lead to SNRs of 115/M , which is already larger than 17
if M = 256 (i.e. a noise level for which the security graph will be ex-
tremely close to the worst case one of Figure 9.8-right). So although
there is a “gray area” where a leakage-resilient PRF implemented in
hardware can be (weakly) security-bounded, these contexts are of quite
limited interest because this will imply bounds on the data complexity
that are below 256, i.e. they lead anyway to less efficient solutions than
the tweaked construction that we investigate in the next subsection.
Security-bounded implementations. As just discussed, stateless
primitives hardly lead to security bounded implementations if physical
and algorithmic noise can be averaged - which is straightforwardly fea-
sible in a known plaintext scenario. The tweaked construction in [133]
aims at avoiding such a weakness by preventing the averaging of the
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Figure 9.16: LR-PRFs in hardware with KP. 80-bit (left) and 100-bit
(right) security.
Figure 9.17: LR-PRFs in hardware with KP. 120-bit security.
algorithmic noise, thanks to the combined effect of hardware parallelism
and carefully chosen plaintexts leading to key-dependencies in this noise.
Since only the physical noise can be averaged in this case, the bounded
data complexity is guaranteed by the leakage-resilient PRF and conse-
quently leads to security-bounded implementations again. This is illus-
trated both by the standard DPAs (such as in Figures 9.5-right and 9.7-
left) and the iterative attacks (such as Figure 9.8) that can be performed
against this PRF.5As in Section 9.4.1, we extracted the maximum data
complexity D from these graphs, and produced as global cost metric:⌈
128
blog2(D)c
⌉
× cost function,
where the first factor corresponds to the (rounded) average number of
AES encryptions needed to produce a 128-bit output, and the second
one is the cost function of Table 9.1. A comparison of our different
leakage-resilient PRFs instantiated with a hardware implementation of
the AES and chosen plaintexts is given in Figure 9.18. Here again, we
5As previously mentioned, an additional 16! ≈ 244 time complexity is implied in
the iterative DPA attacks, corresponding to the enumeration of a permutation over
the 16 AES key bytes that is necessary to test each key candidate.
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observe that the most efficient solution is to consider an unprotected
design. Interestingly, we also observe that for the unprotected AES, the
iterative attack is the worst case for the 80-bit security level (where it
forces the re-keying after 97 plaintexts vs. 256 for the standard DPA),
while the standard DPA is the worst-case for the 120-bit security level
(where it forces the re-keying after 10 plaintexts vs. 37 for the iterative
attack). This nicely fits the intuition that iterative attacks become more
powerful as the data complexity increases, i.e. when the additional time
complexity corresponding to the enumeration of a permutation over 16
bytes becomes small compared to the time complexity required to re-
cover the 16 AES key bytes (unordered).
Figure 9.18: LR-PRFs in hardware with CP. 80-bit (left) and 120-bit
(right) security.
9.5 Conclusion
The results in this work essentially show that masking and leakage-
resilient constructions hardly combine constructively. For (stateful)
PRGs, our experiments indicate that both for software and hardware
implementations, a leakage-resilient design instantiated with an unpro-
tected AES is the most efficient solution to reach any given security
level. For stateless PRFs, they rather show that a bounded data com-
plexity guarantee is (mostly) ineffective in bounding the (computational)
complexity of the best attacks. So implementing masking and limit-
ing the lifetime of the cryptographic implementation is the best solu-
tion in this case. Nevertheless, the chosen-plaintext tweak proposed
in [133] is an interesting exception to this conclusion, as it leads to
security-bounded hardware implementations for stateless primitives that
are particularly interesting from an application point-of-view, e.g. for
re-synchronization, challenge-response protocols, . . . Beyond the further
analysis of such constructions, their extension to software implementa-
tions is an interesting scope for further research. In this respect, the
combination of a chosen-plaintext leakage-resilient PRF with the shuf-
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fling countermeasure in [188] seems promising, as it could “emulate” the
key-dependent algorithmic noise ensuring security bounds in hardware.

Chapter 10
Combining Leakage-Resilient PRFs
and Shuﬄing
In this chapter, we investigate whether bounded security can be obtained
for software implementations, by combining the CHES 2012 tweaked
PRF with the shuﬄing countermeasure. We next denote this proposal
as the Shuﬄed PRF (SPRF) construction. The main motivation be-
hind such a proposal is that key-dependent algorithmic noise can be
produced by the parallel manipulation of carefully chosen plaintexts
p = (b, b, . . . , b). Hence, since the impact of a shuﬄing is (under cer-
tain conditions) to emulate the noise of large parallel implementations
within the constraints of small embedded devices, this combination could
be effective. For this purpose, we first describe a framework allowing us
to analyze the security of SPRF implementations against standard DPA
attacks [124]. We put forward that it depends on two main parame-
ters: first, the amount of direct leakage on the S-box computations and
permutation used for shuﬄing; second, the amount of indirect leakage,
essentially due to the fact that the power consumed to compute several
S-boxes may depend on the resource used and execution time. We then
show that one type of indirect leakage (namely, different resources leak-
ing differently at the same time sample) is beneficial to the adversary,
while the other type (namely, the same resource leaking differently at
different time samples) is detrimental. This suggests simple guidelines
for cryptographic hardware designers willing to improve the security of
SPRFs. We finally apply our results to the challenging case-study of
an 8-bit microcontroller, and show that security-bounded implementa-
tions can be obtained under actual (direct and indirect) leakages. To
the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that such a positive re-
sult has been obtained for a small embedded device. Furthermore, and
compared to the hardware construction in [133], our software scheme
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has the additional advantage that all operations (i.e. the key additions
and S-boxes, but also MixColumns and the key scheduling) are shuf-
fled with a 16-permutation. This mitigates possible weaknesses due to
adversaries targeting one out of four MixColumns, hence reducing the
key-dependent algorithmic noise.
10.1 Evaluation framework
10.1.1 Efficiency
We compare the efficiency of the SPRF and the state of the art masking
scheme on the atmel microcontroller. Results are given in Table 10.1.
Table 10.1: SPRF performances compared to Boolean masking.
Implementation Cycles count ×103
First-order Masking [169] 129
Second-order Masking [169] 271
Third-order Masking [169] 470
SPRF (double indexing) [188] 788
SPRF (rand. exec. path) [188] 252
Note that the implementations with double indexing and randomized
execution path from [188] that we re-use in the following paid attention
to shuﬄe all the AES operations with a 16-permutation. For this pur-
pose, MixColumns is implemented in sets of 16 independent instructions
based on xtime operations and three dummy key schedulings are inter-
leaved with the real one (since the AES key scheduling only has four
independent operations).
10.1.2 Security
In order to analyze the security of SPRF implementations, we will use
the standard DPA attacks defined in [124]. Furthermore, as our goal is
to approach worst-case evaluations, we will consider the profiled setting
of template attacks [38], and quantify their complexity with the security
graphs described in [187].
Since the SPRF construction essentially relies on a shuﬄed AES
design, the main challenge for our following investigations is to effi-
ciently exploit the leakages of such implementations. In particular, and
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as previously discussed in [188] this requires combining information ob-
tained from the permuted operations in a meaningful way. As usual in
side-channel attacks, we will target the first-round S-boxes and consider
different (more or less ideal) models for this purpose.
Starting with the simplest situation, we can assume that all the S-
boxes leak in the same manner (as in [133]), e.g. according to a Hamming
weight function. This provides the adversary with 16-element vectors
defined as:
Lu = [HW(S(x0 ⊕ k0)) +N0, . . . ,HW(S(x15 ⊕ k15)) +N15],
in the unprotected case, with Ni a Gaussian-distributed random noise
with variance σ2n. Moving to a shuﬄed implementation, the vector be-
comes:
Ls = [HW(S(xp(0) ⊕ kp(0))) +N0, . . . ,HW(S(xp(15) ⊕ kp(15))) +N15],
with p the permutation used in the shuﬄing. Eventually, the SPRF
construction will additionally force the same single value for all bytes,
that is:
Lsprf = [HW(S(x⊕ kp(0))) +N0, . . . ,HW(S(x⊕ kp(15))) +N15].
For each target implementation in the next section we will repeat
100 experiments and for each value q in these experiments, use the rank
estimation in [187] to evaluate the time complexity needed to recover the
full AES master key. Eventually, we will build security graphs, where the
attack probability of success is provided in function of a time complexity
and number of measurements.
Incorporating indirect leakages.
In shuﬄed implementations, one important observation made in [188] is
the existence of indirect leakages on the permutation p, due to the fact
that the different physical resources used to execute the S-boxes may
leak according to various models. In order to capture this possibility in
our simulations, we will define a family of linear leakage functions as:
Lr(x) =
7∑
i=0
air · x(i),
where the air are random coefficient within some interval (see next).
These different leakage functions are directly reflected in the leakage
vector as follows:
Lrsprf = [Lp(0)(S(x⊕ kp(0))) +N0, . . . , Lp(15)(S(x⊕ kp(15))) +N15].
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Intuitively, such resource-based indirect leakages break the assumption
that all the S-boxes leak similarly, and help the adversary to know at
which time instant a target S-box is executed. How strong are indirect
leakages depends on the correlation between the models for different
resources. In [133], FPGA experiments suggest that this correlation can
rate between strong (i.e. 0.99 for S-boxes implemented in RAM) and
weaker (i.e. 0.68 for combinatorial S-boxes).
Interestingly, we will show in the following that for SPRFs, the detri-
mental effect of leakage functions depending on the resource used is
moderated by the fact that these functions may also depend on the
time instant when they are executed (e.g. because of the pipeline state
of a software implementation). We incorporate this possibility in our
simulations with the following definition:
Lr,t(x) =
7∑
i=0
air,t · x(i),
which directly leads to the leakage vectors of the form:
Lr+tsprf = [Lp(0),0(S(x⊕ kp(0))) +N0, . . . , Lp(15),15(S(x⊕ kp(15))) +N15].
Incorporating direct leakages.
Quite naturally, indirect leakages are not the only information that can
be obtained about the permutation used for shuﬄing. If this permuta-
tion is generated on-chip, an informed adversary may also take advan-
tage of a direct permutation leakage vector. In this context, the fact that
the leakage functions depend on the resource used or time of execution
has no impact on security. So we illustrate it with a Hamming weight
function:
L′ = [HW(p(0)) +N0, . . . ,HW(p(15)) +N15].
Note however that direct permutation leakages can be avoided in certain
cases, e.g. by randomizing the program memory as can be achieved (as-
suming a secure precomputation phase) within the recent FRAM tech-
nology [104].
10.2 Simulated experiments
Simulated experiments are convenient tools to evaluate implementations
in different (more or less realistic) settings and to test the impact of
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different parameters on their security level. In the following, the first
parameter we will play with is the amount of noise in the leakage vectors
defined in the previous section. The amount of noise is characterized by
the variance of the noise variables Ni. In order to make its reading
more intuitive, we will relate this noise level with the Signal-to-Noise
Ratio (SNR), defined as the quotient between the variance of the mean
leakage traces (aka signal) and the noise variance [121]. For Hamming
weight leakages on 8-bit values, this signal equals 2 and we considered
two noise levels for illustration: a weak one corresponding to σ2n = 0.1,
SNR= 20 and a stronger one corresponding to σ2n = 10, SNR= 0.2.
Based on these parameters, we first study the ideal case with no direct
permutation leakage and all S-boxes leaking identically.
10.2.1 Ideal setting (identical S-box leakages, no direct
perm. leakage)
In this case, the adversary is only provided with the leakage vector
Lsprf and the only attack she can mount is a template one with uniform
prior. As expected, the construction is security-bounded. That is, after
a transient period, the time complexity of the template attack saturates
and becomes independent of the number of measurements. The impact
of the noise parameter is clearly exhibited on Figure 10.1, where a higher
noise level (i.e. 10 vs. 0.1) ensures a higher security bound (i.e. 285 vs.
260) that is also reached for a larger number of measurements (i.e. 1000
vs. 100). Note that these results improve even the ones of Medwed et
al. [133] for hardware implementations since a higher noise only implied
a later saturation of the bound in this case (i.e. had no impact on the
value of the bound).
Figure 10.1: Template attacks with uniform prior in the ideal scenario
where all S-boxes leak identically. Left: low noise level (σ2 = 0.1).
Right: high noise level (σ2 = 10).
154 Chapter 10. Combining Leakage-Resilient PRFs and Shuﬄing
10.2.2 Adding indirect resource-based leakages
Now we move towards a more realistic scenario with indirect leakages
due to the use of different resources in the implementation, helping the
adversary to distinguish between the different S-boxes. That is, she can
use the leakage vector Lrsprf . Note that in this case, the only possibil-
ity remains to perform a template attack with uniform prior. But the
probabilities Pr[Lt = lt|Ks = k] now depend on the byte index s = p(t).
This indirect information is directly obtained during profiling, so the
attack methodology remains identical. As a result, the main additional
parameter is the “similarity” of the leakage functions Lr(.) for different
r’s. For illustration, we will consider a high (average) correlation (of
ρr = 0.99) and a smaller one (of ρr = 0.75). We picked up the leakage
functions (more precisely, their coefficients air) randomly for our experi-
ments, under the additional constraint that the signal was constant and
set to 2, in order for the noise levels to have a similar meaning as in our
previous Hamming weight based simulations. The results in Figure 10.2
clearly exhibit the weaknesses of the simulated SPRF implementations
when the noise level is low and S-box leakages differ too significantly
(e.g. for ρr = 0.75 in the left part of the figure) – they are not security-
bounded anymore. Additional simulations performed at the higher noise
level (σ2n = 10) are provided in Figure 10.3, and suggest that increasing
the noise level is a simple way to preserve a security bound.
Figure 10.2: Template attacks with uniform prior and indirect resource-
based leakages, in the low noise scenario (i.e. σ2n = 0.1). Left: ρr = 0.75.
Right: ρr = 0.99.
10.2.3 Mitigating resource-based leakages with time-based
ones
We now consider the possibility to reduce the previous indirect informa-
tion by making the leakage functions not only dependent on the resource
used, but also on the time instant when they are executed. Intuitively,
such dependencies are expected to make the exploitation of resource-
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Figure 10.3: Template attacks with uniform prior and indirect resource-
based leakages, in the high noise scenario (i.e. σ2n = 10). Left: ρr = 0.75.
Right: ρr = 0.99.
based indirect leakages more difficult, by introducing some additional
confusion between them due to the (useless for the adversary) time de-
pendencies. In order to illustrate their impact, we stick with the most
challenging scenario in the previous subsection, with low noise (σ2n = 0.1)
and low similarity between the resources ρr = 0.75. We additionally con-
sider weak and strong time-dependencies (with ρt = 0.99 and ρt = 0.75
for the leakage functions Lr,t(.), respectively). As illustrated in Fig-
ure 10.4, these time-dependencies indeed provide an efficient alternative
way to reach security-bounded SPRF implementations, with lower noise
levels (the same figure is provided for the high noise level in Figure 10.5.
Figure 10.4: Template attacks with uniform prior and indirect
time+resource-based leakages (ρr=0.75), in the low noise scenario (i.e.
σ2n=0.1). Left: ρt=0.99. Right: ρt=0.75.
Note that in this setting, the adversary has to estimate 16 × 16
templates, each of them corresponding to 256 intermediate values, which
is quite a time-consuming task. Simplifying this profiling may result in
a loss of informations.
10.2.4 Direct permutation leakage
Eventually and for completeness, we add the direct permutation leak-
age vector and consider an adversary who can exploit Lr+tsprf and L
′.
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Figure 10.5: Template attacks with uniform prior and indirect
time+resource-based leakages (ρr=0.75), in the high noise scenario (i.e.
σ2n=10). Left: ρt=0.99. Right: ρt=0.75.
This context is investigated in [188]: it requires an adversary perform-
ing a template attack with non-uniform prior and considers f(t, s, l′) =
Pr[L′t = l′t|Kt = Kt], where Kt is the part of the master key that is
manipulated at time instant t. As in this previous work, we see that
its impact on security is limited when the shuﬄing is based on random
permutations – yet, they allow converging faster towards the bound.
Figure 10.6: Template attacks with direct and indirect (time+resource-
based) leakages (ρr=0.75), in the low noise scenario (i.e. σ
2
n=0.1). Left:
ρt=0.99. Right: ρt=0.75.
10.3 Practical experiments
The previous section suggests that SPRF implementations are promising
candidates for designing security-bounded implementations in low-cost
devices. Moreover it puts forward that designers have two main param-
eters to increase their security level: the noise (as usual) and the time-
vs. resource-based indirect leakages. In the latter case, we have strong
incentive to design shuﬄed operations that only slightly depend on the
resource used, and more significantly on their execution time. It natu-
rally raises the question whether such designs exist in practice. In this
respect, an interesting reference is the work on collision attacks in [75]:
it shows that different implementations of the AES (e.g. always re-using
the same registers or not) make the leakage models correspond to differ-
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ent operations more or less similar (hence, more or less realistic collision
attacks). Now we provide an experimental case study based on an imple-
mentation of the SPRF construction in an Atmel AVR microcontroller.
First we investigate the time- and resource-based dependencies in a shuf-
fled AES implemented with double indexing and randomized execution
path, then exhibit security evaluations based on these concrete values,
and finally discuss scopes for further research.
In order to characterize the time- and resource-dependencies of the
leakage models in our target AVR implementation, we build accurate
templates for each S-box and time instant. As previously mentioned,
this implies computing 16× 16 sets of 256 templates – for each of them,
we used 50,000 traces. Unfortunately, we rapidly found out that, both
for the randomized execution path and the double indexing implemen-
tations, the time dependencies were small (i.e. with average values of
ρˆt ≈ 0.99). By contrast, we could observe the quite strong resource-
dependencies illustrated in Figure 10.7. Interestingly, we also noticed
significant differences between the two approaches to shuﬄing. Namely,
the double indexing implementation exhibits larger average values of
ρˆr ≈ 0.86, compared to ρˆr ≈ 0.5 for the randomized execution path
one. This intuitively matches the expectations for these two designs,
since the first one is based on the repeated exploitation of a single reg-
ister, while the randomized execution path inherently requires traveling
through the different resources of the target device. In view of the perfor-
mances listed in Table 10.1, this leads to a clear security vs. performance
tradeoff.
Figure 10.7: Correlation between resources. Left: rand. exec. path.
Right: double indexing.
We then launched experiments against these two implementations
(with and without exploiting direct permutation leakages). In order to
exhibit the impact of indirect leakages, we first analyzed an intermediate
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scenario, where the template mean values follow exactly the patterns of
our target device, but we arranged the noise levels of all the leakage
samples so that their SNR was fixed to a constant value. As expected
and illustrated in Figures 10.8 and 10.9, the implementation based on
double indexing allows a better security bound in this case.
Figure 10.8: Template attacks against the randomized execution path
implementation (ρˆr=0.5, ρˆt=0.99, SNR=2). Left: with direct leakages.
Right: without direct leakages.
Figure 10.9: Template attacks against the double indexing implemen-
tation (ρˆr=0.86, ρˆt=0.84, SNR=2). Left: with direct leakages. Right:
without direct leakages.
We then considered the leakage samples with their actual noise level,
as measured experimentally. It turned out (see Figures 10.10 and 10.11)
that for the exploited samples, the SNR of the double indexing imple-
mentation was larger, hence canceling its advantage over the randomized
execution path implementation. The exact reason of this observation is
hard to state with confidence (we assume the additional memory ma-
nipulation of intermediate values in the double indexing implementation
may be in cause). But this last experiment confirms the subtle depen-
dencies between our two parameters on the concrete security level of an
implementation. Since the leakage models are admittedly hard to con-
trol in cryptographic devices, this suggests that ensuring a large enough
noise level may be the most reliable way to ensure large enough security
levels in practice.
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Figure 10.10: Template attacks against the rand. execution path imple-
mentation (ρˆr=0.5, ρˆt=0.99, variable SNR). Left: with direct leakages.
Right: without direct leakages.
Figure 10.11: Template attacks against the double indexing implemen-
tation (ρˆr=0.86, ρˆt=0.84, variable SNR). Left: with direct leakages.
Right: without direct leakages.
Discussion.
The previous results are worth a few words of interpretation as we now
detail. First, from a pragmatic complexity point-of-view, the values of
the security bounds obtained may not be sufficient (as the enumeration
of up to 250 keys is reachable by determined adversaries and improved
attacks and measurement strategies can probably be deployed). Yet, the
very fact of being security-bounded is already a significant improvement
compared to most state-of-the-art countermeasures (e.g. the combina-
tion of masking and shuﬄing). Combined with the simulated results
in the previous section, showing that it is possible to improve these
bounds with higher noise or less informative indirect leakages, we be-
lieve this section confirms that SPRFs lead to an interesting family of
protected implementations, that are certainly worth further investiga-
tion. In particular, we conjecture that combining it with a commercial
security chip (including some hardware countermeasures) could already
lead to much better concrete results. Furthermore, the best exploita-
tion of time-dependent resource leakages is a nice research scope as well.
In this respect, it is worth mentioning that the constructive investiga-
tion of the similarities between leakage models as we envision here is
different (more demanding) than the destructive one in collisions at-
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tacks. That is, while a single sample showing good similarity is enough
for these attacks to succeed, we need to guarantee that all of them are
similar (for resource-based indirect leakages) or different (for time-based
indirect leakages) – which also raises interesting characterization chal-
lenges. Eventually, and as for the previous (hardware) construction of
CHES 2012, we recall that our current security analyses are based on
first-round leakages. While we believe this is a natural first step for
understanding these constructions, investigating whether (more compu-
tationally intensive) attacks against the inner block cipher rounds could
be more damaging remains an important research topic.
Chapter 11
Conclusion and Perspectives
Obtaining embedded security in the side-channel model is quite chal-
lenging. In this thesis, we aimed at improving the security and the
efficiency of side-channel countermeasures. We looked at four different
directions that can be synthesized by the following questions.
1. How efficient can masked software implementations of the AES
be?
2. Is the modeling of the leakage functions used for masking proofs
good enough?
3. Can some (secure) ciphers be masked at a cheaper cost than the
AES?
4. Can we achieve a side-channel security that is dependent on com-
putational power of the adversary and not on the number of traces?
The results obtained are briefly summarized in this chapter. They
left some open problems and directions that we succinctly discuss.
Masking of the AES
In Chapter 3, we focused on two families that achieve different security
goals. The first family corresponds to the masking schemes secure in
the probing model, i.e. in which the adversary has only access to the
intermediate values. For example, Boolean masking schemes [94, 169]
belong to this family. The second family corresponds to the masking
schemes secure in the presence of glitches, i.e. in which leakages can
depend on several shares. Polynomial masking [55, 170] and threshold
implementations [140] belong to this family. We evaluated the efficiency
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of state of the art higher-order masking schemes of these two families for
the AES. The implementations are performed on an Atmel microcon-
troller. We showed that the polynomial masking is more expensive than
masking schemes of the first family, both in terms of randomness and of
computational time. To reduce this gap, we tried to take advantage of
some techniques used in the MPC literature. Firstly, we used another
multiplication [51] with a smaller cost. We then used the technique of
“packed secret sharing” [70]. Both techniques allowed us to reduce the
efficiency gap. In particular, the combination of both techniques allowed
us to obtain a quasi-linear complexity of the polynomial masking scheme
in function of the security order. Unfortunately, for security orders used
in practice, the efficiency gap remains large.
Regarding these results, we can see that having efficient masking
schemes secure in the presence of glitches is an interesting direction of
work. So far two techniques exist to obtain masked implementations
secure in the presence of glitches. The first technique is the threshold
implementations which are limited to first and second-orders [24, 166].
One possible direction is to generalize threshold implementations at
higher-order. The second technique is based on Shamir’s secret shar-
ing [55, 170]. Using different secret sharings could improve the efficiency
of glitch-free higher order implementations. For example, in the MPC
literature, the use of somewhat homomorphic encryption is suggested in
order to take advantage of a preprocessing phase to reduce the complex-
ity [54].
In chapter 3, we also saw that a difference of efficiency exists be-
tween masking schemes secure in the probing model. The switch be-
tween Boolean and multiplicative masking schemes [73] that exploit the
structure of the AES is more efficient than generic masking schemes
based on polynomial representation of the S-box and of secure multipli-
cations [169, 105]. To reduce the cost of generic methods, we looked in
Chapter 4 at how to combine efficiently different multiplications from [45,
169]. This led to a more efficient representation of the AES S-box.
Regarding this work, a new secure multiplication method with a
lower cost can always improve the efficiency of the computations of the S-
box. Another possible improvement is the quantity of randomness used
by techniques based on polynomial representation of the S-box. Random
generation is omitted in the comparison. Obtaining a representation
with limited number of sharing’s refreshment could be an improvement
for masked implementations. The representation of cipher over F2 can
be a direction since in such a representation, the refreshment phases are
not required.
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Proof assumption errors
In Chapter 5, we focused on the security of low entropy masking sche-
mes [20, 35, 120, 138]. The idea is to use a smaller set of mask values
than the full set. As a result, less randomness is required. Low entropy
masking schemes proofs assume that the leakage functions are linear.
We evaluated the security of such constructions when this hypothesis is
not fulfilled. In this case, we showed that the security of the low entropy
masking schemes is not guaranteed anymore. Hence, it seems risky to
use such a technique to reduce the randomness requirement.
In chapter 6, we focused on the assumption of the independence
of the shares’ leakages. This assumption can be proved defective in
hardware with glitches [125], or in software with memory transitions [42].
We analyzed if security can be obtained in the presence of memory
transitions. We showed that proofs achieved in the value-based probing
model (where independence of the shares’ leakages is assumed) can be
translated in the transition-based probing model at the cost of a division
by 2 of the security order.
Regarding this result, obtaining an easy and automated technique
to counter the problem of memory transitions can validate an impor-
tant line of research trying to exploit compilers to replace the manual
insertion of countermeasures by expert developers [13, 15, 137, 161].
Better results than the division by 2 of the security order could be ob-
tained when the leakage functions are specified. Another option could
be to use refreshment of registers and buses (which can be costly in
terms of effort). Finally, changing the order of operations can protect
against memory transition. This is suggested in [13]. They verified this
technique by using formal verification tools. Although this can be an
interesting solution, it has not been confirmed by experiments on mea-
surements.
Block cipher design
In Part III, we explored the possibility of improving masked implemen-
tations thanks to block ciphers that are easier-to-mask. The S-box layers
are the most expensive parts in masked implementations. We first tried
to build easier to mask S-boxes as suggested in [149]. In Chapter 7,
we focused on S-boxes for Boolean and polynomial masking. In Chap-
ter 8, we specified the search of S-boxes for Boolean masking and took
advantage of representation over F2. Then, we also tried to reduce the
number of S-boxes executed. This can be achieved when strong diffusion
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layers are available. In Chapter 7, we looked at SPN block ciphers with
partial substitution layer. In Chapter 8, we looked at more conservative
diffusion layers which have a large branch number. The block ciphers
presented in the two chapters have efficient masked implementations
compared to the AES masked implementations.
Regarding these results, the idea of partial substitution layer was
later used to design ciphers efficient for MPC [5]. Unfortunately, both
ciphers with partial substitution layer (from Chapter 7 and [5]) have
exhibited weaknesses due to this partial substitution layer [11, 58, 117].
Recently, an algorithm has been presented to study the linear and dif-
ferential properties of ciphers with partial substitution layer [11]. This
paper left open the possibility of using a partial substitution layer and
obtaining a secure cipher. Besides, for bitslice ciphers, the Boolean
masked implementations are efficient (which is proven secure in the
probing model). Efficient representation of such ciphers for masking
implementations in presence of glitches is more difficult. Finding an ef-
ficient way to perform bitwise AND in a secure manner in the presence
of glitches can be a real plus for bitslice ciphers. Another direction is the
construction of larger diffusion layers or of S-boxes for bitslice ciphers.
For the moment, their constructions remain heuristic. Thus, alternative
approaches can lead to more efficient ciphers. This direction is explored
in [96].
Leakage resilience
In chapter 9, we considered in the trade-off between the security and the
efficiency obtained by using masking, re-keying and their combination.
Our first comparison was for a stateful construction. The stateful con-
struction is based on the PRG construction that uses a block cipher in
counter mode [56]. In that case, the adversary can observe a bounded
number of measurements. Hence, she obtains a bounded amount of in-
formation. Combination of this PRG and masking reduces the amount
of information leaked, but lead to higher cost and limited security im-
provements. In conclusion, if the bounds wished are not too high, the
most efficient construction is to use re-keying alone. The second compar-
ison was for stateless construction. It is based on the PRF construction
using block cipher to build a tree for derivate keys [78]. In that case, the
number of plaintexts is limited and not the number of measurements.
Hence, the adversary can average the noise. As a consequence, bounded
security cannot be achieved and masking is an interesting (only) solution
to force the adversary to perform more measurements. The tweak for
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hardware PRF [133] that adds algorithmic noise can achieve bounded
security when considering leakages that combine information on all the
subkeys at the same time. In chapter 10, we analyzed its transposition
to software by combining the tweaked PRF with shuﬄing [188]. In that
case, some bounded security can be achieved, but leakage functions on
the different subkeys are required to be similar.
Regarding these results, we see that obtaining bounded security for
PRF is difficult. Fresh re-keying [2, 131, 132] could be a possible solution
for this problem. It allows to derivate a session key that is then used to
perform the cryptographic operations

Chapter A
Other Contributions
A.1 Side-channel security evaluations
Rank estimation is an important tool for side-channel evaluations lab-
oratories. It allows determining the remaining security after an attack
has been performed, quantified as the time complexity required to brute
force the key given the leakages.
A.1.1 Comparing approaches
In this paper, we first clarify the connections between these solutions, by
organizing them according to their (maximum likelihood or weak maxi-
mum likelihood) strategy and to whether they take as argument a side-
channel distinguishers’ output or some evaluation metrics. This leads us
to introduce new combinations of these approaches, and to discuss the
use of weak maximum likelihood strategies for suboptimal but highly
parallel enumeration. Next, we show that the different approaches to
rank estimation can also be implemented with different mixes of very
similar tools (e.g. histograms, convolutions, combinations and subsam-
pling). Eventually, we provide various experiments allowing us to discuss
the pros and cons of these different approaches, hence consolidating the
literature on this topic.
A.1.2 New rank estimation
In this paper, we propose a new tool for rank estimation that is concep-
tually simpler and much more efficient than the first instance of rank
estimation proposed at Eurocrypt 2013. It allows approximating the
key rank of (128-bit, 256-bit) symmetric keys with very tight bounds
(i.e. with less than one bit of error), almost instantaneously and with
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limited memory. It also scales nicely to larger (e.g. 1024-bit) key sizes,
for which the previous algorithm was hardly applicable.
A.2 ASCA, SASCA and DPA with enumera-
tion: which one beats the other and when?
ASCA, SASCA and DPA with Enumeration:
Which One Beats the Other and When?
Vincent Grosso, Franc¸ois-Xavier Standaert.
ICTEAM/ELEN/Crypto Group, Universite´ catholique de Louvain, Belgium.
Abstract. We describe three contributions regarding the Soft Analyti-
cal Side-Channel Attacks (SASCA) introduced at Asiacrypt 2014. First,
we compare them with Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks (ASCA) in a
noise-free simulated setting. We observe that SASCA allow more efficient
key recoveries than ASCA, even in this context (favorable to the latter).
Second, we describe the first working experiments of SASCA against an
actual AES implementation. Doing so, we analyse their profiling require-
ments, put forward the significant gains they provide over profiled Dif-
ferential Power Analysis (DPA) in terms of number of traces needed for
key recoveries, and discuss the specificities of such concrete attacks com-
pared to simulated ones. Third, we evaluate the distance between SASCA
and DPA enhanced with computational power to perform enumeration,
and show that the gap between both attacks can be quite reduced in
this case. Therefore, our results bring interesting feedback for evalua-
tion laboratories. They suggest that in several relevant scenarios (e.g.
attacks exploiting many known plaintexts), taking a small margin over
the security level indicated by standard DPA with enumeration should
be sufficient to prevent more elaborate attacks such as SASCA. By con-
trast, SASCA may remain the only option in more extreme scenarios (e.g.
attacks with unknown plaintexts/ciphertexts or against leakage-resilient
primitives). We conclude by recalling the algorithmic dependency of the
latter attacks, and therefore that our conclusions are specific to the AES.
1 Introduction
State-of-the-art. Strategies to exploit side-channel leakages can be classified as
Divide and Conquer (DC) and analytical. In the first case, the adversary recovers
information about different bytes of (e.g.) a block cipher key independently, and
then combines this information, e.g. via enumeration [36]. In the second case,
she rather tries to recover the full key at once, exploiting more algorithmic
approaches to cryptanalysis with leakage. Rephrasing Banciu et al., one can see
these different strategies as a tradeoff between pragmatism and elegance [2].
In brief, the “DC+enumeration” approach is pragmatic, i.e. it is easy to
implement, requires little knowledge about the target implementation, and can
take advantage of a variety of popular (profiled and non-profiled) distinguishers,
such as Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) [6], Mutual Information Analysis
(MIA) [14], Linear Regression (LR) [34] or Template Attacks (TA) [8]. We will
use the term Differential Power Analysis (DPA) to denote them all [22].
By contrast, analytical approaches are (more) elegant, since they theoreti-
cally exploit all the information leaked by an implementation (vs. the leakages
of the first and/or last rounds independently for DC attacks). As a result, these
attacks can (theoretically) succeed in conditions where the number of measure-
ments available to the adversary is very limited. But this elegance (and the
power that comes with it) usually implies stronger assumptions on the target
implementation (e.g. most of them require some type of profiling). The Algebraic
Side-Channel Attacks (ASCA) described in [30] and further analyzed in [7, 32]
are an extreme solution in this direction. In this case, the target block cipher
and its leakages are represented as a set of equations that are then solved (e.g.
with a SAT solver, or Groebner bases). This typically implies a weak resistance
to the noise that is usually observed in side-channel measurements. As a result,
various heuristics have been suggested to better deal with errors in the infor-
mation leakages, such as [24, 39]. The Tolerant Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks
(TASCA) proposed in [25, 26] made one additional step in this direction, by re-
placing the solvers used in ASCA by an optimizer. But they were limited by their
high memory complexity (since they essentially deal with noise by exhaustively
encoding the errors they may cause). More recently, two independent proposals
suggested to design a dedicated solver specialized to byte-oriented ciphers such
as the AES [16, 27]. The latter ones were more efficient and based on smart
heuristics exploiting enumeration. Eventually, Soft Analytical Side-Channel At-
tacks (SASCA) were introduced at Asiacrypt 2014 as a conceptually different
way to exploit side-channel leakages analytically [38]. Namely, rather than en-
coding them as equations, SASCA describe an implementation and its leakages
as a code, that one can efficiently decode using the Belief Propagation (BP)
algorithm. As a result, they can directly exploit the (soft) information provided
by profiled side-channel attacks (such as LR or TA), in an efficient manner, with
limited memory complexity, and for multiple plaintexts. Concretely, this implies
that they provide a natural bridge between DC attacks and analytical ones.
Our contribution. In view of this state-of-the-art, we consider three open
problems regarding DC and analytical strategies in side-channel analysis.
First, we observe that the recent work in [38] experimented SASCA in the
context of noisy AES leakages. While this context allowed showing that SASCA
are indeed applicable in environments where ASCA would fail, it leaves the
question whether this comes at the cost of a lower efficiency in a noise-free
context open. Therefore, we launched various experiments with noise-free AES
leakages to compare ASCA and SASCA. These experiments allowed us to confirm
that also in this context, SASCA are equally (even slightly more) efficient.
Second, the experiments in [38] exploited simulations in order to exhibit
the strong noise-resilience of SASCA (since the amount of noise can then be
used as a parameter of such simulations). But this naturally eludes the question
of the profiling of a concrete device, which can be a challenging task, and for
which the leakage functions of different target intermediate values may turn out
to be quite different [13]. Therefore, we describe the first working experiments
of SASCA against an actual AES implementation, for which a bivariate TA ex-
ploiting the S-box input/output leakages would typically be successful after more
than 50 measurements. We further consider two cases for the adversary’s knowl-
edge about the implementation. In the first one, she has a precise description
in hand (i.e. the assembly code, typically). In the second one, she only knows
AES is running, and therefore only exploits the generic operations that one can
assume from the algorithm specification.1 Our experiments confirm that SASCA
are applicable in a simple profiled scenario, and lead to successful key recoveries
with less traces than a DC attack (by an approximate factor up to 5). They
also allow us to discuss the profiling cost, and the consequences of the different
leakage functions in our target implementation. A relevant observation regarding
them is that weak leakages in the MixColumns operations are especially damag-
ing for the adversary, which can be explained by the (factor) graph describing an
AES implementation: indeed, XORing two values with limited information sig-
nificantly reduces the information propagation of the BP algorithm execution.
This suggest interesting research directions for preventing such attacks, since
protecting the linear parts of a block cipher is usually easier/cheaper.
Third, we note that SASCA are in general more computationally intensive
than DC attacks. Therefore, a fair comparison should allow some enumeration
power to the DC attacks as well. We complement our previous experimental
attacks by considering this last scenario. That is, we compare the success rate
of SASCA with the ones of DC attacks exploiting a computational power corre-
sponding to up to 230 encryptions (which corresponds to more than the execu-
tion time of SASCA on our computing platform). Our results put forward that
SASCA remain the most powerful attack in this case, but with a lower gain.
Summary. These contributions allow answering the question of our title. First,
SASCA are in general preferable to ASCA, with both noise-free and noisy AES
leakages. Second, the tradeoff between SASCA and DC attacks is more balanced.
As previously mentioned, DC attacks are more pragmatic. So the interest of
SASCA essentially depends on the success rate gains it provides, which itself
depends on the scenarios. If multiple plaintexts/ciphertext pairs are available,
our experiments suggest that the gain of SASCA over DPA with enumeration is
somewhat limited, and may not justify such an elegant approach. This conclusion
backs up the results in [2], but in a more general scenario, since we consider
multiple-queries attacks rather than single-query ones, together with more a
powerful analytical strategy. By contrast, if plaintexts/ciphertexts are unknown
(which renders DPA [17] and enumeration more challenging to apply), or if the
number of plaintexts one can observe is very limited (e.g. by design, due to a
leakage-resilient primitive [10]), SASCA may be the best/only option.
Preliminary remark. Our focus in this paper is on a couple of extreme ap-
proaches to side-channel analysis, i.e. the most pragmatic DC attacks against
8-bit targets of the first AES round, and the most elegant ASCA/SASCA ex-
1 Admittedly, such a generic scenario still assumes that the target implementation
closely follows the specifications given in [11] which may not always be the case, e.g.
for bitslice implementations [29], or T-table based implementations [9].
ploiting most/all such targets in the implementation. Quite naturally, the other
analytical attacks mentioned in this introduction would provide various trade-
offs between these extremes. Besides, more computationally-intensive DPA at-
tacks (based on larger key hypotheses) are also possible, as recently discussed by
Mather et al. [23]. Such attacks are complementary and may further reduce the
gain of SASCA over DPA, possibly at the cost of increased computational re-
quirements (e.g. the latter work exploited high-performance computing whereas
all our experiments were carried out on a single desktop computer).
2 Background
In this section we first describe the measurement setup used in our experiments.
Then, we describe two tools we used to identify and evaluate information leakages
in the traces. Finally, we recall the basics of the different attacks we compare.
2.1 Measurement setup
Our measurements are based on the open source AES FURIOUS implementation
(http://point-at-infinity.org/avraes) run by an 8-bit Atmel ATMEGA644p mi-
crocontroller at a 20 MHz clock frequency. We monitored the power consumption
across a 22Ω resistor. Acquisitions were performed using a Lecroy WaveRun-
ner HRO 66 ZI providing 8-bit samples, running at 400 Msamples/second. For
SASCA, we can exploit any intermediate values that appear during the AES
computation. Hence, we measured the full encryption. Our traces are composed
of 94 000 points, containing the key scheduling and encryption rounds. Our pro-
filing is based on 256 000 traces corresponding to random plaintexts and keys.
As a result, we expect around 1 000 traces for each value of each intermediate
computation. We use lin,x for the value x of the n
th intermediate value in the ith
leakage trace, and lin,x(t) when we access at the t
th point (sample) of this trace.
2.2 Information detection tools
Since SASCA can exploit many target intermediate values, we need to identify
the time samples that contain information about them in our traces, next referred
to as Points Of Interest (POI). We recall two simple methods for this purpose,
and denote the POI of the nth intermediate value in our traces with tn.
(a) Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) [6] is a standard side-channel distin-
guisher that estimates the correlation between the measured leakages and some
key-dependent model for a target intermediate value. In its standard version,
an a-priori (here, Hamming weight) model is used for this purpose. In practice,
this estimation is performed by sampling (i.e. measuring) traces from a leakage
variable L and a model variable Mk, using Pearson’s correlation coefficient:
ρk(L,Mk) =
Eˆ[(L− µˆL)(Mk − µˆMk)]√
vˆar(L)vˆar(Mk)
·
In this equation, Eˆ and vˆar respectively denote the sample mean and variance
operators, and µˆL is the sample mean of the leakage distribution L. CPA is a
univariate distinguisher and therefore launched sample by sample.
(b) The Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) [21] of the nth intermediate value
at the time sample t can be defined according to Mangard’s formula [21]:
SNRn(t) =
vˆarx
(
Eˆi
(
lin,x(t)
))
Eˆx
(
vˆari
(
lin,x(t)
)) ·
Despite connected (high SNRs imply efficient CPA if the right model is used),
these metrics allow slightly different intuitions. In particular, the SNR cannot
tell apart the input and output leakages of a bijective operation (such as an S-
box), since both intermediate values will generate useful signal. This separation
can be achieved by CPA thanks to its a-priori leakage predictions.
2.3 Gaussian templates attacks
Gaussian TA [8] are the most popular profiled distinguisher. They assume that
the leakages can be interpreted as the realizations of a random variable which
generates samples according a Gaussian distribution and work in two steps. In
a profiling phase, the adversary estimates a mean µˆn,x and variance σˆ
2
n,x for
each value x of the nth intermediate computation. In practice, this is done for
the time sample tn obtained thanks to the previously mentioned POI detection
tools. Next, in the attack phase and for each trace l, she can calculate the
likelihood to observe this leakage at the time tn for each x as:
Pˆr[l(tn)|x] ∼ N (µˆn,x, σˆ2n,x).
In the context of standard DPA, we typically have x = p ⊕ k, with p a known
plaintext and k the target subkey. Therefore, the adversary can easily calculate
Pˆr[k∗|p, l(tn)] using Bayes theorem, for each subkey candidate k∗:
Pˆr[k∗] =
∏
i
Pˆr[k∗|p, li(tn)].
To recover the full key, she can run a TA on each subkey independently.
By contrast, in the context of SASCA, we will directly insert the knowledge (i.e.
probabilities) about any intermediate value x in the (factor) graph describing
the implementation, and try to recover the full key at once.
Note that our SASCA experiments consider univariate Gaussian TA whereas
our comparisons with DPA also consider bivariate TA exploiting the S-box in-
put and output leakages (i.e. the typical operations that a divide-and-conquer
adversary would exploit). In the latter case, the previous means and variances
just have to be replaced by mean vectors and covariance matrices. This choice is
motivated by our focus on the exploitation of multiple intermediate AES com-
putations. It could be further combined with the exploitation of more samples
per intermediate computation, e.g. thanks to dimensionality reduction [1].
2.4 Key enumeration and rank estimation
At the end of a DC side-channel attack (as the previous TA), the attacker has
probabilities on each subkey. If the master key is not the most probable one,
she can perform enumeration up to some threshold thanks to enumeration al-
gorithms, e.g. [36]. This threshold depends on the computational power of the
adversary, since enumerating all keys is computationally impossible. If the key is
beyond the threshold of computationally feasible enumeration, and in order to
gain intuition about the computational security remaining after an attack, key
rank estimation algorithms can be used [15, 37]. A key rank estimation takes in
input the list of probabilities of all subkeys and the probability of the correct
key (which is only available in an evaluation context), and returns an estimation
on the number of keys that are more likely than the actual key. Rank estima-
tion allows to approximate dth-order success rates (i.e. the probability that the
correct key lies among the d first ones rated by the attack) efficiently and quite
accurately. The security graphs introduced in [37] provide a visual representation
of higher-order success rates in function of the number attack traces.
2.5 Algebraic side-channel attacks
ASCA were introduced in [30] as one of the (if not the) first method to efficiently
exploit all the informative samples in a leakage trace. We briefly recall their three
main steps and refer to previous publications for the details.
1. Construction consists in representing the cipher as an instance of an algebraic
problem (e.g. Boolean satisfiability, Groebner bases). Because of their large mem-
ory (RAM) requirements, ASCA generally build a system corresponding to one
(or a few) traces only. For example, the SAT representation of a single AES trace
in [32] has approximatively 18 000 equations in 10 000 variables.
2. Information extraction consists in getting exploitable leakages from the mea-
surements. For ASCA, the main constraint is that actual solvers require hard
information. Therefore, this phase usually translates the result of a TA into
deterministic leakages such as the Hamming weight of the target intermediate
values. Note that the attack is (in principle) applicable with any type of lekages
given that they are sufficiently informative and error-free.
3. Solving. Eventually, the side-channel information extracted in the second
phase is added to the system of equations constructed in the first phase, and
generic solvers are launched to solve the system and recover the key. In prac-
tice, this last phase generally has large RAM requirements causing ASCA to be
limited to the exploitation of one (or two) measurement traces.
Summarizing, ASCA are powerful attacks since they can theoretically recover a
key from very few leakage traces, but this comes at the cost of low noise-resilience,
which motivated various heuristic improvements listed in introduction. The next
SASCA are a more founded solution to get rid of this limitation.
2.6 Soft analytical side-channel attacks
SASCA [38] describe the target block cipher implementation and its leakages
in a way similar to a Low-Density Parity Check code (LDPC) [12]. Since the
latter can be decoded using soft decoding algorithms, it implies that SASCA
can directly use the posterior probabilities obtained during a TA. Similar to
ASCA, they can also be described in three main steps.
1. Construction. The cipher is represented as a so-called “factor graph” with
two types of nodes and bidirectional edges. First, variable nodes represent the
intermediate values. Second, function nodes represent the a-priori knowledge
about the variables (e.g. the known plaintexts and leakages) and the operations
connecting the different variables. Those nodes are connected with bidirectional
edges that carry two types of messages (i.e. propagate the information) through
the graph: the type q message are from variables to functions and the type r
messages are from functions to variables (see [20] for more details).
2. Information extraction. The description of this phase is trivial. The probabil-
ities provided by TA on any intermediate variable of the encryption process can
be directly exploited, and added as a function node to the factor graph.
3. Decoding. Similar to LDPC codes, the factor graph is then decoded using the
BP algorithm [28]. Intuitively, it essentially iterates the local propagation of the
information about the variable nodes of the target implementation.
Since our work is mostly focused on concrete investigations of SASCA, we now
describe the BP algorithm in more details. Our description is largely inspired
by the description of [20, Chapter 26]. For this purpose, we denote by xi the i
th
intermediate value and by fi the i
th function node. As just mentioned, the nodes
will be connected by edges that carry two types of messages. The first ones go
from a variable node to a function node, and are denoted as qvn→fm . The second
ones go from a function node to a variable node, and are denoted as rfn→vm . In
both cases, n is the index of the sending node and m the index of the recipient
node. The messages carried correspond to the scores for the different values of
the variable nodes. At the beginning of the algorithm execution, the messages
from variable nodes to function nodes are initialized with no information on the
variable. That is, for all n,m and for all xn we have:
qvn→fm(xn) = 1.
The scores are then updated according to two rules (one per type of messages):
rfm→vn(xn) =
∑
xn′ ,n′ 6=n
(
fm(xn′ , xn)
∏
n′
qvn′→fm(xn′)
)
. (1)
qvn→fm(xn) =
∏
m′ 6=m
rfm′→vn(xn). (2)
In Equation 2, the variable node vn sends the product of the messages about
xn received from the others function nodes (m
′ 6= m) to the function node fm,
for each value of xn. And in Equation 1, the function node fm sends a sum over
all the possible input values of fm of the value of fm evaluated on the vector
of (xn′ , n
′ 6= n)’s, multiplied by the product of the messages received by fm for
the considered values of xn′ . The BP algorithm essentially works by iteratively
applying these rules on all nodes. If the factor graph is a tree (i.e. if it has no
loop), a convergence should occur after a number of iterations at most equal
to the diameter of the graph. In case the graph includes loops (e.g. as in our
AES implementation case), convergence is not guaranteed, but usually occurs
after a number of iterations slightly larger than the graph diameter. The main
parameters influencing the time and memory complexity of the BP algorithm are
the number of possible values for each variable (i.e. 28 in our 8-bit example) and
the number of edges. The time complexity additionally depends on the number
of inputs of the function nodes representing the block cipher operations (since
the first rule sums over all the input combinations of these operations).
3 Comparison with ASCA
ASCA and SASCA are both analytical attacks with very similar descriptions.
As previously shown in [38], SASCA have a clear advantage when only noisy
information is available. But when the information is noise-free, the advantage
of one over the other has not been studied yet. In this section, we therefore tackle
the question “which analytical attack is most efficient in noise-free scenario?”. To
this end, we compare the results of SASCA and ASCA against a simulated AES
implementation with noise-free (Hamming weight) leakages. We first describe
the AES representation we used in our SASCA (which will also be used in the
following sections), then describe the different settings we considered for our
simulated attacks, and finally provide the results of our experiments.
3.1 Our representation for SASCA
As usual in analytical attacks, our description of the AES is based on its tar-
get implementation. This allows us to easily integrate the information obtained
during its execution. For readability purposes, we start by illustrating the graph
representation for the first round of one column of the AES in Figure 1. To
build this graph for one plaintext, we start with 32 variable nodes (circles), 16
for the 8-bit subplaintexts (pi), and 16 for the 8-bit subkeys (ki). We first add
a new variable node in the graph representation each time a new intermediate
value is computed in the AES FURIOUS implementation,2 together with the
corresponding function nodes (rectangles). There are three different operations
that create intermediate values. First, the Boolean XOR takes two variables as
inputs and outputs a new variable that is equal to the bitwise XOR of the two
inputs. Next, two memory accesses to look-up tables are used for the S-box and
Xtimes operations, which take one variable as input, and create a new variable
2 Excluding memory copies which only increase the graph diameter.
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Fig. 1. Graph representation of one column of the first AES round.
as output. We finally add two types of leaf nodes to these three function nodes.
The P’s reflect the knowledge of the plaintext used, and the L’s give the posterior
probability of the value observed using Gaussian templates. A summary of the
different function nodes used in our AES factor graph is given in Table 1.
XOR(a, b, c) =
{
1 if a = b⊕ c,
0 otherwise.
SBOX(a, b) =
{
1 if a = sbox(b),
0 otherwise.
XTIMES(a, b) =
{
1 if a = xtimes(b),
0 otherwise.
P(xn) =
{
1 if xn = p,
0 otherwise.
L(xn) = Pr[xn|l(tn)].
Table 1. Summary of the function nodes used in our AES factor graph.
The graph in Figure 1 naturally extends to a full AES execution. And when
using several traces, we just keep a single description of the key scheduling, that
links different subgraphs representing the different plaintext encryptions. Our
description of the key scheduling requires 226 variable nodes and 210 function
nodes. Our description of the rounds requires 1 036 variable nodes and 1 020
function nodes. The key scheduling nodes are connected by 580 edges, and each
round of the encryption contains 292 edges. As a result and overall, the factor
graph for one plaintext contains 1 262 variable nodes, 1 230 function nodes and
3 628 edges. On the top of that we finally add the leakage function nodes which
account for up to 1 262 edges (if all leakages are exploited). Concretely, each
variable node represents an intermediate value that can take 28 different values.
Hence, if we represent each edge by two tables in single precision of size 256, the
memory required is: 256× (3 628× 2 + 1 262)× 4 bytes ≈ 8MB.3
3.2 Comparison setup
Our noise-free evaluations of ASCA and SASCA are based on single-plaintext
attacks, which is due to the high memory requirements of ASCA (that hardly
extend to more plaintexts). In order to stay comparable with the previous work
in [32], we consider a Hamming weight (WH) leakage function and specify the
location of the leakages as follows:
– 16 WH ’s for AddRoundKey,
– 16 WH ’s for the output of SubBytes and ShiftRows,
– 36 WH ’s for the XORs and 16 WH for the look-up tables in MixColumns.
As previously mentioned, these leakages are represented by L boxes in Figure 1.
We also consider two different contexts for the information extraction:
3 For the leakage nodes, messages from variable to function (qvn→fm) are not necessary.
– Consecutive weights (cw), i.e. the WH ’s are obtained for consecutive rounds.
– Random weights (rw), i.e. we assume the knowledge of WH ’s for randomly
distributed intermediate values among the 804 possible ones.
Eventually, we analyzed attacks in a Known Plaintext (KP) and Unknown Plain-
text (UP) scenario. And in all cases, we excluded the key scheduling leakages, as
in [32]. Based on these settings, we evaluated the success rate in function of the
quantity of information collected, counted in terms of “rounds of information”,
where one round corresponds to 84 WH ’s of 8-bit values.
3.3 Experimental results
The results of our SASCA with noise-free leakages are reported in Figure 2, and
compared to the similar ASCA experiments provided in Reference [32].
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Fig. 2. Experimental results of comparison of ASCA and SASCA.
We first observe that 2 consecutive rounds of WH ’s are enough to recover
the key for SASCA with the knowledge of plaintext and when the leakages are
located in the first rounds.4 Next, if we do not have access to the plaintext,
SASCA requires 3 consecutive rounds of leakage, as for ASCA. By contrast,
and as previously underlined, the solving/decoding phase is significantly more
challenging in case the leakage information is randomly distributed among the
intermediate variables. This is intuitively connected to the fact that the solver
and decoder both require to propagate information through the rounds, and
that this information can rapidly vanish in case some intermediate variables
4 We considered leakages for the two first rounds in this case, which seems more natu-
ral, and is the only minor differences with the experiments in [32], which considered
middle rounds. However, we note that by considering middle round leakages with
known plaintext, we then require three rounds of WH ’s, as for ASCA.
are unknown. The simplest example is a XOR operation within MixColumns,
as mentioned in introduction. So accumulating information on closely connected
intermediate computations is always the best approach in such analytical attacks.
This effect is of course amplified if the leakages are located in the middle rounds
and the plaintext/ciphertext are unknown, as clear from Figure 2.
Overall, and since both SAT-solvers and the BP algorithm with loops in the
factor graph are highly heuristic tools, it is of course difficult to make strong
statements about their respective leakage requirements. However, these experi-
ments confirm that at least in the relevant case-study of Hamming weight AES
leakages, the better noise-resilience of SASCA does not imply weaker perfor-
mances in a noise-free setting. Besides, and in terms of time complexity, the
attacks also differ. Namely, the resolution time for ASCA depends of the quan-
tity of information, whereas it is independent of this quantity in SASCA, and
approximately 20 times lower than the fastest resolution times for ASCA.
Note finally that moving to a noisy scenario can only be detrimental to ASCA.
Indeed, and as discussed in [26], ASCA requires correct hard information for the
key recovery to succeed. In case of noisy measurements, this can only be guar-
anteed by considering less informative classes of leakages or similar heuristics.
For example, previous works in this direction considered Hamming weights h’s
between h − d and h + d for increasing distances d’s, which rapidly makes the
attack computationally hard (and cannot be mitigated with multiple plaintext
leakages because of the high RAM requirements of ASCA). So the efficiency gain
of SASCA over ASCA generally increases with the measurement noise.
4 SASCA against a concrete AES implementation
In this section, we complete the previous simulated experiments and explore
whether SASCA can be transposed in the more realistic context of measured
leakages. To the best of our knowledge, we describe the first uses of SASCA
against a concrete AES implementation, and take advantage of this case-study
to answer several questions such as (i) how to perform the profiling of the many
target intermediate values in SASCA?, (ii) what happens when the implementa-
tion details (such as the source code) are unknown?, and (iii) are there significant
differences (or even gaps) between concrete and simulated experiments?
4.1 Profiling step
We first describe how to exploit the tools from Section 2.2 in order to detect
POIs for our 1 230 target intermediate values (which correspond to 1 262 vari-
able nodes minus 32 corresponding to the 16 bytes of plaintext and ciphertext).
In this context, directly computing the SNRs or CPAs in parallel for all our
samples turns out to be difficult. Indeed, the memory requirements to compute
the mean trace of an intermediate value with simple precision requires 94 000
(samples) × 256 (values) × 4 (bytes) ≈ 91MB, which means approximately 100
GB for the 1 230 values. For similar reasons, computing all these SNRs or CPAs
sequentially is not possible (i.e. would require too much time). So the natural
option is to trade time and memory by cutting the traces in a number of pieces
that fit in RAM. This is easily done if we can assume some knowledge about
the implementation (which we did), resulting in a relatively easy profiling step
carried out in a dozen of hours on a single desktop computer. A similar profiling
could be performed without implementation knowledge, by iteratively testing
the intermediate values that appear sequentially in an AES implementation.
A typical outcome of this profiling is given in Figure 3, where we show the
SNR we observed for the intermediate value t1 from the factor graph in Figure 1
(i.e. the value of the bitwise XOR of the first subkey and the first subplaintext).
As intuitively expected, we can identify significant leakages at three different
Fig. 3. SNR-based profiling of a single intermediate value.
times. The first one, at t = 20 779, corresponds to the computation of the value
t1, i.e. the XOR between p1 and k1. The second one, at t = 22 077, corresponds to
the computation of the value s1, i.e. a memory access to the look-up table of the
S-box. The third one, at t = 24 004, corresponds to memory copies of s1 during
the computation of MixColumns. Indeed, the SNR cannot tell apart intermediate
values that are bijectively related. So we used the CPA distinguisher to get rid
of this limitation (taking advantage of the fact that a simple Hamming weight
leakage model was applicable against our target implementation).
A summary of the results obtained after our profiling step is given in Table 2,
where the most interesting observation is that the informativeness of the leakage
samples strongly depends on the target intermediate values. In particular, we
see that memory accesses allow SNRs over 2, while XOR operations lead to
SNRs below 0.4 (and this SNR is further reduced in case of consecutive XOR
operations). This is in strong contrast, with the simulated cases (in the previous
Assembly code Graph description SNR ρ(WH)
Add Round Key
ld H1, Y+ * * *
eor ST11, H1 Xor t1 p1 k1 0.1493 0.5186
Sbox
ldi ZH, high(sbox<<1) * * *
mov ZL, ST11 * * *
lpm ST11, Z Sbox s1 t1 1.6301 0.4766
MixColumns
ldi ZH, high(xtime<<1) * * *
mov H1, ST11 * * *
eor H1, ST21 Xor h1 s1 s2 0.1261 0.6158
eor H1, ST31 Xor h2 h1 s3 0.0391 0.1449
eor H1, ST41 Xor h3 h2 s4 0.3293 0.5261
mov H2, ST11 * * *
mov H3, ST11 * * *
eor H3, ST21 Xor mc1 s1 s2 0.2802 0.6163
mov ZL, H3 * * *
lpm H3, Z Xtime xt1 mc1 2.8650 0.6199
eor ST11, H3 Xor cm1 xt1 s1 0.0723 0.2508
eor ST11, H1 Xor p17 cm1 h3 0.1064 0.3492
Key Schedule
ldi H1, 1 * * *
ldi ZH, high(sbox<<1) * * *
mov ZL, ST24 * * *
lpm H3, Z Sbox sk14 k14 2.2216 0.5553
eor ST11, H3 Xor ak1 sk14 k1 0.1158 0.5291
eor ST11, H1 XorCste k17 ak1 1 0.3435 0.5140
Table 2. Summary of profiling step results.
section and in [38]), where all the variables were assumed to leak with the same
SNR. Note that the table mentions both SNR and CPA values, though our
selection of POIs was based on the (more generic) first criteria, and CPA was
only used to separate the POIs of bijectively related intermediate values.5
4.2 Experimental results
Taking advantage of the previous POI detection, we now want to discuss the con-
sequences of different assumptions about the implementation knowledge. These
investigations are motivated by the usual gap between Kerckhoff’s laws [18],
which advises to keep the key as only secret in cryptography, and the practice
in embedded security, that usually takes advantage of some obscurity regarding
the implementations. For this purpose, we considered three adversaries:
5 We used a relatively noisy setup on purpose (e.g. we did not filter our measurements),
in order to magnify the effectiveness of SASCA in such challenging contexts.
1. Informed. The adversary has access to the implementation details (i.e. source
code), and can exploit the leakages of all the target intermediate values.
2. Informed, but excluding the key scheduling. This is the same case as the
previous one, but we exclude the key scheduling leakages as in the simulations
of the previous section (e.g. because round keys are precomputed).
3. Uninformed. Here the adversary only knows the AES is running, assumes it
is implemented following the specifications in [11], and only exploits generic
operations (i.e. the inputs and outputs of AddRoundKey, SubByte, ShiftRows
and MixColumns, together with the key rounds’ inputs and outputs).
In order to have fair comparisons, we used the same profiling for all three cases
(i.e. we just excluded some POIs for cases 2 and 3), and we used 100 sets of 30
traces with different keys and plaintexts to calculate the success rate of SASCA
in these different conditions. The results of our experiments are in Figure 4. Our
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Fig. 4. Success rate in function of the # of traces for different adversaries: informed one
( ), informed one without key scheduling leakages ( ) and uninformed one ( ).
first and main observation is that SASCA are applicable to actual implemen-
tations, for which the leakages observed provide more or less information (and
SNR) depending on the intermediate values. As expected, the informed adver-
sary is the most powerful. But we also see that excluding the key scheduling
leakages, or considering an uninformed adversary, only marginally reduces the
attack success rates. Interestingly, there is a strong correlation between this suc-
cess rate and the number of leakage samples exploited, since excluding the key
scheduling implies the removal of 226 leakage function nodes, and the uninformed
adversary has 540 leakage function nodes less than the informed one (mostly cor-
responding to the MixColumns operation). So we can conclude that SASCA are
not only a threat for highly informed adversaries, and in fact quite generically
apply to unprotected software implementations with many leaking points.
Simulation vs. measurement. In view of the previous results, with informa-
tion leakages depending on the target intermediate values, a natural question
is whether security against SASCA was reasonably predicted with a simulated
analysis. Of course, we know that in general, analytical attacks are much harder
to predict than DPA [31], and do not enjoy simple formulas for the prediction of
their success rates [22]. Yet, we would like to study informally the possible con-
nection between simple simulated analyses and concrete ones. For this purpose,
we compare the results obtained in these two cases in Figure 5. For readabil-
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Fig. 5. Experimental results for SASCA for an informed adversary (a) and unin-
formed adversary (b). Red curves are for simulated cases ( , , , ) for
SNR (21, 2−1, 2−2, 2−3). Blue curves ( ) are for experiments on real traces.
ity, we only report results for the informed and uninformed cases, and consider
different SNRs for the simulated attacks. In this context, we first recall Table 2
where the SNRs observed for our AES implementation vary between 21 and 2−2.
Interestingly, we see from Figure 5 that the experimental success rate is indeed
bounded by these extremes. (Tighter and more rigorous bounds are probably
hard to obtain for such heuristic attacks). Besides, we also observe that the
success rates of the measurements and simulations are closer in the case of the
uninformed adversary, which can be explained by the fact that we essentially
ignore MixColumns leakages in this case, for which the SNRs are lower.
5 Comparison with DPA and enumeration
In this section, we start from the observation that elegant approaches to side-
channel analysis generally require more computational power than standard
DPA. Thus, a fair comparison between both approaches should not only look at
the success rate in function of the number of traces, but also take into account
the resolution time as a parameter. As a result, and in order to compare SASCA
and the pragmatic DPA on a sound basis, this section investigates the result of
DC attacks combined with computational power for key enumeration.
5.1 Evaluation of profiled template attacks
In order to be as comparable as possible with the previous SASCA, our compar-
ison will be based on the profiled TA described in Section 2.3.6 More precisely,
we considered a quite pragmatic DC attack exploiting the bivariate leakages
corresponding to the AddRoundKey and SubByte operations (i.e. {si}16i=1 and
{ti}16i=1 in Figure 1). We can take advantage of the same detection of POIs as
described in the previous section for this purpose. This choice allows us to keep
the computational complexity of the TA itself very minimal (since relying only
on 8-bit hypotheses). As previously mentioned, it also aims to make comparison
as meaningful as possible (since we compare two attacks with one sample per
target operation that only differ by their number of target operations). Follow-
ing, we built the security graph of our bivariate TA, as represented in Figure 6,
where the white (resp. black) curve corresponds to the maximum (resp. mini-
mum) rank observed, and the red curve is for the average rank. It indicates that
approximately 60 plaintexts are required to recover the key without any enu-
meration (which is in line with Footnote 5). But more interestingly, the graph
also highlights that allowing enumeration up to ranks (e.g.) 230 allows to reduce
the required number of measured traces down to approximately 10.
Fig. 6. Security graph of a bivariate TA.
6 We considered TA for our DPA comparison because they share the same profiled
setting as SASCA. Comparisons with a non-profiled CPA can only be beneficial to
SASCA. More precisely, we expect a typical loss factor of 2 to 5 between (WH -based)
CPA and TA, according to the results in [35] obtained on the same device.
5.2 Comparing SASCA and DPA with enumeration
In our prototype implementation running on a desktop computer, SASCA re-
quires roughly one second per plaintext, and reaches a success rate of one after
20 plaintexts (for the informed adversary). In order to allow reasonably fair
comparisons, we first measured that the same desktop computer can perform
a bit more than 220 AES encryptions in 20 seconds. So this is typically the
amount of enumeration that we should grant the bivariate TA for comparisons
with SASCA.7 For completeness, we also considered the success rates of bivariate
TA without enumeration and with 230 enumeration power.8 The results of these
last experiments are in Figure 7. Overall, they bring an interesting counterpart
to our previous investigations. On the one hand, we see that SASCA remains
the most powerful attack when the adversary has enough knowledge of the im-
plementation. By contrast in the uninformed case, the gain over the pragmatic
TA with enumeration is lower. So as expected, it is really the amount and type
of leakage samples exploitable by the adversary that make SASCA more or less
powerful, and determine their interest (or lack thereof) compared to DC attacks.
In this respect, a meaningful observation is that the gap between SASCA and
DPA without enumeration (here approximately 5) is lower than the approximate
factor 10 that was observed in the previous simulations of [38]. This difference
is mainly due to the lower SNRs observed in the MixColumns transform.
Eventually, we note that in view of these results, another natural approach
would be to use enumeration for SASCA. Unfortunately, our experiments have
shown that enumeration is much less effective in the context of analytical at-
tacks. This is essentially caused by the fact that DC attacks consider key bytes
independently, whereas SASCA decode the full key at once, which implies that
the subkey probabilities are not independent in this case, and can be degraded
when running the loopy BP too long. Possible tracks to improve this issue in-
clude the use of list decoding algorithms for LDPC codes (as already mentioned
in [13]), or enumeration algorithms that can better take subkey dependencies
into account (as suggested in [19] for elliptic curve implementations).
6 Conclusion and open problems
This paper puts forward that the technicalities involved in elaborate analytical
side-channel attacks, such as the recent SASCA, are possible to solve in prac-
tice. In particular, our results show that the intensive profiling of many target
intermediate values within an implementation is achievable with the same (SNR
& CPA) tools as any profiled attack (such as the bivariate TA we considered).
7 We omit to take the (time and memory) resources required for the generation of the
list of the most probable keys to enumerate into account in our comparisons, since
these resources remain small in the total enumeration cost. Using the state-of-the-art
enumeration algorithm [36], we required 2.7MB + 0.55 seconds to generate a list of
220 keys, and 1.8GB + 3130 seconds to generate a list of 232 keys.
8 Which is also more than allowed by the new suboptimal key enumeration in [3].
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Fig. 7. Comparison between elegant and pragmatic approaches.
This profiling only requires a dozen of hours to complete, and then enables very
efficient SASCA that recover the key of our AES implementation in a couple
of seconds and traces, using a single desktop computer. Furthermore, these suc-
cessful attacks are even possible in a context where limited knowledge about the
target implementation is available, hence mitigating previous intuitions regard-
ing analytical attacks being “only theoretical”. Besides this positive conclusion,
a fair comparison with DC attacks also highlights that the gap between a bivari-
ate TA and a SASCA can be quite reduced in case enumeration power is granted
to the DC adversary, and several known plaintexts are available. Intuitively, the
important observation in this respect is that the advantage of SASCA really de-
pends on the amount and type of intermediate values leaking information, which
highly depends on the algorithms and implementations analyzed.
The latter observation suggests two interesting directions for further research.
On the one hand, the AES Rijndael is probably among the most challenging tar-
gets for SASCA. Indeed, it includes a strong linear diffusion layer, with many
XOR operations through which the information propagation is rapidly amor-
tized. Besides, it also relies on a non-trivial key scheduling, which prevents the
direct combination of information leaked from multiple rounds. So it is not im-
possible that the gap between SASCA and standard DPA could be larger for
other ciphers (e.g. with permutation based diffusion layers [4], and very mini-
mum key scheduling algorithms [5]). On the other hand, since the propagation
of the leakage information through the MixColumns operation is hard(er), one
natural solution to protect the AES against such attacks would be to enforce
good countermeasures for this part of the cipher, which would guarantee that
SASCA do not exploit more information than the one of a single round. Ideally,
and if one can prevent any information propagation beyond the cipher rounds,
we would then have a formal guarantee that SASCA is equivalent to DPA.
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